

THE PERUVIAN STATE AND REGIONAL CRISES - THE DEVELOPMENT OF
REGIONAL MOVEMENTS, 1968-1980

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I. Some points of departure.

A basic overview of the main features and varying determinants of the new social movements¹ to have emerged in Latin America in recent years has yet to be undertaken. Evers (1983) in his thought provoking paper in this volume attempts to draw out some of the key elements and in so doing raises many fundamental issues. One of the central problems to emerge from Evers' approach is not only our relative lack of knowledge of the nature of these new social movements - in Evers' phrase the ribbon connecting social movements to social knowledge has been torn - but equally crucially the validity and applicability of our categories of social knowledge continue to be brought into question - or at least placed on an agenda of needed re-evaluation. A very clear reflection of this new questioning may be found in Kärner's (1983) recent article which can give us one or two useful discussion points for further examination.

Kärner contends that social movements, whether emerging in the so-called industrialized countries or in the developing countries, are not essentially brought into being by 'economic causes' (p.26), but rather by a process of alienation, whereby social subjects are reified or objectified through the imposition of the dominant structures of exploitation. According to Kärner, when collective consciousness acquires a level that permits a recognition of the reality of alienation social movements may be born. In this context, social movements may be understood in terms of a collective and communicative process of protest, led by individuals engaged in a struggle against existing social relations. For Kärner the necessary minimum conditions for the formation of a social movement are the existence of possibilities for collective communication and expression.

Now, although we can readily accept these necessary minimum conditions, taken together with the emergence of a collective awareness of alienation, in its varied forms of existence, I would like to suggest that Kärner's downgrading of the role of 'economic causes', without those causes being specified, raises a number of difficulties. Above all perhaps it brings our attention back to the problematic issue of the materiality of social questions and to the vexed discussion of the possible material roots of social protest and action within specific societies during given historical periods. Furthermore, material changes, in particular the deepening and diversification of the contemporary economic crisis, and their social and political effects need to be linked to the reality of state interventionism. Social movements do not emerge in a context devoid of materiality or state power, even though their genesis, orientations and impact cannot be simply situated within the traditional marxist schema of 'base' and 'superstructure'. In addition, although the level of organization and combativity reached at a certain moment by the popular classes and sectors may appear to be an immediately 'new' phenomenon, with an attendant variety of spontaneous expressions, the historical context, or more precisely the formation of a specific political conjuncture, needs to be taken into account.

Examining some of these themes, Vergopoulos (1981), in a recent article on social democracy and new types of popular mobilization in Latin America, emphasizes the specificity of the new social movements in relation to two contrasts with the earlier popular movements of the Inter-War period. Firstly, he suggests that the present movements have much less confidence in the possibilities of national capitalism, and instead are seeking to discover new possibilities of social development, without *étatisme*. Secondly, in contrast to the populist model of the 1930's, the politicization of these contemporary movements does not reflect the dominance of a centralized or charismatic form of direction and organization, but rather results from a variety of conditions determined at the base level. In other words, politicization does not emerge 'from above', but spreads out from communal, collective base units, whereby the norms of hierarchy and centralist command, so charac-

teristic of the *foquista* guerrilla movements of the 1960's and the 'mass-line' politics of the orthodox communist parties of Latin America, are replaced by a much more fluid, unstructured, and democratic approach to making politics in everyday life.

Vergopoulos' argument intersects at this point with some of Kärner's observations on the traditional definition of socialism, whereby very considerable emphasis has always been placed on the need for the centralized planning of the productive forces, already developed under capitalism. Kärner argues that this particular political disposition limits the possibilities for a much broader and more liberating approach to socialism wherein the democratization of all spheres of social life can prepare the way for an *alternative* society, rather than the perfection of capitalism. The Brazilian economist Paul Singer has expressed the point in the following way:

'the socialism of our epoch demands a broader content, putting less emphasis on the enlargement of material consumption and stressing instead the democratization of decision-making processes in both the economic and social spheres, as well as, in general terms, the diminution of authoritarianism in all fields of human life: from the family, school and factory to the larger national institutions of parties, trade unions and armed forces...'²

In the Peruvian case, and especially post-1975, one can discern evidence of a political tendency, often only embryonically present, which mirrors the major thrust of Singer's approach to socialism, and this tendency can be found in the new popular movements, which must not be conflated with the more structured organizational entities of the established left.

II. Structure and Content.

In concentrating my attention on the emergence of regional social movements in Peru, during the military period (1968-1980) and especially the latter phase of that period, I do not wish to imply that this particular type of movement has acquired a significance greater than other related forms of social organization and protest.

It is rather that these regional social movements do express a 'newness' and an orientation which is partially reflected in other modalities of socio-political protest. Hence, an examination of such movements can present us with some possible indicators for a more general discussion of the emergence of new forms of socio-political opposition to the state and the reproduction of capitalist social relations.

After signalling the importance of situating regionalism and the development of regional social movements within particular historical conjunctures, the analysis of regional crises in Peru during the 1968-1980 period is divided into three major parts. First, a brief evaluation of the socio-political background is presented, and in this section I attempt to pinpoint some of the salient contradictions of the military regime's socio-economic strategy during the *docenio*. Second, a few general remarks are advanced with respect to the overall nature of regional social movements in Peru. And, thirdly, by taking two examples - Arequipa and Pucallpa - I sketch out some more details of the specific trajectory of regional movements in the period under review, especially the latter phase of the "Peruvian Revolution" - i.e. the years from 1975 to 1980. Finally, in the concluding part of the paper, I make one or two connections with the more recent phase of civilian rule (post-1980) emphasizing the continuous development of regionalist struggles. The paper as a whole may be regarded as highly preliminary since much further research needs to be done on the issues brought forward for discussion. The essay thus represents no more than a so-called 'first statement'.

III. Periodization and Regionalism - A Note

Not infrequently, one does tend to find an assumption that in Latin America regionalism is predominantly a feature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and whilst in Love's (1974) case this assumption might well be a reflection of disciplinary background, in other cases (Balán 1978 and Roberts 1981) one is left with the impression that regionalism somehow belongs to the

past. I am not suggesting that these authors are denying the contemporary relevance of regional conflict but nevertheless what *is* absent is a sense of periodization.

Certainly, regionalism is not a new phenomenon (Mariátegui 1952, pp. 204-241) but its modalities continually change and it is therefore important to signal these changes and to try and anchor them within specific phases of capitalist development and state-society relations. As will be immediately apparent, this is not an easy task, and it can only be approached, in my view, with reference to a given social formation during a specific historical period, not forgetting of course that certain general tendencies may well be in evidence in a number of such formations during the same period.

In the case of Peru, the 1968-1980 period was characterized by military rule of a highly specific form, and I would argue that during this period we have the emergence of a number of 'regional problems' and conflicts which, despite exhibiting traits from previous historical phases, do express something quite new. I do not have the space in this paper to establish, in any detail, the specificity of military intervention,³ nor will it be possible to deal comprehensively with the variegated nature of all the regional expressions of social conflict relevant to the 1968-1980 period. However, through concentrating on two examples I hope to shed some light on the regional character of social struggle and state interventionism during the 1968-1980 period.

IV. Regions in Crisis - Peru, 1968-1980

1. The Socio-Political Background

When launching any discussion of the problems involved in characterizing the 1968-1980 period of military rule, we must always begin by distinguishing two phases: 1968-1975 and 1975-1980. In the first phase which is commonly referred to as the Velasco period, the military introduced a wide series of structural reforms and set in train an ambitious programme of modernization and

state capitalist development. Subsequently, in the second phase, post-1975, there were far fewer innovations and under the exigencies of economic and political crisis, there was a noticeable return to more orthodox social and economic policies, reflecting an overall trend of retrenchment and realignment.

The changes that took place between these two phases provide a necessary backdrop to any examination of regional social conflict and before analysing two 'regions in crisis' I want to mention some of the most determinant features of these two phases.

In the first place, we must remember that on the eve of the 1968 military coup d'etat, the dynamic contradictions of capital accumulation within the Peruvian social formation had reached a level of intensity that demanded a new form of state intervention.

For example, the contradiction between capital and wage-labour, particularly evident within the rapidly growing coastal cities, especially in the metropolitan agglomeration of Lima-Callao, manifested itself in an increasingly sharp incidence of strike action. Also, contradictions and conflicts between the agro-commercial and industrial fractions of capital had reached a point of serious stalemate which the conventional political parties were unable to effectively resolve or mediate. Furthermore, the well-known heterogeneity of class structure, the absence of any territorial universalization of capitalist relations of production, and the continuing backwardness of the agricultural economy, within which non-capitalist forms of production still persisted, defined a socio-economic context within which peasant movements and struggles around the agrarian question were acquiring an increasingly explosive character. It was due to the acuteness of these problems, and their apparent intractability within the traditional framework of the political system, that some form of state intervention was called for so as to preserve the long-term interests of Peruvian capitalist development.

As far as the class basis or context of military intervention was concerned, it should be noted that the industrial bourgeoisie in pre-1968 Peru had no political party through which it could direct-

ly express its interests and objectives. Moreover, since it was clearly antagonistic towards the so-called 'oligarchic bourgeoisie' which had its material basis in the agricultural export sector, the initial orientation of the Velasco regime with its emphasis on the need for industrialization, modernization of infrastructure and eradication of inefficient forms of production in the agricultural sector, was met with cautious optimism by Peru's industrial class.

Nonetheless, it would be quite wrong to assume from this that the military take-over was carried out at the behest of the industrial bourgeoisie, not only because of the later emergence of hostility towards the regime on the part of the industrialists, but because such an argument fails to explain the specificities of the regime's overall strategy and its accompanying ideological discourse, which cannot be simply designated as 'bourgeois'.

If we remain within the 'sphere of the national', then it is feasible to talk of the existence of a 'hegemonic stalemate' - a declining agro-commercial class, a developing, but still politically weak, industrial bourgeoisie, a relatively small and poorly-organized urban proletariat, and a backward so-called 'peasant sector' - where no single force within civil society was in a position to push through its own political project. In this historical moment, not only did the military seize power, but a specific group or fraction within the army, which had a particularly distinctive ideological conception of Peruvian development, was able to initiate a series of completely new structural reforms. But, equally, we must bear in mind that the reforms and new political initiatives were not carried out by an independent or autonomous state, certainly not within an international frame of reference, for the state remained dependent on foreign capital. In addition, the military's ideological project of attempting to dissipate the consciousness and autonomous organization of the dominated classes was not successful. On the contrary, the project boomeranged with the growth of working-class resistance to corporatism and peasant opposition to state administered agrarian reform.⁴

Although the Velasco regime established and developed a state enterprise sector, the profitable industrial branches were left open to foreign and private domestic capital and, in fact, many of the state enterprises accumulated large debts. However, at the same time, the expansion of state capital, and attempts at bringing sections of the labour force into management participation were regarded by both small and medium-scale Peruvian industrialists as dangerous encroachments on their economic and political position.⁵

On the one hand, a major limitation of the military's project in the first phase was that it could not create the independent base necessary for rapid industrialization unless it nationalised the profitable sectors of the economy. But, to do so would have required massive political mobilization of the dominated classes. This in turn would have menaced the interests of domestic and international capital and signalled the beginning of a real revolution. On the other hand, the encroachments and increased control exercised by the state alienated important sections of national and international capital, whilst the military's corporatist ideology did not quell the development of more radical forms of consciousness within the dominated classes. Finally, the crisis at the international level and the need for greater austerity in the interests of capital led to international pressure on the Peruvian regime to return to a more 'orthodox' pattern of dependent capitalist development.

In the second phase (1975-1980), the primary emphasis of economic policy fell on the export promotion of non-traditional products (export-processing industries). By the latter part of the 1970's it became clear that the dominant industrial groups in Peru were those whose major interests lay in production for the external market, and these groups were closely linked to foreign firms. Thus efforts to develop the domestic market met more sustained opposition, and furthermore Velasco's economic projects brought in their train a burgeoning public debt, so that by 1975, service payments amounted to 36.7% of the value of total exports.

Under the tutelage of the IMF, Morales-Bermúdez introduced cut-backs in public expenditure, privatization of state-sector firms, devaluation of the currency, reductions in subsidies and wage and salary freezes. Similarly, since the exigencies of capitalist crisis required a more assertive and repressive approach to the dominated classes, the Morales-Bermúdez regime began to elaborate an ideological discourse, which although not shorn of all populist elements, did conform, in increasing measure, to a more authoritarian, non-participatory vision of socio-political development.

2. Regional Social Movements

With the above-mentioned remarks in mind, we must now formulate some guidelines for our treatment of regional struggles.

Apart from the well-known case of the Arequipa region, to which I shall return shortly, the period immediately prior to the military coup d'état of 1968 witnessed no significant emergence of specifically *regional* movements, that is to say, movements which articulated their demands within a regional rather than specifically urban or rural framework.

In the first phase of military rule, a number of disconnected conflicts arose and although these social disputes have sometimes been placed within a wider framework of regional social movements, the social protests that emerged in the province of Huanta (Aya-cucho) in 1969 or in Cuzco in 1971 and 1972 crystallized around highly-restricted demands. In the former case, the origin of the protests against the central state lay in local objections to restrictive legal changes in the free provision of education, and in the Cuzco example, the disputes focussed on specific organizational problems in the local university. Thus, in these instances, one did not see the coalescence of variegated demands and protests around a wider regional objective.

On the other hand, in 1973, in the department of Moquegua, situated towards the frontier with Chile, a front for the defense of the interests of the whole area was formed (*El Frente Unico de Defensa de los Intereses de Moquegua*). In that year, the regional

front organized a twenty-four hour stoppage, and promulgated a series of demands, including a call for the construction of the Ilo-Moquegua-Desaguadero-La Paz highway, the re-instatement of the dismissed construction workers attached to the Cuajone project , and educational reforms (Ballón and Filomeno 1981). This particular zone is characterized by the localized dominance of the Southern Peru Copper Corporation and the struggles that take place in Moquegua have always to be linked to the central role played by the mineworkers.⁶

Subsequently, in the second phase (1975-1980) of military rule, other regional movements emerged, and as Ballón and Filomeno remind us such relatively new forms of social protest followed on from the development of widespread national opposition to the austerity measures introduced in 1977 by the Morales-Bermúdez regime. The national one-day stoppage of 19 July represented the culmination of a territorially broad range of demonstrations, strikes, protests and actions against the return to a more regressive economic strategy.⁷ At the end of 1977, the committee of the popular organizations of Cuzco submitted to the central government a series of regional demands, which were followed up and reinforced by strike-action and stoppages. Similarly, in Iquitos, Pucallpa, and Tarapoto protests of a regional character erupted and several fronts for the defense of regional interests were formed.⁸

As several authors have already noted, it is extremely difficult to discern a common thread running through these disparate regional movements, no least due to their highly specific and polymorphous nature. Nevertheless, it is still possible to follow the suggestions of Ballón and Filomeno (p. 102) who extract some significant political conclusions from their survey of regional social movements. They argue, not surprisingly, that the 'regional problem' is interpreted in different ways by different social classes, and that in the Peruvian case, one has a double content or character to regional struggles. The dominant social classes, and often those groups most closely connected to local commerce, limit their regional demands to an emphasis on the need for

economic expansion and state encouragement of new productive activities. Hence, in this political context, the articulation of regional protest is addressed to the central state which is called upon to mediate in a manner whereby both 'parties' to the dispute accept and maintain the prevailing order of social relations and political power, but through which the regionally-based commercial groups seek to reform or rationalize a given aspect of the socio-economic structure in accordance with their own interests.

Conversely, the popular sectors - workers, peasants, public employees, students, teachers and some small-scale traders address the state from the point of view of demanding improvements in the provision of social services, economic infrastructure and overall socio-economic development, but in a manner that expresses a qualitatively different form of opposition. The prevailing pattern of social relations and political power is contested, and what is more, (within a regional movement) there often unfolds an antagonism towards the dominant social classes of a specific zone. Hence one has present not only the well-known heterogeneity of social composition, but also an embedded class contradiction determined by capitalist relations of production and the associated disposition of political power.

Consequently, there also exists a potential conflict concerning the political leadership of a given movement - a struggle over ideological hegemony. In this sense, the formation of broadly based social movements at the regional level offers the left new opportunities to develop a presence and a project which can define the content of democratic change under a socialist rubric.

The appearance and consolidation of numerous regional social movements during the Morales-Bermúdez phase of military rule must be linked to key political and ideological changes during the earlier *velasquista* phase. In these formative years, the popular sectors developed new forms of political expression and organization, and, in the absence of concerted state repression, the subordinated classes began to question the automatic nature of the relation that the state was trying to establish with civil society.

The peasantry augmented its mobilization and strengthened its organization on a departmental basis; the proletariat increased its degree of sindicalization and began to articulate more autonomous modes of political expression; the '*pueblos jóvenes*' became the foci of new forms of social organization and popular expression; and certain layers of the middle-classes (teachers, state employees) registered advances in the level and scope of their organization (Tovar 1982). These new modalities of popular social expression, movement and organization emerged during a very specific political phase - a kind of political *intermezzo* within which the dominant social classes were no longer assured of a state that expressed their interests in an unequivocal and unambiguous manner.

As a way of lending these above comments a greater degree of concreteness, I now want to consider the situation in two quite different regions. In both cases I shall attempt to link an awareness of the material constraints or contexts of the emergence of regional social movements with a 'localization' of the nature of regional conflicts in the related but not necessarily determined context of state-society relations. In this latter sphere, the struggle against political and administrative centralism has been quite crucial.

3. The 'Regional Question' in Two Instances - a brief sketch

i. Arequipa

The city of Arequipa is usually viewed as the socio-economic pivot of the southern region, and previous manifestations of southern regionalism have always been closely associated with the key influence of the Arequipeño bourgeoisie. In the 1968-1980 period there have been new evidences of regional conflict and protest and although the dominant urban-industrial groups of Arequipa have played a role in this context, the subordinate classes have also emerged as a central element in the formulation and prosecution of regional social demands. The emergence of the working class as a primary force in the articulation of regional protest can be partly linked to the relative incapacity

of the import-substitution industrialization strategy to create the necessary foundation for expanding employment opportunities.⁹ In addition, however, several other factors must be mentioned.

1. The evidence shows that not only has the industrial structure of the Arequipa department been heavily orientated around textiles, food and beverages (c. 60 per cent of gross value of industrial production in 1975) but that a small number of transnational companies (*Leche Gloria, Sidsur, Perulac* and *Compañía Cervecería del Sur*)¹⁰ dominate this consumer goods production. Further, one can see an association between this pattern of concentration and external, i.e. extra-regional, control of the industrial sector with internally-generated value being re-directed outside the Arequipa zone (Jameson 1976). In other words, within the industrial sector, re-investment within the Arequipa region has been limited.
2. The definition of 'region' is more problematical than is often assumed in writings on Arequipa and the southern zone, for in some instances related struggles evolved in different urban nuclei (e.g. Arequipa, Cusco, Puno, Tacna and Moquegua), which, within a broad definition, all fall within the southern region of Peru. On the other hand, struggles in the countryside, and in particular in the rural areas of the department of Arequipa, did not assume the same importance as in other regions, such as, for example in Cuzco.
3. The policies of the Velasco regime concentrated on developing the economic resources (agricultural, mineral) of the Arequipa department, in conjunction with improvements in associated infrastructure. Similarly, in the contiguous departments of Moquegua and Tacna large-scale investments in the mining sector created new centres of working class concentration, and as Lombardi (1981 p. 27) points out such new concentrations led not only to the establishment of new labour organizations (e.g. the mineworkers union of Cerro Verde) but to the subsequent

alliance of these new groups with working-class organizations in other branches of the industrial sector. Thus, in 1972 and 1973 general stoppages in the southern region as a whole were characterized by a new link or articulation between urban workers and workers in the mining sector. According to Durand (1979, p. 103) it was in these movements that the dynamic of the popular movement presented itself in a regionally unified manner.

4. In the second phase of military rule, the exacerbation of the economic crisis stimulated a much more militant response from the dominated classes. During these years, the capital-wage/labour contradiction became more acute, and in Arequipa, as also in Moquegua, Puno and Cuzco, regional demands came to be increasingly delineated by the growing class consciousness and combativity of the urban and mining proletariat. Equally, sections of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, especially teachers and state employees, were involved in strike action, but, as Lajo (1981) intimates a broad urban-rural combination or coalition of urban and rural forces did not materialize.
5. In the Morales-Bermúdez phase the military gave added weight to new organs of regional development and in the case of ORDE-AREQUIPA the regime attempted to incorporate representatives of the locally-dominant groups as a way of preventing the possible formation of a unified regional bloc. But the state's intervention in this form was not the only source of division, for as both Lombardi (1981) and Durand (1979) show ideological conflicts among the various left-wing parties and tendencies worked against the coalescence of radical forces in the region.

In attempting any analytical synthesis of the explanatory factors responsible for the generation of social protests and conflicts within the Arequipa region it is necessary to bear in mind that historically the city of Arequipa has always acted as a nucleus for anti-centralist social forces located in the southern zone as a whole (i.e. including the departments of Moquegua, Puno, Tacna and also, to a certain extent, Cuzco). In this sense, one

has a rather complex pattern of social struggles that largely reflects the heterogeneous socio-economic structure of the southern region. At the same time, the social forces present in the city of Arequipa have tended to play a regionally coalescent role, helping to bring together other social groupings and tendencies located in different parts of the southern region, and articulating their various demands within a broader regionalist framework. In the past, the dominant industrial and commercial groups based in Arequipa (the so-called Arequipeño bourgeoisie) attempted to fulfill such a role, and more recently the popular sectors have been attempting to develop a similar regionalist function, although rooted in quite different social demands.

As far as the popular struggle is concerned, we can identify three basic issues:

- a) opposition to Lima centralism and demands for a greater degree of regional control over public administration and the course of socio-economic development;
- b) opposition to the role of foreign capital in the southern region in general, linked to demands for national and regional control of the planning and utilization of the area's use values, and
- c) struggles at the point of production, which can perhaps be best defined in terms of capital-labour conflicts embedded in the valorization process.

ii. Pucallpa

What has been referred to as the '*Pucallpazo*' of June 1980 and the events leading up to this highly significant outbreak of sustained regional protest provides us with our second example of a 'regional question'. The formation of the *Frente de Defensa de la Provincia de Coronel Portillo* (FREDECOP) represented a remarkable fusion of social forces located within the city of Pucallpa and its adjacent rural hinterland. The vitality, heterogeneity and territorial sphere of influence of the social struggles in Pucallpa and its surrounding selva

province of Coronel Portillo opened up a new phase in the history of regional movements in Peru and in these brief notes it is only possible to sketch out, in the barest detail, some of the essential features of those developments.

At the outset, it must be born in mind that the city of Pucallpa, which had an estimated population of just over 90,000 in 1981, has experienced a totally different social and economic history to the much larger urban agglomeration of Arequipa, and that Pucallpa's rural hinterland and geographical location make any detailed comparison with our first 'case-study' exceedingly tenuous. I do not wish to imply adherence to the 'uniqueness' view of regional history, nor do I subscribe to that tradition of studying regions as though they were entities somehow divorced from socio-economic trends operating at the wider international and national levels. But, the economic and socio-political specificities of regions in crisis ought not to be swept aside by the tide of general theory. By way of synthesis the following observations may be made.

1. During the 1970's Pucallpa and its region experienced a marked economic expansion - industrial production, for example, increasing by 25.4 per cent between 1974 and 1979 (María Salcedo 1980 p. 106) - but by the end of the decade deficiencies in social and economic infrastructure had become even more pronounced. Problems with the availability of running water and electricity were compounded by wholly unsatisfactory health and educational facilities. In addition, the prices of basic consumer items was a further source of regional grievance. Therefore, although the region witnessed an increasing utilization of its use values - the growth in forestry was particularly strong - the concomitant social and economic benefits appeared to be extremely limited, plus the fact that, politically, the provincial population had no control over the administrative structure of the area.

2. In the years of the Velasco phase, the incipient bases of future regional struggle can be traced back to the organization of the teacher's union (SUTEP) and to the activities of the Federation of Bank Employees. These two sectors exerted a much more dynamic influence than the pro-*aprista* working class of the area, and together with new forms of popular organization in the *pueblos jóvenes*, the activities of these social groupings heralded the emergence of a more structured regional consciousness.
3. In 1975, a front for the defence of the interests of the people of Pucallpa was formed (*Frente de Defensa de los Intereses del Pueblo de Pucallpa*) and a key factor in the establishment of this front was the widespread dissatisfaction with the municipal authorities, who were appointed and controlled by the central state in Lima, and who remained insensitive to the demands of the local population. This initial front combined sections of the left with the Chamber of Commerce and other representatives of provincially-based industrial and banking groups.
4. From 1975 to 1977 the changes at national level, the deepening of the crisis, gave a stimulus to the regional forces of the left and when workers involved in the July 1977 stoppage were dismissed, a committee for their defence was established. Gradually, this committee came to amplify its aims and in 1978 it was transformed into the *Frente de la Defensa de la Provincia de Coronel Portillo*. The front's demands were multifaceted, reflecting its social composition, and included such things as immediate improvement in urban water supplies, and electricity supply, the establishment of a national university in Pucallpa, the setting up of a new hospital, the construction of a new river terminal, re-instatement of dismissed workers, the granting of land titles to the peasant communities, and the creation of a new department as recognition of the importance of the area. The front was composed of industrial workers, teachers, neighbourhood organizations (*pueblos jóvenes*), peasants, taxi drivers, professional groups

and representatives of provincial commerce and small to medium-scale businesses.

5. The culmination of the front's political activity came with the general strike of June 1980 and the paralysis of the region's economic and social functions. Popular assemblies were organized, roads were blocked, food was collectively distributed, through the active cooperation of the peasant communities of the area, free medical care was given to those in need, and the local police force was obliged to subordinate its authority to that of the regional popular front.
6. The state intervened in a reformist guise and in June of 1980 Morales-Bermúdez promulgated a decree which created the legal basis for the establishment of the new department of Ucayali; one of the central demands of the regional movement was thus officially recognized and accepted.
7. Subsequently, the political heterogeneity of the regional bloc reasserted itself and the reformist limitations of the movement became more visible. The inevitable duality or ambivalence of any movement composed of dialectically-opposed social forces re-expressed itself within the confines of regionalist politics. Equally, however, new opportunities and forms of political organization were opened up and new levels of consciousness evolved.

V. The Continuance and Accentuation of Regional Social Conflicts, post-1980 - a few concluding notes.

No matter how much political importance may be attached to the issues of democracy, popular participation and possible openings for socialist development, the continuing generalization of social conflict and struggle in post-1980 Peru cannot be understood *outside* the material implications of the world crisis and the varied implications of that crisis within the economic and political structure of Peruvian society. In other words, one key driving force of the continued development of social protest in the post-

1980 phase emanates from the severe material constraints placed upon economic expansion and social improvement by conditions of capitalist crisis and state-administered monetarist policies. Furthermore, it is the concrete reality of the capitalist economic crisis which underlines the political importance of discussions of democracy, popular participation and struggle, as well as the related and difficult issue of the possible connections and interaction of the new social movements with existing political organizations and parties. Thus, the recent interest in new forms of social protest in contemporary Peru ought not to be divorced from the material roots of those new forms of protest, and the relation between these material roots and the global tendencies of capitalist development.

At another level, the qualitatively distinct political expressions and perspectives of *velasquismo*, coupled with the introduction of a series of relatively progressive structural reforms, helped to generate new forms of consciousness within the popular classes, even if, at the same time, state-administered reforms from above were often met with demands for further radicalization and freedom from corporatist control. In the sphere of regional social struggles, the importance given by the Peruvian military to 'decentralized development', especially by the Velasco regime but also to a lesser extent by Morales-Bermúdez, helped to generate a greater popular awareness of this particular issue, while, in reality, the actualized policies of both regimes led to an *increase* in uneven regional development. In addition, Lima centralism continued unabated, so that the provincial and departmental levels of the administrative structure remained largely devoid of effective financial and political power. As a consequence, a key demand of the post-1980 regional movements, concretized in the political form of regional stoppages, has been that of greater decentralization of political power away from the capital. However, as in the cases of the Cerro de Pasco, Tingo María, Morropón and Ayacucho regional protests in 1982, as well as that of Puno in 1983, anti-centralist demands were linked to grievances concerning social services, economic infrastructure, labour relations and state productive investment, or the lack of it.

These recent regional movements have not, of course, confronted the capitalist state in any directly revolutionary way, but equally it would be inappropriate to designate such socio-political tendencies as being 'reformist' in character, and in need of 'correct' political guidance. The emergence, or in some cases eruption, of broadly-constituted movements of social protest and action poses new questions for the political organizations of the left - questions which reveal, in a highly stark fashion, the gap between empirical reality and theoretical knowledge, and perhaps, above all, the need for new approaches to the theoretical and practical content and direction of socialism and democracy in the capitalist societies of the periphery.

NOTES

1. Under this general rubric we can mention, as one possible selection, the following: the new workers' movement in Brazil (PT), the urban and regional movements of Peru, developing at the level of the urban neighbourhood and at a much wider level, in the form of fronts for the defense of popular interests and rights in specific regions, indigenous social movements (Colombia), environmental and ecology movements (Venezuela), peasant land seizures and autonomous peasant movements (Mexico), human rights associations and groups, the feminist movement, and in Central America new kinds of guerrilla movements.
2. Quoted in Kärner (1983, p. 29).
3. For a recent and stimulating discussion of the 1968-1980 period, see Booth and Sorj (1983); in a previous paper I have attempted to draw out some broader issues - see Slater (1981).
4. For a good discussion of the relations between the military and the working class, see Haworth (1983, pp.94-116); on the agrarian question, see Havens et al (1983, pp.14-39).
5. The social property sector was repeatedly attacked by the National Society of Industries and in general the Velasco model of 'economic pluralism' did not correspond to the vision of Peruvian economic development held by the dominant domestic industrial groups. As Stepan (1978, p.121) reveals, the *Sociedad Nacional de Industrias* complained in 1974 that it had never faced so serious a problem in its entire institutional life as was now being created by the Velasco government's policies toward industrial development.
6. Some useful discussion of the impact of foreign capital on the socio-economic structure of the department of Moquegua may be found in Lopez (1981); see also the document on Moquegua published in the same issue of *Tareas*.
7. As Sulmont (1981, p.62) indicates the 1970's witnessed a concomitant growth in the number of recognized labour organizations, the figure rising from 2,331 in 1968 to 4,536 by 1977.
8. Henríquez (1982) has provided a useful list of the various regional stoppages and popular actions to emerge at the regional level - her data are for the years from 1977 to 1981.
9. As a specific measure of the industrial decline of the department of Arequipa, we may note that during the Velasco phase, Arequipa's share of the nation's total gross value of industrial production declined from 3.7 percent in 1969 to 2.0 percent in 1975 (Cabieses et al 1982, p.111).
10. *Leche Gloria* is a subsidiary of the Northamerican transnational Carnation, *Sidsur* belongs to the transnational Bunge and Born, *Perulac* is controlled by Nestlé and Cervecera del Sur is part of a larger brewery firm operating across national frontiers (Pilsen, Cristal). By the end of the 1970's, the

companies of Leche Gloria, Sidsur and Cervecera del Sur accounted for 46% of the total value of industrial production in Arequipa.

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