


Part Two

The Andes



Face-to-Face with Rebellion

Individual Experience and Indigenous Consciousness in the Thupa Amaro Insurrection

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"The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them the names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language."

—Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*—

The Context of Rebellion

Having decided that corregidor Antonio de Arriaga was to be hanged, José Gabriel Thupa Amaro called on his trusted old friend and teacher, the creole priest of Pampamarca, Antonio Lopez de Sosa, to inform the corregidor of his fate. Handing Arriaga a picture of Christ, the priest conveyed the sentence of death. On November 10, 1780 Arriaga, dressed in a penitential habit, was led to the gallows in Tungasuca. The corregidor asked Thupa Amaro's pardon for once having called him a 'fraudulent Indian.' Then Antonio Oblitas, a black selected to be the executioner, carried out the Inca's order and hanged Arriaga, but the leather rope broke and both the executioner and victim tumbled to the ground. The corregidor's death was only temporarily delayed. Another rope was obtained and while several men secured the rope that encircled Arriaga's neck, others, including the executioner, pulled on Arriaga's feet

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until the corregidor was dead.

The gathered Indians and residents of Tungasuca watched along with Thupa Amaro and several priests as the corregidor was hanged and the insurrection made public. These witnesses and the use of a penitential habit added to the formality and 'legality' of the situation. They also helped confirm the authority of Thupa Amaro, adding to the mystique the rebel leader already had as heir to the Inca throne. As Leon Campbell noted,

*"the rebel's elaborate use of ceremony and ritual in publicly stripping Arriaga of his sash of office and sword, as well as his bastón, [vara], or authority stick signifying his position as corregidor, dressing the fallen official in sackcloth and ashes and as [in?] the penitential habit of the Franciscans, was a visible effort to gain the support of the people also. Witnesses to the event noted the hanging certified Túpac Amaru's charismatic authority: the people who cordoned off the plaza appeared to be 'entranced' and firmly under the sway of the leader."*¹

Thupa Amaro envisioned broad changes and reforms that he knew would not be acceptable to viceregal officials. The colonial government might tolerate the execution of a corregidor, particularly one such as Arriaga who had been abusive and excessive, without resorting to reprisals. However, it would never accept the changes he demanded nor the appropriation of the twenty-two thousand pesos of tribute that Thupa Amaro had taken from the Canas y Canchis treasury after having coerced or forged the signature of Arriaga. The crown's tribute, the product of the sweat and toil of Indians, would provide the initial funding for the rebellion.

Yet, at least publicly, Thupa Amaro took his actions in the name of the king of Spain. Even though people in the communities were experiencing increasing tensions by 1780, they were not necessarily disposed to rebel, or, if they rebelled, to reject the Spanish crown. By rising against colonial officials in the name of Charles III, Thupa Amaro sought to win support from those who would have hesitated or shied away had they seen their actions as part of an open rebellion against the king rather than against unjust authorities and laws. Even to the condemned Arriaga, the rebel leader claimed to have in his possession royal orders for the corregidor's execution.² Thus, as the flames of rebellion began to spread, Thupa Amaro's followers were led to believe that they were taking up arms in the name of the king to rid themselves, and the crown, of bad government.

The capture and execution of Antonio de Arriaga was the opening salvo by Thupa Amaro (also known as Túpac Amaru³) in a rebellion that swept like wildfire across the southern Andes in 1780 and which is generally known by his name. This insurrection, the most serious challenge to Spanish colonial rule in the Andes since the sixteenth century, is the subject of this chapter. I will first place the rebellion in its colonial and, especially, its eighteenth century context. Then I will examine ways in which face-to-face relations affected participation, or the lack of

participation, by indigenous peoples in the movement. In so doing I will focus primarily on events in the two Cuzco provinces, Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis, where the rebellion was centered and where Thupa Amaro was a *curaca* (ethnic leader).

There were actually several uprisings, Thupa Amaro and his followers constituting the largest and most successful rebellious force. The movements that have been subsumed under the name of the Thupa Amaro rebellion were complex. They shared some characteristics, but their participants also had different agendas, different goals. Thupa Amaro sought to incorporate *criollos* to a much greater degree than did the movements in Upper Peru or what is now Bolivia. The indigenous peoples themselves were separated not only by their own cultures and ethnicities and by certain differences in regional economic and political circumstances, but by language. The people near Cuzco were Quechua speakers while many of those in the rebellious zones of Bolivia often spoke Aymara. Indeed, as Leon Campbell argues, there were,

*"profound differences between neo-Inca nationalism as it was expounded by the elitist Túpac Amarus of Cuzco, whose purpose was to unite everyone who was not a 'Spaniard,' and the radical, populist, and separatist views held by the commoner, indigenous Kataris of Upper Peru, whose ideas were shaped by the strong presence of native community leadership."*⁴

Though one may dispute the implications of Campbell's definition of the Thupa Amaros as 'elitist' and argue that Cuzco communities, like those under the influence of the Kataris *"were shaped by the strong presence of native community leadership,"* the regional variations were strong.

The execution of Arriaga, though it was Thupa Amaro's entrance on to the revolutionary stage, was not the first act of rebellion in 1780. In the province of Chayanta in Upper Peru fighting had broken out in August and September of 1780. The leader of this rebellion was Tomás Catari, but by January of 1781 he had been captured and executed. His brothers, Dámaso and Nicolás assumed control of the rebellion, but they shortly met their brother's fate. While the Chayanta revolt found roots in many of the same factors that drove the peoples of rural Cuzco to rebel, the Chayanta rebels were different. They more often turned against their own curacas, as well as the Spanish, and what resulted was an inner civil war as well as a rebellion against colonial rule. In this region close to Potosi there were also many *forasteros* who added to the complexity of the ethnic composition of the region and which provided a basis of conflict between *originarios* and *forasteros* in this zone. Spaniards also had a very strong influence in this region and controlled considerable lands. This is in relatively sharp contrast to the home provinces of Thupa Amaro where there were relatively few *forasteros* or Spaniards, except in the zone of Quispicanchis closest to the city of Cuzco.

After the defeat of the Catari brothers, Julián Apasa, better known as Túpac Catari (borrowing names from Túpac Amaru and Tomás Cata-

ri), emerged as the leader of indigenous rebel forces in the Aymara speaking regions of Upper Peru which by this point were strongest in the zone near La Paz. Túpac Catari, though acting with a great deal of independence and in control of a more popular movement, did accept the Thupa Amaros, at least in name, as leaders of the rebellion. However, by November of 1781 he too had met his end at the hands of colonial justice, and many of his followers had grown wary or tired of the movement.

Operating out of Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis, Thupa Amaro survived barely seven months after initiating the rebellion. He, his wife, and other family members and rebels were executed in a most brutal fashion in the plaza of Cuzco on May 18, 1781. Parts of their bodies were sent throughout the region to serve as very grim reminders to others who might consider rising up against Europeans. The rebellious forces then came under the control of the Inca's cousin, Diego Cristóbal Thupa Amaro. The rebels fought on but eventually accepted the viceroy's offer of pardon. By early 1782 Spanish rule was no longer threatened. For over a year, however, the viceroyalty had been shaken to its foundations.

The events of 1780 had been preceded by the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion which had been fought in the central *montaña* region of Peru during the 1740s and early 1750s and which was strengthened by the belief that its leader was the returning Inca. Juan Santos, claiming descent from the Inca Atahualpa and armed with a Jesuit education, struggled to restore the Inca kingdom and to remove Europeans from the realm he and his followers controlled. When Juan Santos and his troops marched on Andamarca,

*"the defense preparations organized by Andamarca's respectable 'citizens' fell apart. Only two shots were fired before an Indian voice shouted: 'This is our Inca, come over here.' Juan Santos then peacefully entered, marched toward the plaza, and accepted the homage of his new vassals. As a horrified eyewitness later recalled, the Indians and mestizos who betrayed Andamarca's defense kissed the Rebel's hands and feet."*⁵

For these people the idea of an Inca, the acceptance of an Inca ruler, had cultural resonance.

Identification with, and glorification of, the Inca past was not new, but such tendencies reverberated with increasing strength in the eighteenth century. The desperate present made the rebirth of the past a source of hope as well as providing an alternative vision to the Spanish dominated world. Throughout the colonial period there were those who believed in *Gran Paititi*, an Inca society in the jungle where survivors of Cuzco had fled and rebuilt their empire after the Spanish conquest. A millenarian belief, that of *Inkarri*, also grew after the collapse of Tawantinsuyu and the death of the Inca. According to the *Inkarri* belief the Inca would return and bring order and justice to the world. In the late colonial period many *naturales* (a colonial term for indigenous peoples)

were attracted to the cultural renewal and identity offered by *Gran Paititi* and *Inkarri*. However, as Alberto Flores Galindo cautioned, one should not see in *Inkarri* and *Gran Paititi* "a mechanical response to colonial domination." He also noted that while by the eighteenth century such ideas were widespread they were not continuous, and were probably best thought of as "small islands and archipelagos."⁶

The growing identification of the Inca past as a more harmonious world also stirred pride in some of the remaining indigenous nobility. This is reflected in the colonial portraits of Inca nobles who chose to have themselves painted not in Spanish clothes, their everyday dress, but dressed as Inca royalty. During the rebellion Thupa Amaro not only donned Inca apparel and symbols, such as the loose fitting outer garment or *uncu*, and a gold sun, but he and his wife, Micaela Bastidas, had themselves painted as an Inca royal couple.⁷

Flores Galindo argued that this interest in the Inca even carried over to certain Europeans and served as a potential unifying force between the indigenous and non-indigenous worlds,

"the return of the Inca, as an alternative to colonial oppression, was born of the approximation of the Indian and Spanish republics, those two seemingly impassable worlds. A plain biological fact: the increase of the mestizos (22 percent of the population) over the course of the [eighteenth] century. Andean culture moved from repression and clandestinity to tolerance and into public ambits: fiestas and processions exhibited images of the Incas; similar themes appeared on the keros (drinking cups), canvasses, and even murals. The reinstatement of the Inca Empire would seem then to constitute a principle of identity: this utopia would not be a product solely of the indigenous sector, but would encompass other social sectors as well.

*The approximation of these two republics (Indian and Spanish) followed several routes. At times the creoles and mestizos would opt to express themselves in Quechua, composing yaravies (indigenous folk songs) like 'Mariano Melgar' or dramas with Incaic personages in the style of Ollantay. On other occasions, the Indian might 'employ European elements to better express himself.'"*⁸

The collective memory of the Incan world and its glories was also enhanced, perhaps created, through the reading of Garcilaso de la Vega's *Royal Commentaries*. Indigenous nobles and peoples of European or mixed heritage pored over the work of this first generation mestizo who sought to redeem his mother's people. Again Flores Galindo informs us:

"Comentarios Reales, that book of Renaissance history, came to be read much as a pamphlet by figures such as Túpac Amaru, who took as emphatic denunciation the comparison of the Incas and the Romans, the criticisms of Viceroy Toledo, the veiled suggestion that a just and equitable empire ought to be reconstructed. Garcilaso turned the Inca era, Tawantinsuyo, into a golden age. The Inca believed the past could fill a moralizing function by offering models for the present: his

*historical conception was infected by utopia in the strictest European sense of the word. He was a Platonic historian. The eighteenth-century indigenous elite, which had easy access to Spanish language and to the printed word, understood this inner message of the book; they in turn, transported it orally to other social sectors. We know 'a work by Garcilaso' accompanied Túpac Amaru in his travels."*⁹

While this growing consciousness or Inca nationalism was important, one should be careful to not read too much into this movement. John Rowe cautions that it is necessary "to maintain a clear distinction between the mass of the tributary population and the aristocracy of the caciques; both groups served part of the old tradition, but a different part."¹⁰ However, even if the concern with Inca heritage was not 'the unifying factor' for caste or racial consciousness, it was important in the larger awareness that developed among certain *naturales* in the complex and contradictory years just before the 1780 rebellion.

One of the leading scholars of eighteenth century rebellion in Peru, Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, argues that the Thupa Amaro rebellion erupted in the southern Andes because it was precisely in this region where "the colonial contradictions accumulated."¹¹ O'Phelan had in mind dislocations created by colonial demands, changes in the colonial structure which disrupted trade and the increased economic hardship such burdens placed on *naturales* in the region. However, contradictions within the indigenous communities, often spurred by colonial demands, were also pronounced. In Canas y Canchis and Quispicanchis, where the population remained overwhelmingly Indian, the way of life of the *naturales*, though significantly altered over the course of more than two centuries of colonial rule, still allowed people in the communities to preserve a strong sense of themselves. By the late eighteenth century, however, population growth, economic demands, and shortages of land had eroded the *naturales'* security. With their way of life threatened, the difficulties of being both Indian and a subject of Spanish colonial rule began to be exacerbated. For many people in the southern Andes, but certainly not all, these contradictions had become too great by 1780. In this situation the legitimacy of, and linkages to, viceregal officials and Spaniards, if not the crown, were susceptible of being severed when Thupa Amaro, heir to the Inca throne, provided the leadership, direction, and insurrectional spark.

Over the course of the eighteenth century the Bourbon monarchs of Spain, like other colonial rulers, sought to exert greater control over their colonies and to make the colonies yield increased revenues. As a part of these changes, the crown and individual government officials augmented demands and imposed policies that made life much more difficult for many Andean peoples in the decades prior to the Thupa Amaro rebellion. This, in turn, caused many indigenous people (and some people of European decent), to question the legitimacy of those who governed as well as their own ability to socially reproduce themselves under the altering conditions.

Indigenous peoples had long been subject to a variety of colonial demands such as tribute and forced labor. The peoples of Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis, as well as those of the Chayanta region, were subject to the much dreaded labor draft or *mita* for the silver mining industry of Potosí. For nearly two centuries they had complied with these demands. However, in the mid eighteenth century new demands began to be added to the older burdens. In the 1750s the *reparto* (forced distribution and sale of goods by the corregidor to indigenous peoples and sometimes Spaniards and mestizos), which had been functioning informally, was fully legalized. Instead of improving their situation, legalization made the lot of the people in the communities more difficult. Though official *reparto* demands in Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis were lower than in many regions of the Andes, Corregidor Arriaga provoked tensions in the years just prior to the rebellion by distributing goods far in excess of the established quota. Instead of the one legal *reparto* of 112,000 pesos which the corregidor of Canas y Canchis was allowed to make in his five year tenure, Arriaga made three *repartos* and was accused by Thupa Amaro of collecting some 300,000 pesos.¹²

The situation was further complicated when in 1776 the division of the Viceroyalty of Peru and the creation of the new Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata disrupted trading patterns and economic life in the southern Andes. Economic tensions also increased when the *alcabala*, or sales tax, rose from 4 to 6 per cent and a number of items *naturales* produced which had previously been exempt became subject to the tax. At the same time custom houses or *aduanas* were established that sought to collect taxes with an efficiency never before possible. These changes, in addition to rapid population growth which diminished the per capita resource base, weakened the social glue which secured the relationship of *naturales* to colonial society.

Alone none of these factors was significant enough to incite rebellion, but in conjunction they formed the basis of a growing economic crisis that contributed, in turn, to an even broader crisis in the communities. O'Phelan refers to these economic changes and demands as "*the feather that broke the camel's back,*" arguing that "*if the Bourbon fiscal reforms had not been applied with such rigor in this region, the great rebellion probably would not have broken out, or, in any case, it would not have manifested itself with the same intensity.*"¹³

Perceptions and Personal Relations

In their daily lives most indigenous peoples reacted to others on the basis of their personal relations with them. However, just as non-Indians sometimes showed little respect for indigenous peoples, some *naturales* went so far as to demonize or 'otherize' the non-indigenous peoples, referring to the Spanish as *puka kunka* or 'red necks.'¹⁴ In the region of rural Cuzco, however, a close reading of the documents indicates that

while indigenous peoples may have held prejudices against non-indigenous peoples, in their day-to-day affairs they tended to deal with others on an individual and face-to-face basis. The reverse seems to have been at least partly true. People of European descent often supported indigenous individuals and communities against the claims of other Europeans. In this world, dominated as it was by *naturales*, other people living in the region were treated as they were known. If they deserved respect they got it, however if they were held in low esteem respect was not forthcoming. For instance, a mestizo who was believed to be a thief by the indigenous peoples in one Canas y Canchis community was referred to by these people not as a mestizo, but derisively as a 'cholo dog' and they assaulted him and "grabbed him by the testicles and squeezed them so hard from which he was suffering more than a year."¹⁵ However, these *naturales* did not paint everyone of a different racial category with the same broad strokes.

Similarly, Thupa Amaro, though a descendant of the Inca, was a mestizo with many *criollo* and mestizo friends. He did not share the prejudices towards non-Indians, or at least not with the same intensity, as did more radicalized *naturales*. He had his own vision of the world that was to be both restored and created and it included people other than just the *naturales*. Besides a normal reluctance to risk all in rebellion, the individual experiences of *naturales*, even within the same community and region, were often quite different. This understanding of themselves as specific peoples with specific identities, and the relationships formed on the basis of this identity, had a great deal to do with the participation, or not, of indigenous peoples in the rebellion. To better understand the importance of this sense of identity I would like to turn our attention away from the larger conjunctures of demand and exploitation which have received considerable attention in recent years (as they deserve), and focus more on ways in which individual and *ayllu* and community consciousness affected the course of events.

In the fluid situation of the mid to late eighteenth century changing conditions could make what were once tolerable situations and demands intolerable. What was once viewed as acceptable or legitimate could come to be viewed as excessive. Thus, demands that had been begrudgingly complied with in certain circumstances caused tumults in different situations. At the same time *naturales*, and even some *criollos*, were hesitant to believe that oppressive or exploitative changes in policy came from the crown rather than from local officials who wished to enrich themselves. There was good reason to harbor such suspicions as the crown often passed more humane or protective legislation that was not enforced at the local level and indigenous peoples often found relief from abusive or exploitative treatment by individuals and local officials by appealing to higher authorities. Even if such arguments were a ruse designed to warn the crown while not directly attacking it, the stratagem was not only effective but was widely believed. For instance, Bernardo Gallo, the man in charge of the *aduanas* in La Paz who was later

killed by rebels, complained that both Spaniards and Indians “believed that the new alcabala [sales tax] was my own invention, it being impossible to make them understand that this was not the case.”¹⁶ At the same time, as colonial circumstances made it more difficult for *naturales* to meet exactions, the behavior of state officials who enforced the demands was increasingly perceived as excessive and abusive. Indeed, *abusos y excesos* was the term used in legal documents to describe the actions of individuals who exceeded the understood cultural and legal limits that guided acceptable behavior.

When the degree of *abusos y excesos* was severe enough to not only transgress the *naturales'* sense of justice but their limits of tolerance, the legitimacy that a representative of the state—such as a *corregidor* or *cobrador* (tax collector)—may have enjoyed was stripped away, leaving the offending individual open to attack. And, in fact, colonial officials may have increasingly resorted to threats and force as it became more difficult for people to meet the heavy demands and they, therefore, became more resistant to the demands. In this situation the harsher character of some individuals may have led to attacks on their person, while others who were enforcing similar demands and confronting similar problems were not assaulted. Not all *cobradores* or *corregidores* were alike, just as the circumstances under which they operated were not always the same.¹⁷ In fact, Jürgen Golte argues that the forced distribution of goods was a primary cause of local rebellions and, indeed, the *reparto* does seem to have been at the center of many local upheavals along with the collection of other debts. The question remains, however, if it was the debt or the manner of collecting the debt (or both) that was the source of violence.¹⁸

A typical case is that of a *cobrador* in Quiquijana, Quispicanchis, who was killed after trying to collect a tribute debt.¹⁹ At first glance the incident appears to be an attack or protest against tribute, but when looked at carefully from the ground level the revolt seems less a protest against colonial demands than a lashing out against an especially abusive official. Don Carlos Ochoa, a mestizo *cobrador*, went to collect tribute owed by Lucas Poma Inga, the cacique of Cusipata (Quiquijana). Poma Inga could only pay sixty pesos and offered the *cobrador* a note for the remainder. Though Poma Inga was known for being reliable in meeting his obligations, this was not good enough for Ochoa who had a reputation for ferocity. The *cobrador* and his friends hauled the curaca from his home, tied him up, beat him with a whip, and took him to Ochoa's home where he was again beaten and then locked in a storage room (*troje*).

In desperation, Poma Inga's wife, whom the *cobrador* had also beaten, asked the priest to intervene on her husband's behalf. The priest told her that Ochoa was “a very fearsome man and that he was not able to intervene with him,” but after a second request from the desperate woman the priest wrote a note to Ochoa. The *cobrador* not only ignored the message, but verbally abused the person who delivered it. With no reso-

lution in sight and aware that their cacique was in very bad shape, and fearing for his life, the people of Poma Inga's *ayllu* met and decided to rescue him "for the great love [they had] for their cacique." At night they entered Ochoa's house, removed Poma Inga, and killed Ochoa for having treated their cacique badly and with 'ignominy.' After the incident the priest cared for Poma Inga, who was "almost without movement," in the church and later testified both to his good character and to the bad character of the *cobrador*.

Other people of European descent also supported the actions of the community. Pascual Antonio de Loayza, an *arriero*, stated that he knew Poma Inga well, considered him a friend, and also knew that he was well respected by his *ayllu*. It was also reported that Poma Inga, even after being beaten, had told his people "not to riot and to try to calm themselves." The corregidor summoned the caciques from Quiquijana and took testimony, but no action was taken by the state or any of its representatives against those involved in Ochoa's death. In view of the excesses committed, the incident was either viewed as a provocation by the *cobrador* or it was deemed unwise to punish community members given the circumstances.

While it is true that Ochoa was a *cobrador*, and that his office had put him in the position to abuse the cacique, the people of Poma Inga's *ayllu* killed Ochoa not because he was a *cobrador*, but because he was an abusive *cobrador*. His abuses delegitimized his authority because they went beyond the bounds that governed Indian-Spanish relations in the colonial world. Neither the *naturales* nor the Europeans saw the killing as a challenge to colonial authority as a system. Violence was not directed at other representatives of the state nor at Europeans in general and it did not go beyond the borders of the community. After the incident Cusipata settled into its former routine, its moral economy restored.²⁰

As the case of Ochoa indicates, at the local level *naturales* perceived, and acted upon, differences in the behavior of individuals. Face-to-face relations were important in determining the course of events. For instance, Juan Antonio Reparaz, a corregidor of Canas y Canchis, dealt fairly with the *naturales* he governed in the day-to-day matters that came before him. He even donated 13,000 pesos out of his own funds to build bridges for certain communities, including Tinta (the provincial capital of Canas y Canchis where Arriaga was executed), after his term as corregidor ended.²¹ It does not follow that the system Reparaz was enforcing was just. He collected colonial exactions, like the other corregidores. Indeed, his contribution towards the building of the bridge most likely came from his profits in the *reparto*, but his treatment of the people of Canas y Canchis was perceived as fair by Thupa Amaro and others within the context of an increasingly exploitative system. Thus, violent confrontation between *naturales* and Reparaz was unlikely.

The majority of corregidores in Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis were not as considerate as Reparaz in their behavior. Excessive or new

demands, violations of traditional arrangements, or treatment not in keeping with normative behavior were among the factors that strained or broke Indian-corregidor relations. For instance, in 1767, Corregidor Pedro Muñoz de Arjona worsened the conditions of the communities of Pichigua and Yauri when he issued orders forcing them to haul dried llama dung to the silver mines of Condoroma. Several of the people obliged to serve this *mita* had previously hauled llama dung, burnt in the refining process, to the mines and had also transported metals from the mines in order to earn money, some of which undoubtedly was used to meet state demands. However, under the new orders of the corregidor the burden on the *naturales* was increased and community members were no longer free to decide if they wished to earn money transporting dung up to the rocky, cold, and windswept mines of Condoroma. Moreover, mine owners now compensated the *naturales* with coca, clothes, food, and silver, and not exclusively with the much needed silver as had previously been the practice.²²

The differences between colonial officials, the way they were perceived, and the responses they evoked from *naturales* were apparent in the attitude of Thupa Amaro towards the last four corregidores who governed Canas y Canchis prior to the 1780 rebellion. While he grew increasingly impatient with the system the corregidores enforced, he clearly recognized differences between individual corregidores. Of these four men, according to John Rowe, Thupa Amaro disliked two, had mixed feelings about one, and "got along well" with the other. Corregidor Gregorio de Viana "harassed him greatly with the repartimiento" and treated him badly in business dealings. The next corregidor, Muñoz de Arjona, confirmed him as curaca (*curacazgo* of Pampamarca, Surimana, and Tungasuca), something that Viana had not done. Muñoz de Arjona and Thupa Amaro coexisted in harmony for a while, but when the corregidor had the curaca jailed over a dispute with a *cobrador* the relationship soured. Thupa Amaro "got along well" with the next corregidor, Reparaz. In commenting on how the actions of Reparaz influenced him, the rebel leader informed captors that "the rebellion had been thought of for many years, but he had not determined to rebel because Corregidor Reparaz, Arriaga's predecessor, had treated him very well and looked on the Indians with compassion."²³ Thupa Amaro had been swayed by the actions of an individual corregidor to set aside the idea of rebellion against the colonial state. Personal relations and behavior had made a difference. However, Thupa Amaro did not hold a similar opinion of the next corregidor, Arriaga, whom he hanged.

The reliance on close personal relations made kinship ties especially significant. It was only natural that when Thupa Amaro needed people he could trust implicitly he looked to his family. Some of his relatives were fellow muleteers and shared Thupa Amaro's knowledge of places and people beyond Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis, but with or without this knowledge the inner circle of advisers and confidants were primarily family members. The authority of family members was also

enhanced by their being so closely related to the Inca, their being part of the royal family. Micaela Bastidas, the rebel's wife, enjoyed respect and a position of leadership within the movement, man and wife being a unit and complementing one another. Her status, like that of other family members, was not just ascribed however, it was also achieved. She shared many of her husband's responsibilities and exercised broad authority on her own.

The Spanish clearly recognized the importance of the kinship network in the rebellion. The Thupa Amaro family was nearly annihilated in public and brutal executions that made manifest the consequences for those who attacked the colonial system. Thupa Amaro was not only beheaded, but his body was quartered and parts placed throughout the rebellious countryside. One colonial official commented:

*"Neither the King nor the state thought it fitting that a seed or branch of the family should remain, or the commotion and impression that the wicked name of Túpac Amaru caused among the natives."*²⁴

In this vengeful manner the Spanish attested that they fully understood the importance of close familial relations in Andean society, particularly the family of the Inca.

As important as Thupa Amaro's other attributes were in initiating the rebellion, perhaps the most important factor in gaining the adherence of the *naturales* of Canas y Canchis and Quispicanchis to the cause, in addition to his being heir to the Inca throne, was his personal relationship with other local curacas. With few exceptions, people in the Cuzco region followed the lead of their curacas in supporting or opposing the rebellion, in sharp contrast to Catarista regions where many curacas were the first victims of the rebellion. More caciques in the Catarista zone of operations seem to have abused their ties with their communities, making them, as well as Spaniards, the focus of rebel violence.²⁵ In Cuzco, with many curacas of royal Inca blood still in authority and setting the example for curaca behavior, this was not the case. With few exceptions, the *ayllus* followed the lead of their curacas.²⁶ In fact, out of twenty-five regional curacas who supported the rebellion, twelve were from Canas y Canchis and another five from Quispicanchis (see the table on the next page).²⁷ The curacas from these two provinces were key in gaining initial support for the rebellion. Because their relationships with their *ayllus* were strong, the curacas were able to command the respect and support of their people. When the curacas decided to follow Thupa Amaro this translated into a swelling of the rebel ranks.

However, not all curacas in the Cuzco region supported the rebellion, and the people in the *ayllus* they governed also followed the lead of their non-rebellious curacas. The powerful, well-to-do noble curaca of Azángaro, Diego Choqueguanca, fought against Thupa Amaro. Rebel forces, in turn, burned haciendas and killed people in the zone controlled by Choqueguanca.²⁸ From Chinchero, to the north of Cuzco, another powerful curaca, Mateo Pumacahua, led his people into battle

against the Thupa Amaro army and was instrumental in the royalist defense of Cuzco. The depth of the differences between the two curacas was symbolized in a painting that Pumacahua commissioned after Thupa Amaro's capture:

*"The art depicted a puma [Pumacahua] defeating a snake [Amaru] beneath the benevolent gaze of the Virgen of Monserrat, Chinchero's patron saint. In the background stood Pumacahua and his wife, both dressed in Spanish garb, affirming their territorial sovereignty. Beneath the painting was inscribed Ceasar's dictum: Veni, Vidi, Vici, commemorating the defeat of this rival faction, an action which brought the house of Pumacahua renewed respect."*²⁹

Curacas who supported Thupa Amaro		
Name	curacazgo	
	Canas y Canchis	Quispicanchis Other
Pedro Bargas	Combapata	
Francisco Guambatupe	Yauri	
Francisco Guamaticlla	Checacupe	
Carlos Herrera	Combapata	
Crispín Huamani	Coporaque	
Josef Mamani	Tinta	
Ramón Moscoso	Yanaoca	
Crispín Ramos	Pitumarca	
Catalina Salas Pachacuti	Yanaoca	
Bentura Saravia	Layo	
Tomás Soto	Yanaoca	
Miguel Zamalloa	Sicuani	
Lucas Collque		Pomacanchis
Puma (I)nga		Quiquijana
Marcos Torres		Acomayo
Tomasa Tito Condemaita		Acos
Pedro Urpide		Pirque
Pablo Guamansulca		Carabaya, Carabaya
Antonio Gualpa		Belén, Cuzco
Juan de Dios Inca Roca		Santa Ana, Cuzco
Jacinto Inगतुपा		Santa Ana, Cuzco
Francisco Tallana		Betanzos, Azángaro
Pascual Díaz Calisaya		Lampa, Lampa
Santos Mamani Anco		Macari, Lampa
Blas Pacaricona		Lampa, Lampa

Source: Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth Century Peru and Upper Peru*, (Köln, 1985), p. 214.

This is not a complete list of rebel caciques.

The situation surrounding the decision of Eugenio Sinanyuca, the curaca of Coporaque, to not join the rebellion is most interesting and

makes apparent the importance of personal considerations and face-to-face relations in determining perceptions and the consequent loyalties. Sinanyuca and the *naturales* of Coporaque were at loggerheads with their parish priest. The growing tensions between the priest and the community led Sinanyuca to rupture the traditional ties of support between the community and its priest. Eventually the situation became so serious that the people of Coporaque rose in a *motín* and paraded in front of the priest's house carrying a coffin and singing an Inca war song:

*"We will drink from the skull of the traitor, we will use his teeth as a necklace, from his bones we will make flutes, from his skin a drum, afterwards we will dance."*³⁰

In addition to being curaca, Sinanyuca also functioned as the *cobrador* for the ill-fated corregidor Arriaga. When the priest brought charges against Sinanyuca the cacique turned to the corregidor for help. Arriaga, who was himself at odds with the church over questions of jurisdictional authority and who had been excommunicated by the bishop, came to the aid of Sinanyuca and the community of Coporaque just when they learned that the bishop had excommunicated all of them for defying the priest. This was in late October of 1780, just a couple of weeks before Arriaga was detained by Thupa Amaro. The corregidor began legal proceedings against local priests and promised to send them to the proper authorities in November, a proposition with which his impending hanging made it impossible for him to comply.

In light of this struggle with the priest and bishop it is less puzzling why Sinanyuca and his people, who had been supported by Arriaga and excommunicated by the church, remained aloof from Thupa Amaro who was a friend of the bishop and who executed the corregidor while priests like his friend Lopez de Sosa watched. Sinanyuca and the people of Coporaque, and other indigenous peoples like them, were not behaving in a manner contradictory to their interests. They acted out of their own circumstances, their own experience, their own self-interest. They were not part of a generic indigenous mass. They were not united with other communities or region just because they were of the same race. They were the people of the *ayllus* of Coporaque and their leader was Eugenio Sinanyuca. In these very personal matters they did not share Thupa Amaro's experiences or interests. Thus, out of reasons grounded in their own personal experience many of them remained aloof from the rebellion.

Conclusion

The world view of indigenous peoples in the Andes was complex and contradictory. By the late eighteenth century colonial policies combined with population pressure had exacerbated divisions within indigenous society and native peoples began to question their ability to maintain their way of life. When changes in political administration and economic

policy further heightened tensions,

*"a conjuncture was produced in which the relations and assumptions that collectively formed the moral economy began to come under doubt, and compliance with its norms no longer seemed to assure the social reproduction of the Indian communities."*³¹

It was in this situation that the "lid the Spanish had successfully kept over the simmering tensions" of indigenous society finally blew off.³² One of the factors that led people to rebel, or not, was their face-to-face relations. In Chayanta it was not just Spanish policies, but negative face-to-face relations with local curacas that led indigenous peoples to revolt under other ethnic leaders. While Thupa Amaro's position as heir to the Inca throne was very important, in Quispicanchis and Canas y Canchis it was also the positive face-to-face relations with curacas that led *naturales* to join the curacas in rebellion. And, in turn, it was at least in part the curacas' personal relationship with Thupa Amaro that led them to follow the Inca.

In the province of Cuzco, not including the city and surrounding zone (the *cercado*), it has been calculated that out of a total population of 174,623 people some 28,495 were aligned with rebel curacas, while some 36,775 followed loyalist caciques. The overwhelming bulk of rebel support came from Thupa Amaro's home province, Canas y Canchis, and from neighboring Quispicanchis. These provinces contributed approximately 85 per cent of the Cuzco rebels. In contrast, all the other Cuzco provinces contributed roughly 15 per cent of the rebel forces. The percentage of *naturales* under loyalist curacas in Canas y Canchis and Quispicanchis was 25 percent and 11 percent, some 64 percent coming from the other *partidos*. These figures, inevitably not as precise as they seem, do give an indication of Thupa Amaro's strengths and weaknesses in Cuzco and reflect, I believe, the importance of personal ties.³³

Cultural tradition, reciprocal relations, communal solidarity and hope for a more just order under an Inca were among the factors that led *naturales* to follow their curacas in joining the insurrection, but they would not have followed—as the situation in Upper Peru shows—if their ties had not been strong. The length of the conflict, the misfortunes of war, and personal concerns, however, ultimately meant that both Indians and non-Indians reevaluated their commitments. Micaela Bastidas noted the fragile adherence to the movement when she commented that the rebel troops might begin to desert because "*they act mainly out of self-interest.*"³⁴ Such personal convictions and self-interests were powerful motivating factors for rebels and loyalists alike. Thupa Amaro even fell into royalist hands due to the personal motives of his captors. Two women from the Canas y Canchis community of Langui, one who had lost a husband in the rebellion and the other two sons, grabbed the bridle of his horse and held him as he sought to escape.³⁵ In the Andean world where personal actions and relations counted for so much, these women held Thupa Amaro responsible for the deaths of their loved ones. In turn, *naturales* in Langui later killed one of the women.

They held her responsible for the capture of their Inca.

In seeking to understand peoples and events in situations as complex as the Thupa Amaro rebellion it is very difficult to analyze the significance of both the broad issues and forces that shaped their lives and the local or short term forces in which their lives were immersed. The diversity and complexity of the latter make them difficult to analyze, but they form a vital component of people's consciousness. This is especially true in the Andes where ethnicity and divisions created by the rugged terrain, to mention but a couple of factors, led to a situation in which people maintained strong local identities and face-to-face relations. Thus, it is especially important to keep the personal and local—human agency—in mind in our broader analysis of revolts and rebellions.

Endnotes

1. Campbell, "Ideology and Factionalism," p. 122; and Fisher, *Last Inca Revolt*, pp. 45-48; Vega, "Sacerdotes." For a similar use of formal legal structure in an uprising see Langer "Andean Rituals of Revolt."
2. Fisher, *Last Inca Revolt 1780-1783*, p. 46.
3. For the correct spelling of the revolutionary's name see Rowe, "Thupa Amaro."
4. Campbell, "Ideology and Factionalism," pp. 114-115.
5. Stern, "Age of Andean Insurrection," p. 53.
6. Flores Galindo, *Europa*, pp. 50, 67. For a discussion of *Inkarri*, see Ossio A., *Ideología mesiánica*.
7. Rowe, "Colonial Portraits"; Campbell, "Ideology and Factionalism," p. 125; Fisher, *Last Inca Revolt*, p. 30.
8. Flores Galindo, "In Search of an Inca," pp. 194-195.
9. Flores Galindo, "In Search of an Inca," p. 202.
10. Rowe, "Movimiento nacional inca," pp. 21, 25.
11. O'Phelan Godoy, "Reformas fiscales borbónicas," p. 353, and, *Rebellions*, pp. 256-273.
12. Golte, *Repartos*, p. 95; Fisher, *Last Inca Revolt*, p. 39; Stavig, "Ethnic Conflict," p. 744.
13. O'Phelan Godoy, "Reformas fiscales borbónicas," pp. 342, 353.
14. Campbell, "Ideology and Factionalism," p. 121.
15. ADC. Corrg. Prov. Crim. Leg. 81, 1776-84. 1776.
16. O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions*, p. 184.
17. Stavig, "Ethnic Conflict," pp. 747-748.
18. Golte, *Repartos*.
19. Golte, *Repartos*, pp. 141-147.
20. ADC. Corrg. Prov. Crim. Leg. 80, 1773-75. 1774. Don Lucas Poma Inga, cacique ... de Cusipata de Quiquijana contra don Carlos Ochoa.
21. ADC. Intend. Prov. 1786. Expediente relativo a que se verifique la fabrica de puentes en Tinta poniendo una cantidad de pesos que dejo ... el corregidor Reparaz (is a 1785 case with 1786 materials). There are several cases that give this picture of the daily decisions of Reparaz. For a case that gives a different view, see Corrg. Prov. Crim. Leg. 79, 1745-73. El Común de Indios del ayllu Lurucachi del Pueblo de Marangani. Interestingly, in this case it was Corregidor Arriaga who found a judicious solution to community complaints.
22. ADC. Corrg. Prov. Leg. 67, 1766-69. [H]ucha a minas de Condorama, 1767; O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions*, p. 271.
23. Rowe, "Genealogía," pp. 74-76; also *Descargos del Obispo del Cuzco Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta*, p. 224.
24. Fisher, *Last Inca Revolt*, p. 379.
25. Campbell, "Ideology," pp. 115, 124; O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions*, p. 249.
26. One such exception occurred in Quiquijana where the cacique, Antonio Solis Quivimas, at first supported Thupa Amaro, but when his support faltered the people

drove him out of the community. See Mörner and Trelles, "Intento de calibrar," pp. 12-13.

27. O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions*, pp. 214-215.

28. Campbell, "Ideology," pp. 122-123.

29. Campbell, "Ideology," pp. 123-124.

30. Glave, "Comunidades campesinas," p. 72: "*Beberemos en el cráneo del traidor, usaremos sus dientes como un collar, de sus huesos haremos flautas, de su piel haremos un tambor, después bailaremos.*"

31. Stavig, "Ethnic Conflict," p. 767.

32. Stavig, "Ethnic Conflict," p. 769.

33. Mörner and Trelles, "Intento de calibrar," pp. 26-27. Mörner and Trelles have developed different models that produce different figures. I have selected the models that I think best represent the situation, but one should consider the numbers more as close approximations rather than exact figures.

34. O'Phelan Godoy, *Rebellions*, p. 240.

35. Valcarcel, *Túpac Amaru*, p. 243; Fisher, *Last Inca Revolt*, pp. 218-219.