Introduction

In his now famous Imagined Communities Benedict Anderson tries to explain the special characteristics of the Latin American nations, which achieved their independence at the beginning of the nineteenth century. He calls these new republics ‘Creole Pioneers’. In this way he draws attention to the fact that the creole communities which were in the vanguard of the struggle for independence had a clearly developed sense of ‘nation-ness’ already in the late eighteenth century. They developed this sentiment well before most European countries, in spite of the restrictions on printing and literacy, essential factors in Anderson’s scheme. To explain this phenomenon, Anderson points first to the fact that each of the new Latin American republics had been an administrative unit during most of the colonial period. Although these administrative units were to a large extent arbitrary and fortuitous, over time they developed into a firmer reality. To explain how administrative units over time could be conceived as fatherlands, Anderson suggests, it is necessary to look at the ways in which administrative organizations create meaning.¹
It is important to study the construction of this feeling of nation-ness in the way Anderson proposes, but in this essay I would like to add another two elements of the nation-building process. First, Anderson’s attention is primarily geared towards the centre of nations, the administrative core where the ‘imagined community’ takes shape in the form of the press, legislation or education. Recent research has highlighted the limitations of state intervention and the multifarious ways in which local societies may ignore, manipulate or appropriate state measures and legislation. Here, it will be argued that it is also important to analyse the effects of this process in the periphery. What were its characteristics in regions where its effects were only weakly or irregularly felt?

Border regions provide an interesting place to study the relation between states and societies. Nation-states have boundaries which separate one nation from another. But these borders also connect different states. Already a long time ago, Fredrik Barth stressed the fact that identities are created above all in contact with other groups, at the boundaries of cultures. In addition, national borders are political constructs, imagined projections of territorial power. Although they appear on maps in deceptively precise forms, they reflect, at least initially, merely the mental images of politicians, lawyers and intellectuals. Their practical consequences are often quite different. Jorge Bustamante has argued that from the perspective of national centres of authority the border between countries is a sharp line, an impenetrable barrier. But from the perspective of the border, borderlands are scenes of intense interactions in which people from both sides work out everyday accommodations based on face-to-face relationships. This provides an interesting angle to study nations in their peripheries. In the words of John W. House: “There is an urgent need both for empirical and comparative studies of a dynamic nature for [border] situations, whether these involve confrontational or co-operative relationships, and for a more coherent set of theoretical frames within which to study such situations.” Borderland populations can take advantage of the proximity of two state systems. Borderlands therefore present an interesting laboratory to study the possibilities and limitations of state intervention and the logic of popular responses.

Anderson has drawn attention to the coming into existence of ‘imagined’ national communities, but his ideas may also be of interest to studies of Latin American nation-states in a period in which globalization, transnationalism and regional integration are changing their basic foundations. We may ask ourselves what has remained of these old administrative units and the meanings they have created at the threshold of the 21st century. This essay will focus on these two aspects of the development of the Latin American nation-states. Its focus will be the historical development of the Latin American border regions.
It will discuss the historical establishment of Latin American borders and their social and political significance. Then the current situation of the Latin American borders will be considered. To what extent have they been superseded by recent political, economic and cultural developments? This will enable us to look at the future of the Latin American borders, and its possible consequences for regional and national identities within the continent. The analysis presented in the following can only be provisional. Its main purpose is to stimulate new research which will shed more light on the complex dynamics of Latin American border regions.

**Borders and borderlands in Latin America**

The study of Latin American borders and borderlands has been mainly concerned with legal and geopolitical questions. In the nineteenth century many boundaries remained unclear. For instance, the entire boundary between Argentina and Chile was disputed until a successful arbitration by the United States in 1899. Even today there are still many borders in Latin America which are not completely clearly demarcated. The unclear situation of many Latin American borders has led to a steady stream of books in which the exact delimitations of borders are described, normally from the point of view of one of the contenders. These politically motivated studies have a long history which goes back to the early stages of independence, but they continue to be written by amateur historians, conservative politicians and (ex-) diplomats. From the 1960s onwards they have been complemented by more analytic studies, which tried to uncover the political and diplomatic goals behind these disputes. These studies came together in their emphasis on geopolitical differences between Latin American nations.

Geopolitics has been an important element in Latin American political history. This may partly be seen as the result of the frontier-character of most Latin American borders. The occupation of sparsely inhabited areas became an important geopolitical goals of nationalist politicians. Most geopolitical goals gradually lost importance in the course of the twentieth century. Only a small number of them, which often have to do with access to maritime resources continue to be unsolved. This applies, for instance, to the Colombian-Venezuelan dispute over the Monjes Islands, which determines control over the oil riches in the Bay of Venezuela. Similar problems continue to exist on small islands between other countries bordering on the Caribbean Gulf. Of course, the continuing quest for an outlet to the Pacific Ocean on the part of Bolivia can also be classified in this category.

Conflicting claims on borderlands have occasionally led to violent, albeit limited military confrontations between Latin American nations. Eventually
they are often solved in negotiations between diplomats, many times in international court rooms. However, these solutions were not always enough to put an end to the contesting claims and negotiations interspersed with new violence could last for many decades. The most famous example of such a situation is the conflict between Peru and Ecuador, which appeared to have been solved in 1942 in the so-called Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, but which smouldered on for many years because – as the Ecuadorians claimed – there was a large track of the border in which the Protocol was impossible to execute. In the same vein, but on a much smaller scale, the results of the negotiations between Honduras and El Salvador in the International Court of Justice in The Hague which were issued in 1992, have not been able to avoid continuing disputes and violence. Other differences refer to scarcely inhabited, but economically potential important borders. The best example of such a conflict is that between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel Islands, which have hardly any importance of themselves except that they can strengthen claims to parts of Antarctica, and, in the case of Chile, give direct access to the Atlantic Ocean.

The best-studied case is without doubt the Mexican-US border. As Robert Alvarez states: ‘The Mexican-US border is the model of border studies and borderlands genre throughout the world’. The defining characteristic of this border is the confrontation and interaction between the US, politically and economically a world power, and the ‘third-world’ society of Mexico. Stanley Ross has stressed that the Mexican-US border is ‘a region where two different civilizations face each other and overlap’. Another element which makes this border is special is its urban nature. The U.S.-Mexican borderland nowadays features some of the fastest-growing cities of the American continent. Because of its specific nature this border region will here receive only cursory treatment.

Recently, other aspects of the dynamics of Latin American borderlands has drawn attention of academic research. This is clearest in the increasing attention to transnational migration. Most of this migration was provoked by labour opportunities and the attraction of wage differentials. Some of this migration takes place over long distances, such as the Bolivian workers entering Argentina or the Haitians going to the Dominican Republic. Other migrants cross the border every day or week and in this sense become ‘binational workers’, such as happens with the Paraguayan labourers who work in Brazil and Argentina. Usually these cycles of migration are subject to changes according to the vagaries of the world market. With respect to labour migration, the US labour market has exercised a great attraction to Latin American workers. Of course, the Mexicans were the first to find their way overland to their rich northern neighbour. And they continue to do so, in spite of the increasing efforts to stop them and the militarization of the border.
Increasingly, Latin American migration is conducted by air. Rural communities in southern Ecuador have been depleted of most of their labouring men because of this kind of migration. Many of the small countries in the circum-Caribbean region have seen a large part of their working population leave for the United States and to a lesser extent to Europe. Bad human rights situations or civil war can be another cause for cross-border migration. This has been clearly visible in Central America during the 1980s and 1990s when civil war in Nicaragua and human rights abuse in El Salvador and Guatemala forced many people to hide on the other side of international borders. These large flows of people which have been crossing national borders have created what may be called ‘transnational’ communities. This refers to people who live in spatially far apart places but are connected by kinship or common origins and maintain social, cultural and economic links. Migrants continue to participate in social networks which closely link them to their family and community of origin. Many authors have tried to find concepts which do justice to the spatial division of networks created by migration. Whiteford called these networks ‘spatially extended communities’. In the same vein Goldring speaks of the ‘transnationalization of the social and political space’ and Ho of the ‘internationalization of kinship’.

In the past decade, scholars have started to use the border as a symbol for the fragmented and contradictory character of state formation in Latin America. Doing so they have tried to connect the geographical perspective on borderlands with questions of identity and popular nationalism. This perspective has been obvious in the case of the US-Mexican border and the place of the Latino population in the United States. Another new issue in Latin American borderland studies is the new economic and infrastructural cooperation which is taking place between various Latin American countries. The trends towards regional integration has provoked new interests in the Latin American border. The construction of the Itaipu dam in the Paraná river in the borderland between Brazil and Paraguay has highlighted this new trend. At the same time, it has drawn attention to the problem of cross-border environmental issues. This is another new and important theme in the study of Latin American borderlands.

These novel trends have led, among other things, to the study of social, political and economic interaction across borders. Borderlands often form worlds of their own, with their own logic and dynamics of change. Lawrence Herzog has drawn attention to what he called ‘transboundary social formation’, and suggest that we need to study the extent to which political, economic and cultural networks overlap in the borderland. For his study of the US-Mexico border Oscar Martínez has tried to catch the complexity of borderland interaction by devising four models. First, he distinguishes alienated borderlands in which routine cross-border interchange is practically non-existent, mainly due to
animosity between the two sides of the border. Second, there are coexistent borderlands in which a minimum of cross-border contact exist, despite unfriendly relations between the two states. The third model is that of interdependent borderlands in which the societies on both sides of the border are linked symbiotically, leading to a considerable flow of economic and human resources across the border. Finally, when practically all barriers to trade and human movement are eliminated, we can speak of integrated borderlands. These last two are sometimes called a ‘frontera viva’, where there exists ‘una real articulación social, económica y cultural entre las sociedades vecinas que el dan un sentido histórico a los procesos que tienden hacia una mayor integración espontánea’.

In an article by Willem van Schendel and myself we similarly argued that it is interesting to study the consequences of national borders if we want to understand the realities of contemporary state-building. No matter how clearly borders are drawn on official maps and how many customs officials are appointed, people will ignore borders whenever it suits them. In doing so, they challenge the political status quo of which borders are the ultimate symbol. People also take advantage of borders in ways which are not intended or anticipated by their creators. Revolutionaries hide behind them, seeking the protection of another sovereignty, local inhabitants cross them whenever services or products are cheaper or more attractive on the other side, and traders are quick to take advantage of price and tax differentials. Because of such unintended and often subversive consequences, border regions have their own social dynamics and historical development. Rather than focusing on the rhetoric and intentions of central governments, it is therefore necessary to look at the social realities and the local meanings generated by them. In this way, the study of border regions and their perceptions imply a critique of state-centred approaches which picture borders as unchanging, uncontested and unproblematic. They emphasize the various ways in which people have used, manipulated and circumvented the constructed barriers which result from the territorialization of modern states.

These models are certainly interesting as a heuristic tool for comparing borderlands, although we should be aware of the social and political dimensions: the benefits of cross-border interaction are usually distributed very unequally among the borderline population. Moreover, they carry the danger of unilinearity, as if one model supersedes the other. It is important to note that historical changes in border regions can be abrupt and quite contradictory, following the national and international economic and political conjunctures. It would be erroneous to consider national boundaries as strict and unchanging divides. It is necessary to focus on the historical dynamics of border regions.
Drawing Latin American borderlines

The origins of Latin American border have to be sought in the colonial period and the ways Spanish officials tried to create administrative units upon the vestiges of the pre-Columbian administrative and social structures. Although the Spanish colonizers used the territorial boundaries of the Inca and Aztec empires to organize their colonial jurisdictions in Spanish America, in many regions they established borders with no regard for local territorial definitions. It is not superfluous to stress that the nineteenth-century state building in a number of Latin American countries meant all but the annihilation of indigenous populations. The most notorious example of this development was, of course, Argentina, where the creation of the Argentinian state was accompanied by a relentless war against the Indian population which lived in the pampas. This attack on the indigenous population in the construction of national border took another form in the nineteenth and twentieth century, when state projects and spontaneous colonization increasingly threatened indigenous populations in the tropical lowlands regions of the continent.

In a historical process which extended over three centuries the Spanish Crown created colonial borders which were sometimes superimposed on native borders but often cut across them. Until today, Latin American borders may be considered ‘colonial’ borders in the sense that they are drawn without taking into account political or cultural boundaries which existed in indigenous society. National borders in the Andean region or Central America cut right across indigenous populations which linguistically and culturally are very similar. This may be clearest in the southern Mexico, Guatemala and eastern Honduras region of the Maya speaking Indians. In the Andes national borders have no relation with the regional division of the two most important Indian languages of the region: Quechua and Aymara.

In general, the boundaries of most of Spain’s colonial divisions were loosely determined. Systematic demarcation was deemed unnecessary while the whole territory was united as part of the Spanish empire. Even the contested boundary between Spanish and Portuguese territory was incompletely surveyed. In the extensive grasslands of the central southern part of Latin America, in present day northern Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and southern Brazil, this led to a frontier-like type of struggle between different interest groups. These struggles were settled in a number of regional wars and were by and large defined in the nineteenth century. Especially in the Amazonia region which was hardly accessible, jurisdiction was vague and undefined. This situation was complicated by the colonial penetration of powers from north-western Europe in the northern coastal part of the Amazon, usually called the Guyanas. All this eventually led
to a number of border disputes in contemporary Latin America between Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and British Guyana.

How this may have been, the well-known partition of the continent in vice-royalties and audiencias created political borders that to a great extent determined the actual borders. This was also the explicit goal of the leader of the Latin American independence such as Simón Bolívar. They held on to the principle of uti possidetis juris which meant that the new Latin America would adhere to the existing (colonial) borders. When Upper Peru (contemporary Bolivia) threatened to separate itself under the leadership of José de Sucre in 1825, Bolívar wrote to him:

Neither you, nor I, nor the Congresses of Peru and Colombia can violate or disregard what had come to be recognized as a principle of international law in America, namely: that the republican governments are founded within the boundaries of the former viceroyalties, captaincies general, or presidencies, such as Chile.28

This quote clearly demonstrates that this general principle was already disputed during the wars of independence. The creation of Bolivia was its clearest result. It also presents the most extreme example of unstable Latin American borderlines. In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the country lost about half of its territory to its neighbours. Its existence was disputed from the beginning. In 1829 it was observed that Bolivia is ‘a country without reason of existence’. The same kind of ideas were still expressed in the beginning of the twentieth century, when some writers advocated new political divisions of the Andean region.29

The growing importance of an export-oriented economy and the closing of the Latin American frontiers in the course of the nineteenth century resulted in political and military struggles between the newly created independent republics. These eventually led to a more explicit definition of the political boundaries on the continent. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, border conflicts between Latin American states had no longer something to do with the pre-Columbian political structures. On the contrary, they were determined by the national ambitions of the new ruling elites, which wanted to reinforce their sovereignty in the post-colonial situation.30

Border disputes, especially in regions not populated by the Spanish colonizers, gave rise to a number of wars between Latin American nations. The most notorious of these wars have been the Paraguayan War (or War of the Triple Alliance) (1864-70), the War of the Pacific (1879-83) and the Chaco War (1932-35).31 The war between Colombia and Peru which began with the Peruvian occupation of the Amazonian port of Leticia in 1932 and the long-lasting border dispute between Ecuador and Peru which gave rise to intermittent warfare in the twentieth century may also be mentioned in this respect.32
war between Mexico and the United States in 1848 in which Mexico lost almost half of its territory, is another case in point. It was a combination between a frontier war and an imperialist conquest, which we will leave out of consideration here.

It is interesting to note that – although occurring in similar circumstances of peripheral areas – these wars showed quite different characteristics. The Paraguayan war may be considered a conflict in which the borders of a new South America were created, not unlike the warlike events that created the Central American republics out of the Guatemalan kingdom, or that forced Ecuador’s secession of New Granada. The war decided the fate of the so-called Banda Oriental, claimed both by Brazil and Argentina. The war put a clear stop to the Brazilian attempts to enforce its claims. Cardozo writes that at the end of the war Brazil had failed in its ‘grande objetivo del enseñoreamiento definitivo del Río de la Plata’. The war also defined the political boundaries between Argentina and Paraguay. Although the Argentine province Corrientes and the Republic of Paraguay were constituted as different political entities, their separation was only confirmed in this war. For all the megalomania of the Paraguayan president Solano López, the Paraguayan War was a conflict about regional political power and the drawing of boundaries.

In contrast, the War of the Pacific and the Chaco War can be considered ‘modern’ wars in the sense that they were in one way or another related to Latin America’s insertion in the world economy. In both instances, the boundary dispute was not so much a case of national pride (although, of course, this was invariably invoked by the warmongers), but more of (potential) benefits from the exploitation of a disputed territory: nitrate in northern Chile, petroleum in the Chaco desert. Despite this background, these wars of course, caused a redrawing of political borderlines. The most important effect of the War of the Pacific was that it sealed the fate of Bolivia as a landlocked country.

All three wars had important consequences for the definition of national identity in the countries engaged in them. The Paraguayan War defined the nature of the Paraguayan state. Just as the War of the Pacific did for Peru and Chile, and the Chaco War for Bolivia. As demonstrated convincingly by Nelson Manrique and Florencia Mallon, the War of the Pacific had devastating results for the prestige of the Peruvian military and the national political leaders. The Peruvian defeat signified a conclusive déconfiture of the established power-holders. At the same time, it gave rise to a new kind of popular nationalism in which the rural Indian population connected Peruvian nationhood with their violent struggle for land rights. The Chaco war had similar results for Bolivian society. The recruitment of (indigenous) conscripts and their rhetorical incorporation in the Bolivian national community was a decisive step towards a modern Bolivian nation, which, at least in principle, accepted the Indian
population as being part of Bolivia. The political mobilization under the indigenous population which occurred during and after the war, can be seen as the direct consequence of that process. The importance of these wars was not so much the drawing of borders in and of itself, but their influence on the process of nation building. This is an essential theme for Latin American modern history. It is therefore necessary to increase our understanding of the influence of these wars on the emergence of popular nationalisms and the consequences for the populations living alongside old and new national borders.36

We can also see a distinctive characteristic of the Latin American borders and the struggle around them. It can be said that from the second half of the nineteenth century – and with the exception of the short warlike interludes between Peru and Ecuador – the demarcation of boundaries between the Latin American nation-states cannot be considered a principal source of warfare. At the same time, Latin American governments were confronted with extremely low man-land ratios in most border regions. A state that wanted to ‘govern’, to exert its authority over a given territory, needed people to give its sovereignty meaning and to represent the national values. This may explain the fascination of Latin American politicians and historians with the agricultural colonization of frontier regions. It was seen as a necessary step in the consolidation and control of the national territory. The desire to control the marginal frontier areas was also part of the ‘civilizing’ policy that aimed at the incorporation or extermination of indigenous populations which were considered a symbol of ‘barbarism’ and a threat to state formation and the consolidation of the national identity. They often did not realize that simultaneously it created intercultural relations and eventual mixing and accommodation. The reactions by local (indigenous) populations shaped the peculiar character of frontiers turning into borders.38

From frontier to border societies

In a general sense we can say that in nineteenth-century Latin America all ‘borders’ were at the same time ‘frontiers’. They represented peripheral regions which existed far from, and often in opposition to the political centre in the state capital. Economically border regions were often unimportant. The lack of infrastructural facilities formed a formidable obstacle to their productive development. Of course, there were exceptions, especially in the early phase of the raw export-oriented capitalism. The rubber tapping in the Amazonia region, with all its anarchy, violence and exploitation may be considered the best example of such a development. The establishment of enclave sectors, such as the banana production on the Caribbean coasts of Central America, the sugar industry in northern Peru, or mining in northern Chile can also be
mentioned as examples of economically booming regions at the periphery of the state territory. The irony was that this situation often reinforced their peripheral, semi-independent status within the national state. On the other hand, these sectors demonstrate the validity of the general statement. They are extreme examples of the semi-autonomous character of the Latin American frontier in the nineteenth and twentieth century.

This specific characteristic of Latin America nation building led to a twofold ‘filling in’ of the almost empty border regions. On the one hand, we can see a classical ‘frontier expansion’ in which new regions were colonized and made available for agriculture and cattle raising. Local populations – peasants and large landowners – filled in the void that was left by impotent governments in the no-man’s land around and sometimes across badly-demarcated border lines. They often tried to use the border to their own advantage. In the nineteenth century Bolivian indigenous communities in the border regions tried to escape the fiscal pressure of the Bolivian state claiming that they belonged to Peru.39 On the other hand, national governments tried to incorporate border regions within the orbit of national society. They made their presence felt in the more peripheral regions of the national territory and tried to link the border regions to the Capital. This process tended to confirm the formally established borderlines.

We can only understand the social and economic development of the Latin American borderlands by taking into account their historical development, and more specifically the transformation of the Latin American frontier. The clearest examples of frontier activity can of course be observed in the pampas in Argentina and southern Brazil and the so-called llanos in Colombia and Venezuela. These classical cases of the conquering of the frontier were before anything cattle frontiers, in which the human contribution was quite limited and almost exclusively connected to extensive cattle-holding. However, the productive basis of these frontiers could differ quite clearly. The Colombian, Venezuelan and southern Brazilian cattle frontiers remained technological backward and political unruly in comparison to the Argentinian pampas.40 Also the political meaning of the frontier expansion in these two cases was slightly different, however. In the Rio de la Plata it was part of a basically internal process in which Buenos Aires and the interior were slowly connected into one nation. In contrast, in southern Brazil the frontier became the symbol of the external expansion in southern direction. Many colonists belonged to relatively well-to-do sectors. In Rio Grande do Sul rich landowners were an important factor in conquering the grasslands of southern Brazil.41 Traditionally, Brazil’s southern plains also served as an important military buffer against the Spanish.42 In the course of the nineteenth and even twentieth century, they became connected with Brazil’s territorial and political ambitions and the
presence of Brazilian nationals in Paraguayan and Bolivian border regions. Especially in Bolivia this situation has heightened the fears for a Brazilian political, economic and cultural expansionism.

It is important to note that the colonization of the frontier did not only take place in the large, scarcely inhabited plains of the large Latin American countries. In smaller countries like the Dominican Republic or Guatemala the expansion of frontier agriculture was also clearly visible. The same can be said for regions which are normally considered as dominated by large landholdings, like Morelos (Mexico), central Colombia or the Andean highlands. This conquering of the agricultural frontier was often the work of peasant producers who engaged in different forms of slash-and-burn agriculture and in this way pushed the frontier back. These poor farmers had little social or political leverage but tried to secure their livelihood moving into empty, peripheral areas. When they ‘stumbled’ upon national borders they often found themselves suddenly in a political quagmire. National governments may accept cattle trespassing on their territory, but human beings are perceived as a direct threat to the national sovereignty. Uncontrolled peasant expansion across national borders has been a continuous source of conflicts in Latin American history. Many governments tried to curtail this uncontrolled frontier expansion. As we will see, in some cases they resorted to organized harassment of peasants who had settled on their side of the border.

The process of frontier expansion was the work of men and women who gradually invaded these regions in pursuit of their personal interests. Many of these people were poor and trekked to the frontier in search of a simple livelihood. Others fled situations of civil war or political persecution. This was the case of the twentieth-century colonization of the Colombian selva. In her excellent case study of Colombian frontier expansion Catherine LeGrand clearly shows how patterns of social and political inequality in Colombian society were reproduced in the frontier regions. In Colombia the more powerful colonists took over the landholdings of small-scale peasants, in this way pushing the latter further into the tropical lowlands. This process resulted in an extremely violent and politically charged situation in the Colombian frontier regions. Paul Oquist has noted: ‘In twentieth century Colombia, ‘colonization area’ is synonymous with chronic conflicts and high degrees of violence’. In a different manner, the large landholders in parts of the Andean highlands, who often possessed thousands of hectares, fulfilled the same function, especially when they started to intensify their productive activities during the wool boom around the turn of the century.

The Colombian case throws an interesting light on Turner’s famous concept of the frontier society, which was supposed to foment democratic and liberal political processes. Whatever its value for explaining ‘democratic’ US society
(and of course, it does not account for the existence of slavery and the genocide of the indigenous populations, neither in the US, nor in Latin America⁴⁵), it is clear that in Latin America the movement towards the frontier has not been inductive to democratic social and political relations. Bertha Becker writes for Brazil: ‘Contrary to Turner’s concept that views a vast settlement frontier as the key element in the building of American democracy, in Brazil the frontier is historically associated with authoritarianism...’.⁴₆ Alistair Hennessy sees this specific Latin American situation as the explanation of the fact that in Latin America never acquired the mythic force which it had in the United States. He writes: ‘Without democracy, there was no compulsion to elaborate a supportive ideology based on frontier experiences and their putative influence on national character and institutions’.⁴⁷ He also stresses, however, that the Latin American frontier was not the barbaric no-man’s land such as depicted for Argentina in Sarmiento’s famous Facundo (1845) and for Venezuela in Rivera’s haunting novel La Voragine (1924). We could add that the existence of these novels and their enduring influence on national debates demonstrates that the frontier has continued to be an important symbolic role in Latin America as the dark, barbaric antithesis to civilized society.

The incorporation of borderlands

Most modern borders were conceived of in state capitals where they were negotiated and finalized on drawing boards. Clearly, the state was always involved. Latin American governments tried to make their presence felt in different ways. They built border posts and established villages, constructed roads and schools and placed national symbols. In short, the state constructed symbolic markers of its sovereignty. This was done with two purposes which were often so closely intertwined that they can hardly be separated. First, to show to foreign contenders the exact location of the national borders and to demonstrate that the national government controlled the entire country. This is what I call the ‘external’ objective. Secondly, it was part of the general process of nation-building and the subjecting of semi-autonomous regions, indigenous populations and semi-independent strong-men. This is what I call the ‘internal’ objective. The importance of this second goal was a important feature of the Latin American nations which to this day are haunted by the perils of a fragmentation of political control.

This is not to say that there was always a consensus about the borders and their significance. Within the state elite, various groups might try to bring about border policies which suited their own interests best. The interests of the armed forces, bureaucrats, politicians, landowners, traders and captains of industry often diverged. Whether or not this ‘national’ struggle continued after the border
had been created, depended on the cohesion of the state, the strategic and economic importance of the border, and the actual presence of the state in the borderland. State employees stationed in the borderland and their superiors in the provincial or state capitals could develop very different perspectives on their mission in the borderland. Customs officials might get involved in smuggling, school teachers might resist an assimilatory language policy, and security forces might refuse to risk their lives against well-armed separatists.

The success of state intervention was very much determined by its relationship with regional elites. When borderland elites were well integrated into networks of state power, they could become important allies to the state in its efforts to control borderland society. This was the case with most caudillos of Latin American border regions: their local power depended largely on the state, and they were used by that state not only to extract tribute but also to discipline the border regions. Sometimes such elites might also be enlisted for state expansionist projects. However, borderland elites often remained, at least partly, detached from the state. In many parts of Latin America regionalism formed an effective countervailing force to centralizing tendencies. Borderland elites often retained an independent power base and were in a position to oppose state policies. 48 They often controlled cross-border activity and effectively opposed state measures to control borders and border regions.

We should therefore be careful to exaggerate the role of the state. During much of the modern period the state was hardly able to enforce its authority and to interfere with daily life in the border regions. In the first place, central governments were too busy with the subjection of regional leaders and creating something like a national society. Secondly, inadequate infrastructure often made it impossible to establish regular contacts between state capitals and their border regions. Donadio observes that before the introduction of air transport, it took thirty to forty days to go from Lima to Iquitos. 49 Border guards were non existent or left to their own. Thirdly, state elites were not always prepared to invest much energy in mostly peripheral relatively unimportant parts of the country. During large part of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, life in the Latin American border regions was hardly affected by the intervention of the state. As Demelas states, the highland border between Bolivia and Peru connected more than it separated. Local populations just ignored its existence. 50 For the Venezuelan-Colombian border region, León and Llambi state that las relaciones fronterizas were uncontrolled and espontáneas in the period before the late twentieth century. They observe: ‘Los vínculos eran establecidos con casi ninguna interferencia. Todavía los Estados Nacionales no habían comenzado a intervenir formalmente en la dinámica de la frontera’. 51
This was even true for the important border between the United States and Mexico. Until 1917 there was virtually no restriction on immigration into the United States from Mexico, and relatively little before 1929. Heyman calls this the ‘open border’ period. In a recent article Alexandra Minna Stern, has demonstrated that the border became gradually a clear obstacle for Mexican immigration. It was only under the influence of US xenophobic nativism and the increasing popularity of eugenist thinking, that the US-Mexico border acquired a daily concreteness, among other things because immigrant Mexicans were kept in quarantine under unfavourable circumstances. She writes: ‘Throughout the 1910s (...) the El Paso Anglo elite constructed multiple boundaries that were simultaneously racialized and medicalized’.

The presence of the state in the border regions increased dramatically in the course of the twentieth century. Although not even then always successful, national governments in Latin America by and large succeeded in subordinating unruly border regions and to reinforce their authority. Many states tried to bribe or force regional elites into obedience to the central state. They negotiated, offered them material or political favours and incorporated them into the government structure as provincial governor. When they did not succeed in these attempts, the result would be either a breakdown of state power in the border regions, or an attempt by the state to enforce its territorial claims by means of military force. The first happened in northern Mexico in the nineteenth century, but also during the Mexican Revolution. Colombia is another example of a situation in which the national government proved itself unable to structurally control regional elites in the border regions. A classic example of the second process was the ruthless dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. One of Trujillo’s first acts in 1934 was the assassination of Desiderio Arias, a regional caudillo who symbolized the independence of the border region. By displaying Arias’ severed head in the state capital, the Trujillo regime demonstrated that the power of the state was paramount even in the remotest corners of the country.

These processes were accompanied by two other changes. On the one hand, border regions were linked to the central capital by improving infrastructure and communications. On the other, states tried to incorporate the population of the border regions into national society. They did this by peaceful means such as education and the establishment of state institutions. If that did not work, governments did not hesitate to use force to subdue border populations, put an end to cross-border networks and smuggling and eventually throw out ‘foreigners’. We will now have a closer look to these different examples of state intervention in border regions.
Connecting centre and periphery

One of the most important ways to incorporate peripheral border regions into the national realm was the construction of roads. Infrastructural improvements helped to link these regions to the capital and the national economy. This was especially true for car roads. The many railroads which were constructed around the turn of the century were geared towards the export of commodities and not meant to link border regions to the centre. In general, railroads were financed by foreign capital and did not play a role in national integration. On the contrary, they often hindered local manufacturing concerns that might have developed to serve the domestic market. Nevertheless, in some cases, like in Argentina and Peru, they came to play their part in incorporating the interior to the capital. In other cases, like the railroad building in the Antofagasta region, they were steered by geopolitical concerns of Bolivia and Chile. In the negotiations between Brazil and Bolivia during the rubber boom, which would eventually lead to the Treaty of Petrópolis in 1903, Brazil bought the Acre province but also promised to construct a railroad alongside an intransitable part of the Madeira river south into Bolivia.

Where the era of railroad building was part of the export-oriented development in Latin America, road-building – and in tropical lowland regions as Amazonia and the Colombian Chocó: the improvement of water transportation – went along much more with the process of nation building and import-substitution beginning in the 1930s. Although this is a badly studied topic, Rees speaks of a ‘profusion of ungraded and dirt roads’ that began to be constructed in the 1940s. These newly built roads permitted social and economic communication between regional market centres and their hinterland. In their study of the Colombian-Venezuelan border region, Ramón León and Luis Llambi state that: ‘Ambos Estados Nacionales, pero quizás con una mayor celeridad en el caso venezolano, tienden a una reestructuración de sus formas organizativas propias, a través de la concentración de poderes en el centro de ambos países y la creación de una infraestructura vial dirigida hacia sus respectivas capitales’. Although these projects were not necessarily part of a planned project of national integration, there is no doubt that they played an important role in the incorporation of formerly isolated regions.

In some cases, we can see road-building that was clearly designated to link the border regions to national society. One clear example is the so-called ‘border road’ that was planned and partly executed under the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. Another example was the construction of a highway in Peru from Huánuco to Pucallpa which was a direct reaction to the lost war against Colombia in 1932-33 and an attempt to improve the accessibility of the Amazonian borderlands for the Peruvian army. These projects lost their prime
importance with the advent of air transport. From the 1940s onwards, regions which were hardly accessible by road transport acquired fast connections with state capitals by the building of airstrips. These new means of communication facilitated government control. Nonetheless, they did not totally remove the need for better overland connections.

Improving communications was also an instrument of increasing state control over the border regions. This topic has not been studied systematically, but it is clear that first the telegraph, air transport and then the radio and other means of mass communication has played an important role in connecting peripheral regions to the national centres in Latin America. The telegraph allowed for the first time immediate military reactions to revolutions and unrest. Radio broadcasting allowed for more systematic government propaganda and the communication distribution of nationalist rhetoric and national symbols. In contrast to the written press, national governments held an initial monopoly over the radio communications. It is no coincidence that public radio channels make a profuse use of the national anthem. In this sense, the radio played an important role in the incorporation of border populations in the national community. It may be considered ironic that present-day developments in the field of telecommunication and cable television tend to undermine state control and have made national borders increasingly obsolete.

Educating border populations

To create a nation, it was necessary to create a common iconology, national symbols and, very important in countries with indigenous languages, to reinforce the position of Spanish (or Portuguese) as the national language. Education was an important means to bring these things about, especially when we consider that an ecumenicism or an ‘imagined community’ required instruments to create and reproduce itself. Benedict Anderson has highlighted the importance of education for European colonialism, but it was no less central to Latin American nation-building in the twentieth century. Education was a necessary concomitant to nationalism and an requirement for the extension of the nation-state into the farthest corners of the national territory. Here we see two mechanisms at work. On the one hand, with the exception of Brazil, the Guianas and Haiti, language was not something that divided or separated the Latin American nations. Thus, the teaching of Spanish and the struggle against illiteracy was not part of the external struggle of Latin American nations. Education is not only about language, however. It is just as much about culture, symbolism and the reproduction of values. An external objective for the expansion of education was the creation of a national identity. Perhaps because other markers – language, phenotype, culture – were so difficult to articulate in Latin America,
these ideological, national markers acquired extra significance. This national(ist) education was strongly informed by positivist and eugenist ideas which were prevalent in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Latin America. A special educational effort was directed towards the indigenous populations which had to be civilized and as modern citizens brought into the national community.

This is not to say that the spread of education was only a matter of internal colonialism. It also responded to newly felt ideas about modern nationhood and progress. Anderson writes: ‘This expansion (of modern-style education; MB) occurred not simply to provide cadres for governmental and corporate hierarchies, but also because of the growing acceptance of the moral importance of modern knowledge even for colonized populations’. However, in the Latin American context, education played a central role in the creation and reproduction of national symbols and values. It is necessary only to open a number of Latin American history school books, to become convinced of this. Their nationalist tone is undeniable. Sometimes this emphasis on national values was even stronger. Some countries prepared little booklets which school children had to learn by heart and which contained important national values.

Although these policies were implemented nationwide, they acquired special significance in border regions. Extra funds were often dedicated to the building of schools in border areas. Of course, this mechanism was strongest in the case of contested or thinly populated border regions. An example may be the educational reforms which took place in Bolivia after the Chaco war. Special budgets were allocated to the building of schools and educational organization in the border regions. These schools had a double function. They drew the border population within the national orbit and at the same time countered the political and cultural influence of the neighbouring countries, especially Brazil. After having brought a visit to one of these schools an observer wrote in the early 1940s:

_Pero su importancia no solo se desprende de su excelente ubicación geográfica, sino también por estar en una Zona fronteriza estratégica, donde el país vecino ejerce su influencia con sus centros de reducción y puestos militares. Es, pues, una centinela avanzada de la soberanía patria._

These attempts to construct a national community through schooling can be seen in most Latin American countries. It also led to academic centres such as El Colegio de la frontera norte in Tijuana, Mexico.

The influence of the state went further than schooling alone. In regions with some agricultural basis, state institutions tried to obtain control over agricultural activities and in the process improve the quality of agrarian commodities. Stephen Bell has described how during the turn of the century the central state tried to intervene in agricultural activities in the southern part
of Brazil. Beginning in 1908 it established a journal Revista Agrícola da Fronteira and other journals. It organized Exhibitions and proposed legislation of which the Rural Code in 1865 was the most important.63 These activities were part of more general policies to establish state control over the entire national territory and to redirect autonomous local practices, but acquired special significance in the border regions.

Together with these national projects, many governments tried to populate the border region with ‘national’ citizens. Remembering Sarmiento’s dictum gobernar es poblar,64 they believed that a stable population would be the best way to enforce their sovereignty. In the course of the twentieth century, many governments therefore began colonization schemes meant to increase the population in contested or underpopulated border lands. The conflict with Peru induced the Colombian government of president López Pumarejo (1934-38), for instance, to start an ambitious colonization programme meant to populate the Orinoquia and Amazona provinces. With the same objective, the provincial capital of Calamar, was replaced by Mitú further down the Rio Vaupés. The border officials who were appointed were given the explicit task to stimulate colonization and increase agricultural activity.65 In the same vein, General Trujillo established various agricultural colonies alongside the Dominican border with Haiti in his project of la dominicanización de la frontera.

**Force and repression**

State policies were not only geared towards creating a national consensus and the incorporation of border populations in national projects. Just as often they were in one way or another characterized by repressive measures and violence. Taxation was, of course, an important issue in Latin American border regions. The new republics were very dependent on the collection of import/export duties. Until far into the twentieth century, these taxes accounted for a major part of their national income. Because of their specific position, border regions were very sensitive to these taxation policies. An increase in customs duties could all but stop the cross-border trade and paralyse the border economy. It could also make this trade more profitable and cause frantic commercial activity. The economic policy of one state may create a scarcity or abundance of certain goods and services on one side of the border. Different national taxes may lead to sharply different prices and a reversal or intensification of existing commercial activity. This can lead to paradoxical situations. Colombian coffee, for instance, was introduced into Venezuela in great quantities during the 1980s, because producers and traders tried to take advantage of the export subsidies given by the Venezuelan government.66 Such developments may motivate the state to impose strict border controls, making trade virtually impossible, and
provoking smuggling. It may also condone such trade in order to defuse the tensions which its economic policy causes, at least in the borderland. Finally, state officials themselves may actively engage in border trade for public or private gain.

Many economic activities in border regions depended on the evasion of these duties, partly because it concerned small-scale individual trade on a local scale, partly because smuggling (in reality, nothing else than ‘normal’ trade made illegal because of taxation policies) was a lucrative, perhaps the most lucrative activity in border regions. National governments tried to hold on to their share of the border trade and to different degrees tried to curtail illegal mercantile activity. Special economic policies were devised to curb smuggling, and these affect border economies in specific ways. For example, markets near the border may be closed, or people may be forbidden to carry more than small quantities of certain commodities within a certain range of the border.

The success of these policies depended, of course, on the state’s actual hold over these border regions. Within a like Brazil with a relatively strong state, the government faced many problems in imposing its will and enforce taxation. In contrast, Chilean customs control at its borders with Peru and Bolivia is almost complete. The increase in the state presence in the border was a slow and certainly not an unilinear process. Border patrols could be intensive in one period and all but disappear in the next, depending on the political climate and the financial possibilities of the government. In the Caribbean and Central America, an extra factor was constituted by the repeated US interventions. These interventions were often partly motivated by a deficient return on European and US loans to these countries. They were therefore directly aimed at improving the collection of customs duties. In countries like Nicaragua, Haiti and the Dominican Republic the presence of US marines meant a tighter border control. When the United States took over the government of Haiti (1915) and the Dominican Republic (1916), one of the first things they did was to set up custom houses and to increase their control of the border trade. In this way they tried to break the resistance of the Haitian cacos, the guerrilla forces fighting the US troops. Simultaneously they wanted to increase the customs revenues. This dramatically changed the situation in the border regions. Evasion of customs duties and smuggling were no longer simple offences against Dominican legislation, they became a provocation of international law. No wonder that the US presence in the border region was deeply resented by the majority of the population. All travellers who visited the region in the first decades of the century observed the tense atmosphere and told stories about armed confrontations between the rural population and the border guards. It was reported in 1912 that during the first twenty-eight months of the Customs
Receivership eighteen US customs officials had been killed or wounded in gun battles with what he called ‘contraband gangs’.69

This closing of the border was completed under the dictatorship of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. After the departure of the US troops he would complete the process by ordering the massacre of thousands of Haitians who, according to the official rhetoric, were living ‘illegally’ on Dominican territory.70 This ill-famous massacre of Haitian peasants is a horrific example of the attempts by Latin America governments (just as in other parts of the world) to increase their authority over their national territory. Of course, the killing of ‘invading’ peasants was an extremely violent example, although as we will see, not altogether exceptional.

State control could thus obtain different forms and intensity. In some cases it could lead to outright repression and more or less indiscriminate killings. The Haitian massacre was the most gruesome example of such state action, but the treatment of Salvadorean peasants in the Honduran border region was not much different. After years of silent peasant migration across the border, Honduran politicians started an ideological offensive against the ‘primitive, undernourished and lawless’ Salvadorean peasants. Both in the Dominican as in the Honduran case, the final result was a violent repression of invading peasants. It is still to see what will happen with the Brazilian immigrants who have settled on Paraguayan territory in the past decades. It is clear that resentment against these immigrants has been growing after the downfall of the Stroessner regime, especially because poor Paraguayan farmers felt that the regime had given the Brazilians unwarranted privileges. This led to social protest against the government and anti-Brazilian incidents by disgruntled Paraguayan peasant activists. However, until now they have not been supported by formal anti-Brazilian policies of the Paraguayan government.71

These examples demonstrate how different state policies in border regions may be. States may resort to extremely violent measures in order to enforce their authority in contested borderlands. Of course, we should be aware of the role played in these circumstances by regional elites. They often used the powers invested in the state to further their own interests. On the other hand, local populations tried to find their ways and construct their own social and economic networks, in spite of intervention either by the state or regional elites.

Borders and ethnicity

Borders not only define – or try to define – territories, but also identities. One of the important cornerstones of Anderson’s conception of ‘imagined community’ was the idea that national identities have to be created. They needed cultural and symbolic roots which were able to define the membership of a
nation. However, in the same instance it was also defined who were excluded. All nations in one way or another tried to define who were included and who were excluded. This was clear between nations because every nation tried to define what made it different from its neighbour. Often these differences are couched in ethnic terms. The Argentine nation, for instance, sees itself as ‘European’ and contrasts itself to ‘Indian’ Bolivia and Peru or ‘black’ Brazil. This kind of popular perceptions are voiced in daily relations, but do not have great political implications. Only in one case, the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, ethnic antagonism has acquired violent overtones. In Dominican national ideology, the ‘black’ republic of Haiti became symbol of the ethnic other. This lead to fierce anti-Haitian rhetoric, intermittent warfare and finally, to the infamous massacre of Haitian peasants in the Dominican-Haitian borderlands in 1937. Although the context is quite different, the recent immigration of Indian and mestizo peasants from Guatemala on Belizean territory is producing a similar nationalist reaction against the Spanish-speaking immigrants.

Latin America, however, is a multicultural continent and traditionally ethnic minorities (or majorities) have been excluded within the state borders. Nation states saw themselves confronted with ethnic groups which did not fit in, or adhered to the nationalist ideology of the state. This exclusion was often the result of the state ideology itself, perhaps reaching its most extreme formulation during Spanish colonialism when the indigenous population was classified as a separate república, different from, and subordinate to the nation of the Spaniards. This separatist ideology remained prevalent in the late nineteenth century, when elites in Latin American countries with large indigenous populations (majorities in the case of Bolivia and Peru), used social-darwinist ideas to legitimize their continuing minority rule. Of course, this situation posed formidable problems at the moment nation-states tried to fill in empty patches and to incorporate peripheral populations. They had to turn Indians into citizens, as the old Bolivarian project may be paraphrased. Many of the projects mentioned above, were meant to obtain that goal. They aimed at modernizing and incorporating the indigenous population and, in this manner, include them into the state and homogenize them into law-abiding citizens. Sometimes governments showed a special interest in indigenous populations because they were seen as guardians of the national sovereignty. This was the case with the Shuar Indians in south Ecuador, who were given special privileges in an attempt to use them in Ecuador’s struggle against Peru.

We can identify at least two types in which ethnic differentiation existed within the Latin American nation-building. First, we find ethnic minorities within nation states. Secondly, there are ethnic, often but not always indigenous minorities who share ethnic ties across the border. In the first case, we can
include indigenous groups, but also descendants of African slaves, especially Maroon communities. These populations tried to maintain ethnic loyalties that were parallel or opposed to the national rhetoric. In the nineteenth century, they were often repressed and in some cases destroyed by a modernizing state. An extreme example may be the military destruction of the indigenous populations of the Argentinian pampa. But everywhere in Latin America the construction of the nation state was accompanied by cultural destruction and, on occasions, physical annihilation. A clear case in point may be the maroon communities in the Dutch and British Guyanas. Although they were permitted a limited autonomy in the early colonial period, they became under heavy attack in the twentieth century. This was partly because they were seen as non-national, but also because they were in the way of new economic interests.74

With respect to the question of the borderlands, the second type is the most interesting. Many indigenous groups are not confined to living in one nation. They share their culture and language with other groups across the border. An example may be the region around the Titicaca lake, where the borders of two states come together. Demelas speaks of a ‘remarquable unité’ of the region around the lake, both geographically and ethnically.75 This unity was so evident that in the 1940s the indigenista Ministers of Education of Peru and Bolivia, Luis Valcárcel and Jorge Calero Vásquez, started a shared educational project in this region.76 Other examples can be found in the Amazon region, where tropical lowland Indians often live on different sides of national borders. A third example are the Maya who inhabit at least three different countries in Central America. All are made to obey the laws of the national state, but in each case loyalties to that state are not obvious, especially because repression is applied to enforce that loyalty. This ethnic repression reached a horrid peak in Guatemala in the 1980s.

More recently, the democratization of Latin American politics and the emergence of new ethnic identities have led to a strong ethnic revival movement with important political implications. Most of these ethnic parties, such as the Guatemalan pan-Maya movement, the Bolivian Kataristas, the Colombian CRIC or the Ecuadorian CONAIE, have confined themselves to national borders, thereby – paradoxically – demonstrating the successful creation of the Latin American nation state.77 Nevertheless, some pro-Indian politicians and intellectuals in the Andes have started questioning the legitimacy of the existing borders between Latin American countries. They argue that the national borders ignore indigenous ethnic and spatial structures. In this they find inspiration in the arrangement on the U.S.-Canadian border: here native American groups, which have been accepted as such by both governments, are allowed to cross without any state interference.78 Although less explicitly, the pan-Maya movement has suggested the same kind of solution for the Maya population in
Central America. These movements are faced with a strategic dilemma. Although their ideology suggests a rejection of the nation-state, they have recently been most successful in defending their rights within its borders. This has had interesting and contradictory results. The Zapatista movement in southern Mexico, for instance, has couched its struggle in exclusively nationalist terms, rejecting any explicit cooperation with the Guatemalan Maya movement.79

**Border networks**

The examples of state intervention – and its problems – in border regions demonstrate that most border regions have a dynamic of their own, acting and changing independently and sometimes against the national state. Most significant is that local communities along most international borders have continued cross-border economic links in spite of all the state efforts opposing it. In many cases they did not really have a choice because governments have notoriously failed to provide services in a structural, long-term way and to integrate border economies into the larger national economy. Cross-border economic and commercial activities have therefore remained important and are often based on networks of kinship, friendship and entrepreneurial partnership which span both sides of the border.

Commercial cross-border networks in Latin America have not been studied systematically. One of the reasons being that these commercial networks often take place in an atmosphere of illegality. The small-scale trade which was part of this exchange normally did not worry politicians too much. Only when cross-border trade increased in size, they intervened, mainly to enforce the paying of import-export taxes. The exchange of commodities across national borders creates commercial links that are often difficult to destroy by political or military means. It may not be surprising that these measures were often ineffective and only led to harassment and repression of the small traders. Like the Dominican customs officials who in 1915, for instance, caught a poor Haitian peasant who tried to cross the border with *un bultito al hombro* containing four pounds of *manteca de puerco* and two handkerchiefs.80 Research into this kind of daily, underhand and often small-trade trade across Latin American borders may allow us better to understand the social and economic consequences of nation building.

Whenever a state applies restrictions on cross-border trade, usually the result of the taxation of certain goods for the benefit of the treasury, it invites smuggling. Of course, smuggling is neither confined to inhabitants of the borderland nor does it involve all (or even most) of them.81 But it is in the borderland that smuggling is most manifest. Cindy Forster calculates that thousands of people were involved in smuggling between Guatemala and
Chiapas in the 1940s. She concludes that ‘probably the entire [border] population was in some measure complicit’. 82 This kind of situations gives entire border economies an air of stealth and subterfuge in the eyes of the state. Local people buy cheap consumer goods on one side of the border and sell it on the other side for small profits. In situations where hardly any border guards exist, they must often be hardly aware of the illegality of their trade. But smuggling has also occurred on a much larger scale, often reaching proportions of criminal networks.

An interesting, but rather isolated example of such semi-autonomous network is presented by the Amazonian rubber tappers at the end of the nineteenth century. Both buyers and tappers clearly disliked the attempts by state officials to control and tax their activities. They therefore joined forces to evade these unwanted interventions, cleverly taking advantage of contesting border claims in the region. In the words of Hemming: ‘The Brazilian seringueiros resented Bolivian attempts to tax and control them. They formed themselves into a near-independent republic and rebelled in 1899 and again in 1902’.83 The horrible exploitation of Indian rubber gatherers by (foreign) rubber companies like the ill-famous Casa Arana in the Putumayo region, demonstrates the shadow side of this absence of state control.84

In the frontier-like border regions of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Latin America, much smuggling had to do with cattle rustling (abigeato). Cattle theft was a general problem in nineteenth-century Latin America, 85 but it was especially endemic in border regions where the cattle could easily be sold on the other side of the border. This could be considered organized crime on a regional level in which regional strong-men used the border to pursue their activities.

Ironically, the organized crime character of smuggling increased with the state repression. When it became too dangerous for the majority of the rural population, it became an exclusive activity of the more powerful. The more efficient suppression of the border trade stimulated the emergence of more sophisticated networks of illegal trade. Smuggling became the monopoly of groups which operated on both sides of the border. These groups often enjoyed political protection from their powerful friends in the government. The criminalization of the border trade proved to be a self-fulfilling prophesy. Organized crime tended to extend its activities to various economic sectors. For example in the Dominican border region, with the tightening of the border control in the first decades of the twentieth century, the complaints about the theft of cattle also increased. The authorities on both sides of the border complained about the fact that stolen cattle was taken to the other side of the border to be sold there. The Governor of the border province, Monte Cristi, wrote in 1921:
The thieves on this side of the frontier for instance using agents, steal some cattle and turn them over to accomplices on the other side of the frontier and these in collusion sometimes with some of the authorities, take them to a considerable distance beyond the frontier to sell them.86

In these years, when the economic situation of the Dominican Republic was difficult, much Haitian cattle was stolen by these groups and sold in the neighbouring country. A Dominican judge observed in 1921 that ‘a large part of our frontier people are engaged in this illegal traffic’. This activity was called the *zafra de animales*, the ‘harvest of animals’.87 Dominican cattle-holders who complained that their cattle was stolen by Haitian criminals, ignored the fact that these criminal groups were transnational. They contained nationals of the two nations and were the product of the specific situation of the border region. These groups could only have success when they were protected on both sides of the border.

The same process can be seen in the border region of El Salvador and Honduras. In his analysis of the origins of the so-called ‘Soccer War’ in 1969, Anderson observes:

> For years (before 1967, MB) there had been intermittent struggle along the frontier, as this ill-defined area was the natural haunt of bad men of both countries who preyed upon the nationals of the neighbouring territory with relative impunity, drifting back across the border to avoid arrest. Cattle stealing had become a fine art in the region, and was often attended by bloodshed, pillage, and rape.88

This kind of lawless situations had more general consequences for the societies involved. They led to violent and insecure social relations. At the same time, they left space for the occupation of state lands, partly by small peasant families, but above all by local strong men. While these semi-autonomous cattle frontiers largely disappeared in the course of the twentieth century, new challenges to state authority appeared. These challenges were posed, above all, by an unholy alliance of leftists guerrilla groups and increasingly powerful drugs barons. This new challenge is especially visible in Colombia and Peru but is also important in Bolivia despite the absence of substantial guerrilla activity, and to a lesser extent in all countries bordering on the lowland Amazon region. The boom of coca production for the world market began in the late 1970s. It followed a short cycle of marihuana production which was especially important in Colombia. The Colombian case is interesting for two reasons. First, the emergence of the coca cultivation in Colombia was directly linked to the spontaneous colonization of the Amazonian *selva*. After the start of the Violencia in 1948, a process began what Alfredo Molano has called the *colonización armada*.89 Peasants who had acquired formal or informal
land rights during the López Pumarejo government and had organized strong, defiant peasant unions, came increasingly under attack of government forces or conservative paramilitary forces. This repression caused a massive flight of peasant families which fled over the mountains to the Amazonian lowlands. A famous symbol of this migration, was the so-called Columna de Marcha, in which 3000 people, most people who were not fit to fight, trekked through the cold highlands of the Andean mountain range.\(^90\) These colonizers would come to play an important role in the coca cultivation. This links up with the second interesting characteristic of the Colombian situation. As we saw, this colonization was partly politically motivated. It was led and organized by militant peasant unions (*autodefensa*), which during the Violencia transformed themselves into a full-fledged political actor organizing *juntas de acción comunal* or *organizaciones de autodefensa*. These organizations filled the vacuum left by the state and emerged como la única forma de poder real, habida cuenta de la inexistencia o debilidad del Estado en ellas.\(^91\)

Within this context the cultivation of coca became an important means of subsistence in regions like the Guaviare. The new opportunities created by this new agricultural sector attracted new immigrants, who came individually, often with urban origins and without explicit political background. At the same time new coca dealers arrived in the region, all trying to carve out their own little coca kingdom. This situation led to a situation of overproduction and extreme violence, sometimes called la Guerra del Guaviare. This war cost the lives of many peasants and eventually chased away a considerable part of the peasant population. Eventually, some kind of balance was reached in which the cultivation of coca was complemented by that of food crops. At the same time, *autodefensa* groups and *narcotraficantes* reached a pragmatic understanding. The former took over the functions of the state. In exchange for leaving alone the coca trade, it could levy taxes which could reach 10 per cent of the sales prices of the coca.

A similar disappearance of the state can be seen in the Peruvian selva region where from the 1980s onwards Sendero Luminoso created a virtual absence of the state. In the region of Andahuaylas all authorities at the district level and below, including the justices of the peace, resigned their posts. This vacuum was readily filled by the cadres of Sendero Luminoso.\(^92\) Although resulting in a different power balance, also in the Peruvian case, the coalition between *guerrilleros* and *narcotraficantes* got the upper hand of the state and created semi-autonomous political entities in the border regions.

The Colombian and Peruvian cases present an interesting difference with the situation in the Chapare region in Bolivia. Here the coca cultivation showed a similar dramatic expansion, but did so without the presence of a strong guerrilla movement. Rather, the Bolivian state has maintained a clear presence in the
region. This can partly been explained by the fact that Bolivian legislation permits the cultivation of coca for personal and ritual purposes. This has avoided its complete criminalization. On the other hand, it had its origins in the clear state involvement in the cocaine industry under the notorious ‘coca-dictatorship’ of García Meza. The actual state presence is especially clear in the different (partly US financed) agencies established in the region to eradicate coca cultivation. Ironically, these agencies have in different ways reached tacit understandings with farmers and dealers, thereby undermining the destruction of the coca sector, but at the same time safeguarding some measure of state control over the region.

In this section some examples of cross-border networks were presented. These examples suggest a clear historical development in which cross-border networks increasingly clashed with an intervening state. Although Latin American governments were never able to really subdue unruly border populations, legislation and new policies did not leave border societies untouched. The independence of border networks suffered as their result and where it maintained itself it was increasingly criminalized. The increased influence of drugs trade in the Latin American border regions may be the most extreme example of this process. It also indicated a clear change in the dynamics of border development. *Narcotráfico* is a transnational industry par excellence. It is a clear indication of the increasing global context of present-day Latin American borderlands.

**Conclusion: Latin American borders in a global context**

This article has argued that it is very interesting to look at borderlands when we want to understand the specific process of state building in Latin America. We should especially look at the changing meaning of borders and the importance of cross-border networks. Such an approach may teach us a lot about the consequences of state building and the contestation of local populations. It may also give us clues as to the logic of political behaviour at the margins of the nation-state and the ability of local populations to escape state control and to appropriate parts of state discourses.

This article has tried to show to what extent Latin American border formation has had specific characteristics which set the continent apart from other regions of the world. This could never be a conclusiveendeavour in view of the size of the continent and the different processes of state formation. We have therefore singled out two central features of Latin American border formation. First, the scarce population in most Latin American borderlands, which gave them a clear frontier character. Latin American states had to populate their borders in order to incorporate their borderlands. Secondly, border disputes have led to
relatively little open conflict and military violence between Latin American
countries, especially in the twentieth century. This may be considered significant
in a continent where the exact location of borders was often contested.

It will need another article to study the future of Latin American borders. This would involve the analysis of processed of regional integration in
contemporary Latin America, the changing meaning of borders and the possible
new dynamics within Latin American borderlands. There is no doubt that the
consequences of integration will prove to be far-reaching. The question is what
is remaining of Latin American borders in an age of regional integration and
transnationalism. And what, if any, are their specific characteristics in a
globalizing world? We have of course already touched on some changes which
have radically changed the meaning of the Latin American borders.

First, the international migration has undermined the enclosing function of
borders. The increasing importance and availability of air traffic has rendered
land borders increasingly meaningless. Not only when we talk about formal
airline traffic, but also in view of the thousands of legal and illegal private
airplanes which carry passengers and goods wherever there is a need. Part of
the population of Latin America has increasingly become a floating migrant
community. Contemporary migrant studies today analyse this migration as part
of a new conjuncture of global forces in which migrants live increasingly in a
deterritorialized world.

Secondly, business, legal or illegal, has increasingly transgressed national
borders. Recently, this process has been symbolized by the establishment of
free-trade zones in the continent, especially NAFTA and Mercosur. Some
observers have seen them as the beginning of the end of economic borders in
Latin America, but this appears to be a premature obituary. Recent developments
within Mercosur in which Brazil and Argentina did not hesitate to close their
respective borders and to resort to new protective measures suggest that national
borders are there to stay in Latin America. On the other hand, closer trade
relations have rapidly eliminated existing antagonisms between countries as
Argentina and Chile or Brazil. Economic internationalization shows itself most
clearly in the illegal trade which is part and parcel of the narcotráfico. In the
recent past, the drugs mafia has been able to shift its activities according to
international political cycles. It manages trade, enterprises and finances in
various countries and have as such been very difficult to control by national
governments.

Thirdly, national borders can no longer be considered to be the ideological
gatekeepers which they were meant to be in the eyes of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century nationalist politicians. Cultural globalization has opened Latin
American societies for all kinds of cultural and ideological influences. In the
process, national borders have lost much of their ideological relevance in the
production and distribution of goods and ideas. The consequences of this globalizing and modernizing trends are hotly debated in contemporary Latin America. Pessimists see the destruction of cultural and social values and a comunidad perdida. Globalization and neo-liberal modernization are, in this view, eating away the roots of Latin American culture. Pessimists see the destruction of cultural and social values and a comunità perdida. Globalization and neo-liberal modernization are, in this view, eating away the roots of Latin American culture. They are pitted against the optimists who see these trends as the next stage in an ongoing process of Latin American cultural change. They see the emergence of ‘hybrid cultures’ in Latin America as a sign of the vitality of Latin American culture and its capacity to appropriate and transform external influences. In this vein, the Brazilian academic Renato Ortiz tries to reduce the Latin American fears for the influence of US culture. He stresses the viability and adaptation of local cultures, which transform global culture into local cultural expressions.

In the politics of national governments and the political significance of borders we can see two tendencies. On the one hand, global and transnational pressures make exclusive national policies increasingly difficult. Latin American politicians and intellectuals are drawing on the external world to formulate policies and ideologies. With the economic integration, also politics have become transnationalized as became clear with the failed coup in Paraguay in April 1996. It can also be said that global pressures have played an important role in the end of the authoritarian cycle in Latin American politics in the 1980s. On the other hand, the questions of national identity maintained their importance in Latin America. This led to debates in Chile on its recent authoritarian political past, in Peru and Guatemala on the place of the indigenous population, in Brazil on social inequality. These are all ‘national’ debates, waged in the national press which plays such an important role in Anderson’s analysis of the ‘imagined community’. Anderson himself has also pointed at the fact that international migration not necessarily leads to a decreasing importance of national identities. He stresses the ‘long-distance nationalism’ which gives migrants a strong place in national politics. There are also clear indications that migration has led to ‘cross-border labour organizing’, in which labour activists and unions from different nations are working together.

It is obvious that nationalism and national boundaries are not yet to disappear. What this means for geographical borders is less clear. On the one hand, it seems that the significance of geographical borders for Latin American nationalism has decreased. Although small differences on the demarcation of borders will always remain, the insistence on the integrity of the national borders, which played such an important role in nationalist politics in the past, has all but disappeared. With the signing of an agreement between Peru and Ecuador in 1998, the last explosive border conflict in Latin America has been solved. It seems improbable that less important disagreements between other countries will provoke open conflict. On the other hand, Latin American
governments are increasingly faced with transnational problems, such as the care for their migrant citizens and international crime. It has become clear that internal political problems of one country often radiate to the neighbours. Recently, this has become clear in the case of Colombia, where the guerrilla threatens to extend its activities to the territory of Venezuela and Ecuador. This has led to military activity at the borders. This activity is no sign of a warlike situation between the involved countries, but shows that Colombia no longer can consider its civil war as an exclusively internal affair. It may well be that national governments in Latin America will increasingly work together in order to suppress uncontrolled and often criminal political and economic activities in border regions. This may lead to increasing cross-border political cooperation, but it will in the short run not lead to a decreasing importance of national borders as markers of national identity. In this sense the idea that globalization and transnationalism will bring the end of nationalism and territorial borders is still unfounded, at least for the Latin American case. In the same vein, these new developments have not ended the continuing reproduction of semi-autonomous border networks, which continue to challenge the authority of the Latin American state.
Notes


19 In Chicano literature the concept of ‘border’ or ‘frontera’ has acquired strong symbolic connotations which have hardly anything to do anymore with the ‘real’ border and has become more of a literary concept. See e.g. G. Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza*, Spinsters / Aunt Lute, San Francisco, 1987 and C. Gutiérrez-Jones, *Rethinking the Borderlands. Between Chicano Culture and Legal Discourse*, University of California Press, Berkeley etc., 1995.


23 Martínez, *Border People*, p. 5-10.


26 For an example of the discontinuous history of the Mexican-US borderland: Heyman, *Life and Labor on the Border*.

27 This may be considered still part of the premodern heritage in which drawing border lines was not considered essential for exercising sovereignty. See: D. Power, Introduction: Terms, Concepts, and the Historians of Medieval and Early Modern Europe’, in: Power and Standen, *Frontiers in Question*, pp. 1-31 (esp. p. 27).


40 Slatta, ‘Historical Frontier Imagery’, p. 36.

42 Slatta, ‘Historical Frontier Imagery in the Americas’, p. 35.

43 LeGrand, *Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia*.


49 Donadio, *La Guerra con el Perú*, p. 171.


51 León and Llambi, *Las Relaciones Fronterizas Colombo-Venezolanas*, p. 5.


60 Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 115ff.

62 This quote comes from the 1941-issue of the *Revista Amautta*. This information was kindly offered to me by M. Brienen, who is currently completing a Ph.D. research project on Bolivian educational reform in the period 1937-1952.

63 Bell, *Campanha Gaúcha*, pp. 90-98.

64 This dictum is from the Argentinian politician D.F. Sarmiento, *Life in the Argentine Republic in the Days of the Tyrants; or, Civilization and Barbarism*, Hafner, New York, 1971 [Spanish original 1845].


80 *Gaceta Oficial*, Volume 32, Number 2648, 6 October 1915, ‘Consejo Inferior de Aduanas de Puerto Plata’.


89 Molano, *Selva Adentro*, p. 36.

91 Molano, *Selva adentro*, p. 47.


