

Ethnic Civil War in Peru

The Military and Shining Path

DIRK KRUIJT*

Introduction

Peru is in trouble. It has been in trouble for quite a number of years, and it will be in trouble for the next ten, twenty years. The economy, society and political system of the country is slowly disintegrating. Since 1980, an ethnic civil war has been going on, accountable for twentyfive thousand casualties and twenty billion dollars in property damage. After the spectacular capture of Shining Path's mystified leader Abimael Guzmán in September 1992, the government announced the end of the war and the terror regime. Two years later, the army considers the end of the anti-guerrilla campaign a question of another couple of years. Meanwhile, poverty and violence resulted in an unprecedented process of informalization of economic and social relations and political and moral consciousness. Consequently, the Peruvian economy is a mess. It is the logical effect of an unnerving series of short term, contradicting experiments, rival policies and dramatic changes in economic strategy, running from orthodox state capitalism in the 1970s, orthodox *laissez faire* in the early 1980s, heterodox state intervention in the late 1980s and heterodox adjustment in the early 1990s.¹

Peruvian society is a jungle. Of the estimated national population of twenty-four million, one million belongs to the cohort of refugees. The misery in the capital is beyond proportion: of its estimated population of eight million, more than sixty percent survives in the informal sector.² Informality affects the functioning of the legal institutions, the political parties and the public sector.³ Shining Path and an assorted variety of organized drug traffickers and urban criminals permeated society with violence. 'Counterterrorism' on behalf of the police and the military

* Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies
Utrecht University
Post Box 80140
3508 TC Utrecht
The Netherlands

explains the rest of the death under the peasant population and the slum dwellers.

Peruvian politics is in a chaos. Traditional political parties ceased to represent significant segments of the national population in the late 1980s. The Left, until 1988 in charge of Lima's municipal governments virtually disappeared. The Right and the Center suffered a spectacular loss in the presidential campaign of 1990. An absolute unknown, Fujimori—whose most significant virtue seemed to be a political virginity combined with an intuitive insight in the day-to-day opinions of the unorganized masses—acquired the presidency. Then, amidst a nationwide political crisis and a civil war that reached the suburbs of Lima, the President realized an *autogolpe*, exercising a new brand of civic-military relationship of 'armoured democracy,'⁴ an uneasy alliance between the presidency and the military, legitimized by a new *constituyente* of political novices.

Since then, the country continued to fight its war against misery, poverty, criminal violence, drug maffia's and the guerrilla solitary. The difference with the situation twenty years ago is impressive. In 1975, Peru's reformist military government still thought it could complete the program of 'structural reforms,' elaborated and executed in order to prevent the causes of the guerrilla uprisings in the 1960s.⁵ It enjoyed international prestige as a Third World leader, having concluded successful negotiations with the United States about expropriations and with the Soviet Union about sophisticated weaponry. However, Peru in 1994-95 is an international pariah, criticized because of its chronic human rights violences, succumbing under the dead weight of civil war, drug war and bankruptcy. This contribution seeks to relate the sustained deterioration of Peru with ethnicity and revolution in its country-side, which means that, contrary to the preceding Chapters, my approach does not offer an analysis of Shining Path per se.

Armed Forces and Civil Society

The Peruvian armed forces—that is the army and more especially the intelligence services—keep an interested eye on domestic political affairs. Military control over national politics has been a standing tradition since the nation's Independence. Within the armed forces, especially in the army, a new type of officer emerged in Latin America after World War II: the 'military intellectual.' Military intellectuals hold staff functions in the higher echelons, at training schools for colonels and one-star generals, and within the intelligence services. In Latin America, intelligence is preoccupied with internal rather than foreign enemies of the nation and with the strategies and tactics needed to combat them. A derivation of this is the self-imposed task of producing a military ideology. Thereby the prescription of the role of the armed forces in national development and national politics came to be included in the intrinsic tasks of the intelligence services and the training schools.

The literature pays little attention to the vital role of intelligence in the formation of nationalist cadres and geopolitical authors.⁶ The *Plan Inca* of the military governments in the 1970s—Velasco, 1968-75, Morales Bermúdez, 1975-80—was formulated by a five member team, all of them former or future intelligence directors.⁷ Including in the 1980s, the years of civil government, the intelligence services were considered to be 'leftist,' the object of Belaunde's (1980-85) and later García's (1985-90) distrust. Even some of Fujimori's (1990-92, 1992-) cabinet members and closest advisors have or have had intelligence ties, this time associated with his trusted advisor Montesinos.

Army intelligence became incorporated in the public sector during the last years of the military government.⁸ In the 1970s, army, naval and airforce intelligence merged with comparable police and civil services into the *Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional* (SIN).⁹ In each ministry, in all branches of the public sector an intelligence sector was created, headed by a colonel who reported directly to the office of the prime minister. During García's presidency, the three armed forces—each with its own organizational culture and own minister—and the three police forces—three rivals—were incorporated in one new ministry: Defence and Internal Affairs, to be commanded by army generals.¹⁰ Armed forces and police now are considered to act as a coherent system of *Fuerzas del Orden*. In 1982, an anti-terrorist detective department *Dirección contra el Terrorismo* (DINCOTE) was created as a specialized task force within the police. The department started in a miserable atmosphere and with a virtually non-existing infrastructure.¹¹ García provided better terms. Recently under the Fujimori administration, especially since his *autogolpe* in april 1992, DINCOTE (whose special task force finally captured Guzmán in September of that year) was provided with more authority, men and money. Roughly the same can be said about military intelligence. But police not military intelligence was able to infiltrate a high level of Shining Path's political and combat organization.

The Peruvian security and development theses remained substantially the same since the fifties, endorsing national development as an integral part of the national security conditions. In the 1960s, the military obtained a sublime possibility to put the theory into practice. After a short campaign against 'conventional' (Che Guevara-like) guerrilla-movements in the late 1960s, the Peruvian army took control over the national government to execute a revolution. The 'Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces' elaborated a reform programme and carried out most of it. The reforms, conceptualized as a coherent anti-poverty strategy, were to prevent another guerrilla uprising in the future. I think it is not an exaggeration to affirm that those 'structural reforms' were an operational translation of the military security and intelligence theses. The reforms were elaborated by the military, executed in military style and under complete military guidance.

In fact, a body of twelve colonels, a kind of political staff of the president—the armed forces and intelligence elite, the majority of whom

later obtained cabinet posts—drafted all reform decrees and additional legislation. This military committee—*Comité de Asesoramiento a la Presidencia* (COAP)—acted as think tank,¹² an ‘inner parliament,’ a steering committee of the public sector and designer of the macro-policy from 1968–80. COAP designed and recruited the principal staff members of the reform apparatus: the new line ministries, the national planning institute (INP), the mass movement system (*Sistema Nacional de Movilización Social*: SINAMOS), the state enterprises and the regional administration. COAP was the armed forces elite, and it recruited the lower-echelon elite (*espadas de honor*, numbers-one of the army schools) during the twelve years of the military governments.

As a consequence, the marrow of the Peruvian armed forces was given on-the-job-training in reforms and administration from 1968 till 1980. As another consequence, the armed forces top brass in the 1980s and the early 1990s—and the next five years if Fujimori does not carry out a purification in the upper ranks—consider themselves the heirs of the ‘good military governments, without corruption, terrorism and desolation.’ In private they speak with pride about the *docencia militar*—when they were in charge of ministries or regional development corporations—and lament the absence of someone of the stature of *el general* (Velasco). It is, of course, nostalgia, but the nostalgic tone is mixed with grief about civil incompetence and indolence.

In describing the military government years, I mainly emphasize the strong points of the programme of ‘structural reforms,’ nation building through development and guerilla prevention through ‘good governance’. Building up a strong ‘peruvianized’ economy—through expropriations and nationalizations—the Velasco military governed through a strong public sector. It gave them the instruments for their ‘revolution from above’ with authoritarian and paternalistic rule, and with State presence in each provincial village as well. The public sector was a command structure for ‘development’ and ‘people’s participation.’ It meant security in the city and in the province, water and sewerage in the slums, the peace judges in the indian communities, the alphabetization campaigns, the visiting nurse in the highland villages, the community worker in the jungle. It meant law and order for all, the rich and the formerly excluded and marginalized as well. It meant the benefit of the doubt for the unions, sympathy for the poor, the admission of new popular organizations, the ear to the *Quechua*-speaking Indians.

And it meant CINAMOS, that complex institution of civilian training officers and counterintelligence and security people, idealists and opportunist. CINAMOS became a powerful organization, capable of large-scale deployment of personel, vehicles and auxiliary material in the regions. CINAMOS was present, at the regional and the local level, assisting in the establishment of mass organizations for peasants, deeply influencing the formation of the national peasant federation *Confederación Nacional Agraria* (CNA), that unified in 1977 some 160 peasant leagues with 4500 local unions and a total of 675,000 members.¹³ CINAMOS help-

ed to set up workers' communities in industry, trade, mining and fishery, and was empowered to recognize or dissolve cooperations. It started to organize 'federations for landless peasants,' organizing and unifying local squatter movements in the urban and metropolitan slums. It created 'revolutionary youth organizations' in provincial universities. And it controlled, together with the national planning institute, the performance of the local bureaucracy. Probably it was the only decade of this century, that the State was present in the most remote regions, the most forgotten villages.

The benign and nationalistic Velasco-years constituted a seven-year period of contained hope, of mass mobilization, of experiments, of reforms carried out half-way and interrupted by the governments in the 'restaurative period' of first Morales Bermúdez and then Belaunde during his second term. During the Velasco years the *ancienne régime* of landowners and 'oligarchy' was replaced by military intellectuals and civilian technocrats. The years thereafter, popular frustration exploded, particularly in the post-Land Reform Indian areas and the metropolitan and urban slum *barrios*. The last two years of the military government were years of bitter confrontation between the government and the heirs of the revolution. The government started the first adjustment and austerity programme, accompanied by a package of anti-popular and repressive measures. Half-organized local protests, followed by regional national strikes paralysed the country. The government called for elections of an *constituyente* that should codify most of the reforms and prepare the way for civil democracy.

By then, the military were 'tired,' 'exhausted.'¹⁴ During the last months before the change of government, the three junta members decided to maintain the continuity of military command.¹⁵ By mutual consent with the president-elect, Belaunde, they nominated themselves the new commander general of the army, the navy and the air force, leaving the appointment of the three military ministers to the new civilian government. So Belaunde lived the first year of his presidency in peaceful coexistence with his former adversaries. Even worse: general Hoyos, one of the co-authors of Velasco's *Plan Inca*, had been appointed as the army's chief of staff. After his death in 1981, another *velasquista*, Miranda, who had drafted the public edition of *Plan Inca*, took office as his successor. It became a standard presidential policy to keep the military at a distance and to look to others for support.

Army ideology did not change after the years of military government. The old Peruvian *adagium* that 'security = development' is one of the major themes the military students still discuss.¹⁶ The army still recruits the same ideal type of officers it attracted three, four decades ago. So it reproduces its ideology and its officers corps. Apparently, it also reproduced its geopolitical enemies: the northern border with Ecuador and the Southern with Chile are of traditional Peruvian concern. The three principal military regions are Northern Zone (I), Lima (II) and Southern Zone (III); Highland (IV) and Jungle (V) being the forgotten

ones. Even in the late 1980s, only twenty percent of the military forces was directly dedicated to the containment of the guerrilla and other 'sources of terrorism.'¹⁷ Only recently the Central Government decided to create a new military region VI (Huallaga) in order to coordinate the anti-guerrilla and anti-drug war.

During the 1980s and the years of Fujimori, the United States military diplomatic establishment defined the drug problem as priority number one.¹⁸ New and more adequate anti-guerrilla-equipment was not obtained. The economic crisis and the hyperinflation in the late 1980s and the early 1990s had a catastrophic impact on the maintenance, the budget, the salaries and on the officers' moral. When I interviewed the retired army elite in December 1990 and 1991, I noticed that they lived on \$ 300 a month. I met active duty army captains, commanders of anti-terrorist units in the emergency zones, on leave in Lima and working as freelance taxidriviers to buy their children a Christmas present. During my extended interviews in 1994, I became aware of the fact that serving in the Huallaga military region VI was considered to be extremely attractive among the military officers as an easy way to complement their salaries.¹⁹

In addition to the 'forces of public order,' the military and the police, its private equivalents proliferated from the mid-1980s on. In the urban and metropolitan areas, private police companies constituted a booming industry. The generalized climate of tension and fear, violence and terrorism, created a demand for protection and vigilance. The slum population invented home-made defense instruments like staves, sticks and bicycle chains. In the mine encampments and the industrial cordons, the workers employed self-defense, virtually transforming themselves in local private armies. The government thought about a rural militia and distributed fire arms to organized peasants. These *rondas campesinas* became the semi-institutionalized fourth branch of the armed forces, in 1991 and 1992 marching with the regular army, the navy and the air force at Independence Day.

The *rondas* established themselves as a 'local correcting and defense force' during the early 1980s, balancing between the *fuerzas del orden* and Shining Path. In the late 1980s, the *rondas* were mostly influenced by and subordinated under the regional military command structure.²⁰ When the *rondas urbanas* acquired popularity in the slums, the metropolitan middle classes in Lima bought themselves police cars and uniforms and acted as a regular police force at night; their vigilance corps were recognized as *serenazgo*-units and trained by the police. Recently the coca peasantry in the Huallaga Valley took their arms and formed a self-proclaimed militia. The legal Left and—during the García years—the governing APRA-party (*Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana*) as well created paramilitary units; the APRA-inspired 'Comando Rodrigo Franco' earned a reputation as a 'political death squad' among its terrified adversaries.

The informalization process of social institutions in Peru, running

from the disintegration of the public sector to the rise of an entire 'private public sector' of NGO's, advanced to the military sphere and the police forces as well. It requires a sharp eye to distinguish between the actions of the regular armed forces, the police, the para-military units and the death squads. Sometimes nobody knows who killed whom. Was it Shining Path? A frightened *serenazgo* member? Did the drug mafia give the order? Or was it a political settlement? Was a presidential advisor involved?²¹

Shining Path and the Civil War

If Peru is the land of Job, Ayacucho is the place where his children died. Ayacucho and the surrounding departments are stigmatized with the wounds of poverty, illiteracy, exploitation and underdevelopment. The Land Reform of Velasco was halted prematurely in these parts of the Andean highland. For centuries the capital of a miserable region of medium-sized haciendas and forgotten Indian communities, the city of Ayacucho obtained a regional university in the fifties. Soon, the *alumni* would compete with the students of twenty other provincial universities, most of them better related with structural sources of income and employment. Most of the Indian students returned to their villages. In the early 1960s, a parochial philosopher, Guzmán, went to teach the students at the university and its related normal school. Guzmán became the undisputed leader of a maoist splinter of the Peruvian Communist Party, Shining Path.²² While the pro-Moscow wing allied with the Velasco government and other neo-marxist party leaders participated with success in the elections of the 1980s, Shining Path's leadership chose the anonymity of a diligent cell structure, the cocoons to be matured for a final 'People War,' Guzmán took his time to strengthen his organization and to acquire strong roots among the indigenous and poor peasantry. The very moment of his first armed presence was a brilliant choice: the election day of the first democratic president in May 1980, when the military felt weak and the future civilian magistrative in Lima would be powerless.²³

Shining Path grew during the relatively prosperous years of the military governments. Their progressive educational reforms favoured lower-class universities and similar institutions. A clash between the military and the university students in the early 1970s brought an uneasy distance between the government and the Ayacucho people. But the emphasis on cell structure, ideological pureness, slow proselitism, absolute loyalty and devotion, and strict morality gave them a protective ambience and contributed mostly to the movement's impenetrability in the following years. Shining Path had sought and acquired a strong popular base and started to fight in its home-region.

However, two other important reasons explain their fabulous growth and consolidation in the short period between 1980 and 1982. First, the new Belaunde civilian government did not trust the army and

thought it better to keep them quiet. Velasquista generals commanded the army, and army intelligence was considered to be the heir of the Velasco team. Belaunde downplayed the threat, depicting the movement in cabinet sessions as 'petty cattle-lifters.' Thus instead of the army, Lima police forces—untrained and unfit for guerrilla-fighting—were mobilized against the guerrilla.²⁴ The indolent President transformed the metropolitan police into Shining Path's principal arms supplier! Secondly, the movement's tactics to destroy blindly public sector's infrastructure, and the continuous expulsion—or execution—of local magistrates, teachers, rural police officers and public health personnel aggravated by the withdrawal of funds and people by the central government and the lack of interest in sustainable local development in Lima, provided the guerrillas a genuine monopoly on pressure, power and political legitimation in the Ayacucho region and the surrounding departments.

Apparently, Shining Path's ideology reflected a variety of transplants from other continents. Peru's economy was 'semi-feudal.' The ethnic civil war was explained—in orthodox Stalinistic concepts—in terms of class. Public messages referred to disputes by Jiang Quing, Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. Dead dogs were found hanging with signs: "*Deng Xiaoping, Son of a Bitch.*" The messages appeared to be incongruent and anachronistic, imported from other times and other worlds. But the ideology explained all things or explained all things away. It was the crude and simple *abracadabra* of the crude and effective presence of a crude and poor movement in the crude and desolate milieu of extremely poor peasants and slum dwellers. It symbolized a crude and violent justice—displayed by the selective assassination of 'bad' people. A crude and cruel morality—that implied the public punishing of adulterers and drinkers. A crude and merciless redistribution—emphasizing the necessity of small plots of land and the minimum of food and cattle for survival. And a crude and haranguing pedagogy—teaching people, really humble and acquiescent people with deep respect for teachers and apostles.²⁵

Shining Path used a vocabulary that varied from region to region, from one population segment to another. It incorporated sympathizers and recruited new membership using inducement and coercion, confying gradually more in terror and violence:

*"The urban cell members receive political and military instructions. Focal point is 'el pensamiento-Gonzalo' or Guzmán's thinking [his *nomme de guerre* is Gonzalo]: The linear succession of historic phases since the creation of the universe, the appearance of mankind, the social organizations and the necessary evolution towards communism following Marx, Lenin and Mao, whose nucleus is the elimination of the existing society by the purifying action of the People's War. The new society will be basically agrarian, self-supporting, theocratic, dictatorial and moralistic (the old Inka ethics). Emphasis is put on class struggle against concrete enemies, such as wholesalers and retailers (bour-*

geois), rich peasants (kulaks) and political enemies (members of the government parties and the revisionists and opportunists of the legal left). The military training concerns elements such as physical condition (extended marches and night exercises, surpassing the effects of hunger, thirst and fatigue), technical instruction (knowledge of local attack and defence possibilities, inventory of suitable building and safe houses, practice in short and medium range arms and home-made bombs), psycho-sociological awareness (conviction of the truth of the doctrine and the justice of the actions, recruiting other brother-in-arms and hidden aides-de-camps to form the '1,000 eyes and 1,000 ears' of informers and watchdogs); and operational activities (pass on information, write down slogans, put up bombs, participate in armed assaults and special raids).

[...] The rural bases are real military training camps in situ. Their members receive theory and practice as well, based upon el pensamiento-Gonzalo and the characteristics of the local situation. They are trained in the identification of friends and foes. In the use of fire arms, dynamite and home-made bombs. In espionage and surveillance, proselytism and intimidation. Finally, they participate in combat operations and urban terrorism. They are allowed to assault groups of six to eight persons, based on cell structure and fragmented command.

[...] Rural control is stricter than urban rule. Landowners of medium-size properties are forced out. Independent leaders of the Indian communities were changed for more obedient officers. Smallholders pay regular tribute. Local market people do business under Shining Path's regulations, otherwise they risk losing their trade or their live. Regional Offices of the Ministry of Agriculture, Education and Public Health are threatened or paralyzed, their technical assistance reduced to zero. The clergy is under control. Church services and mass celebrations are permitted, but the sermon's global content should be previously authorized.

[...] The basic objective is to establish political and military control over agricultural production and distribution, and control over the deliverance to the regional centers to facilitate posterior overmastering and domination of the urban population. They proceed in the following order:

- discovering conflicts between leaders and members of cooperatives, landlords and tenants, proprietors and peasants without land, rich and poor community leaders;
- installing military presence to influence the conflict in a favourable sense towards groups or persons upon whose sympathy one can count;
- armed support for the choosen individuals and groups and progressive marginalization of the opposition, effectuated by local land reform, privatization and distribution of land and animals, and legitimized by a 'popular assembly' by Shining Path's representatives;

- *imposition of mitimaes, i.e. the migration of confiable peasants and military from older zones under control (bases), who receive the best lands and who act as leaders of the assault groups and as political supervisors in the new zones;*
- *transformation of the new zones in regular 'bases,' where they establish the type of production, the quantities for local consumption and regional commerce, the social and political life style, as well as the morality in public and private affairs;*
- *consolidation of the bases as self-supporting defensive zones.*²⁶

These were the procedures in provinces. With the extension of Shining Path's realm to the metropolitan areas of Arequipa, Trujillo and Lima, the ingredients of the persuasion and terror cocktail changed. The first areas of infiltration were the urban slums and the industrial cordons. The first category of persons to be intimidated were the independent or leftist union leaders, slum leaders, local mayors and councillors, and the directorate of the local development organizations. Sometimes they were 'persuaded' to retire, sometimes a 'popular tribunal' had to be organized to condemn the obstinate representatives and blow them up with dynamite after trial. With the appointment of a more cooperative leadership, Shining Path established training schools and selected supervisors. Public sector officials, NGO-officers, lawyers, doctors and journalists were paid a warning visit at home or in the office. Car bombs and coach bombs provoked panic among the inhabitants of the industrial zones and the middle class areas. The '1,000 eyes and 1,000 ears' were rumoured to be omnipresent. And to demonstrate their potential for public control, Shining Path organized periodically 'armed strikes' in metropolitan areas, organizing selective punishing by killing disobedient taxidriers and shopkeepers.

Shining Path is—or, at least until Guzmán's arrest, was—composed of a strong political Central Committee with a personal cult towards the sacralized leader, and a network of regional and provincial committees.²⁷ In principle, military and operational planning are realized at the regional level. Although the overall strategy is—was—a matter of national concern, most of the movement's flexibility and perseverance can be attributed to the regional and local decentralization. Shining Path is—was—strong where the government—the military, the police, the public sector—is weak, and that is mostly in the highland misery villages and the metropolitan poverty belts. During the twelve years of the 'People's War', Shining Path operated—in the strictly military sense—prudently: defensively against military formations, avoiding direct contact, allowing only ad hoc raids against isolated units and provincial police-stations. Until the 1990s, the organization reflected basically an uncomplicated attack-defence strategy, operating through a loose structure of 'military columns.'

There are a few ranks, without uniforms or complicated command hierarchy. A *commandante*—women's representation in the higher ranks is surprisingly high—controls a small, versatile unit of ideologically

immaculate, and highly motivated loyalists. This nucleus—an estimated guess gives a hard core of 3,000 to 7,000 persons (1992)—was supported by local sympathizers and novices. They are mostly recruited—was it because of a vague sympathy, a deep resentment or by coercion?—in the ‘liberated areas’ in the highland department or the pauperized metropolitan slums. A secondary support structure is—was—a network of lawyers, medical personal and paramedics, and students and other sympathy organizations, including a sort of diplomatic representation in foreign countries. When Shining Path tried to expand its range of operations to Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile in 1992,²⁸ the first organizations and persons to be ‘touched’ for sympathy and support, were the local NGO’s and the local doctors.

Until recently, Shining Path took and maintained the initiative. Favoured by the central government’s indolence in the early 1980s, the Ayacucho region was easily transformed into a guerrilla stronghold. When in December 1982 the regular army took the *plaza* of Ayacucho and a special military command for the emergency-zone was created, the movement avoided open confrontations but continued exercising constant pressure by surprise attacks. At night, guerrilla-columns controlled the departments in the South-Central highlands. When in September 1982, Shining Path’s nineteen year old *commandante* Edith Lagos died by police fire, a multitude of 30 thousand persons were present at the burial and the conservative archbishop Frederico Richter Prada celebrated the solemn funeral mass.²⁹ The movement’s popularity among the peasants lasted until the mid-1980s, when Shining Path columns began to cruise systematically the highland departments from Ecuador to Bolivia. The local *comuneros* usually refused to prepare food for the pursuing army units.

The guerrillas suffered their first serious set-back in the Alto Hualaga Valley, the most important coca-producing region in the world, while trying to establish control over the taxable regional economy. Its columns were resisted and initially driven out. But after a second effort in the late 1980s, the better part of the valley was under control and the urban middle class in the regional capital Tarapoto, from the local supermarket owner to the police inspector, paid their tax quota on a regular, sometimes daily base. Since then, it tried to surround and penetrate Lima, making its presence visible in the metropolitan slums and distributing land and animals in some of Lima’s rural coastal valleys. The movement could not easily penetrate the labour unions and the industrial organizations. Thus a selective wave of terror against the legal left and the fabric of independent slum organizations, added to an armed strike that paralyzed Lima around Independence Day in 1992, contributed to a generalized sense of demoralization. This war of nerves was suddenly substituted by a wave of official euphoria after the capture of Guzmán and Shining Path’s Central Committee.

A Preliminary Balance

Shining Path is by no means the only agent contributing to the Peruvian horror script. A second guerrilla-movement, Tupac Amaru—abbreviated MRTA, *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru*, named after the 1780s rebel—started its operations in the early 1980s, partly as a competitor to Shining Path. If there is officialdom in guerrilla-warfare, Tupac Amaru belonged to the ‘formal sector’ of uniforms, military-style command and ‘normal’ behaviour, including their public appearances and the *romanesque* bravado of its leadership.³⁰ Both Shining Path and Tupac Amaru tried to acquire control of the Alto Huallaga, Shining Path being the major force of the two and the ultimate winner in the area.³¹ The same can be said about its confrontations with the regular army.³² Being the smaller, the weaker, the more predictable and the more ‘civilized’ of the two, the performance of Tupac Amaru was—until its dissolution in 1993—normally considered to be less significant than the more mysterious Shining Path.

Ordinary urban criminality is also to be taken seriously. Spectacular raids, kidnapping and hijacking began to be chronic during the García presidency. Mass discharges of suspected criminal police officers, unemployed ex-conscripts of the armed forces, former members of the private police organizations—a booming branch in the 1980s—mixed up with petty criminals in the metropolitan areas. The problem became so acute, that the National Chamber of Industry and Commerce, in the 1986 collective negotiations with the government, formulated an ‘effective protection against kidnapping’ as the most important priority on behalf of the private sector. Sometimes urban criminality dropped, then rose again. It never disappeared. Its presence sometimes confounded with guerrilla terrorism or anti-subversive police and military activities.

The drug economy is another factor that contributes to the process of informalization and violence. Originally mainly a Peruvian affair with its local drug aristocracy,³³ laundering money through the *Banco Amazónico* and establishing fragile ties with the regional military, it became a matter of *colombianization* and a division of labour between foreign and Peruvian involvement in the early 1980s.³⁴ Ten years later, only the coca production in the Alto Huallaga Valley alone provides the source of income for some threehundred thousand people. Nobody tried to analyze deeply the interactions between the drug lords, the drug traffickers, Shining Path, Tupac Amaru, the police, the army, the navy, the air force and the government.³⁵ The economic impact of the coca is enormous, the coca share in the national violence statistic should be proportional.

Since the arrest of Guzmán, the character and the intensity of the civil war—‘terrorism’ as it remained paraphrased in the hygienic politico-military jargon—has changed substantially. Some sixty percent of Shining Path’s Central Committee is behind bars; of every twenty-five members, nine are free.³⁶ At the regional level, most of the fighting

machine of Shining Path remains intact: only the Comité Norte has been 'neutralized,' whereas the four others are virtually undetected. The same can be said about the zonal and subzonal committees. An estimated guess of DINCOTE in february 1994 provided a number of three thousand guerrilleros, mostly organized in small columns and cells. Shining Path as a coherent clandestine political organization broke into smaller components. As a military organization at the national level, Shining Path is reduced to regional significance, although some of its brigades, under their new names, display the same violence and surprise tactics as before. October 1994 for instance, combined explosions of the metropolitan electricity plants provoked the same panic as in 1992, when Lima's population felt itself under siege. The guerrilla is forced into the defensive and the poor people in the urban *barriadas* and slums lost their fear. They denounce former Shining Path members to the local authorities and sometimes ask for raids by army special forces. The 'razzia cum development' tactic has become official policy. Fujimori, accompanied by task groups of a special army brigade, makes an unannounced trip to an urban slum and while the anti-guerrilla troops comb out street by street, army hairdressers, army painters, army paramedics and army dentists provide their gratis services at the president's request!

Supposedly, Shining Path's campaigns were defined in some brilliant strategic master plans. In retrospect,³⁷ those plans were more of a propagandistic than a military signature. Guzmán—behind bars—stated that the expansion of his guerrilla-forces from the province of Cangollo in Ayacucho (1980) to the surrounding rural provinces of the department of Ayacucho (1982) occurred so quickly and so unexpectedly:

- that the central committee not exactly know how to use the strategic advantages of a disappearing State in the Peruvian highland.
- that the counteroffensive of the army—when the Armed Forces were given military and political responsibility in Ayacucho and other 'emergency zones' was extremely severe:³⁸ some six thousand people, mostly adults, of an adult Indian population of twohundred thousand in the five provinces of Ayacucho, disappeared or were reported death between January 1983 and October 1984.
- that this countercampaign suddenly lost its force in 1984, on explicit command of Belaunde's government.
- that when the army, protesting against presidential tutelage, from 1985 to 1988 left the initiative to Shining Path and limited itself to strict self protection, the movement developed again a perspective of a war to be won.
- that, when the army finally organized the peasant armies of the *ronderos* in the late 1980s, the army's pressure started to be felt.

In 1990 DINCOTE almost captured Guzmán; one of the 'strategic documents,' found in his clandestine residence estimated the Indian popula-

tion more or less controlled as two hundred thousand, one percent of the national total, living in two percent of the national territory. At the same time, sixtyfive percent of the departments and provinces were declared 'emergency zones' or combat areas.

Basically, Peru's civil war was an ethnic war, fought mainly in the remote rural and Indian zones in the departments of Ayacucho and Junin. During the campaigns of Shining Path and the police from 1980 to 1982, and during the offensives and counteroffensives of the guerrilla and the Armed Forces, two relatively alien fighting machines disputed the military and political power in the Peruvian highland. Only from 1990 to 1992 Lima—and in Lima mostly the inhabitants of the metropolitan slums—formed part of the war scenario. The real war victims were the Indian *comuneros*, the Indian and mestizo war refugees, the people whose villages were destructed, whose properties damaged or confiscated, whose children and relatives murdered or mutilated.³⁹

Ultimately, apparently enlightened intellectuals and their following and recruited *guerrilleros* launched a 'people's war' on behalf of the Peruvian Indians,⁴⁰ but—at least in the long term—with little compassion and relatively little insight into Quechua society, Quechua and Aymara ethnicities and ethnic aspirations. Quechua was a despised language, and Spanish the speech of progress and scientific marxism-leninism-maoism-gonzaloism. Andean symbology was completely neglected in the literature and political papers distributed by Shining Path. The Peruvian Armed Forces fought their anti-guerrilla as a war of law and order in the first place, not using an intelligent ethnic protective symbolism as could be supposed.⁴¹ In this respect, the Peruvian army acted in a comparable way as Guatemala's Armed Forces in another tragic and isolated ethnic civil war:⁴² on behalf of the Indians fighting the Indians, protecting them against communism by massacrating the rural population. In the end, this war transformed the Indian highlands into a killing zone, Lima in an anomic city and Peru into the most spectacular poverty and informalization scenario of the Latin American continent.

Endnotes

1. For a detailed discussion, see Glewwe & De Tray, "Poor"; Gonzáles de Olarte, *Economía bajo violencia*; Ruccio, "When Failure Becomes Success"; Thorp, *Economic Management* pp. 67-143; and, Pastor & Wise "Peruvian Economic Policy."

2. Data obtained in an interview with Minister of Labour Augusto Antonioli on September 10, 1992.

3. See Matos Mar, *Desborde popular*; Franco, *Otra modernidad*; and Pásara *et al*, *Otra cara de la luna*.

4. This is the expression used by colonel D.E.M.R. Letona, then (1992) Chief of Staff of the Minister of National Defence of Guatemala and now (1994) the director of the civil-military study center ESTNA in Guatemala. See Koonings, "Sociología de la intervención militar" for a general discussion.

5. See Kruijt, *Revolution by Decree*, p 135.

6. Data obtained from extensive interviews with the generals Jorge Fernández Maldonado and Edgardo Mercado Jarrin in 1986; Kruijt, *Revolution by Decree*, pp. 50-55. A second interview with general Fernández Maldonado was held in December 1990.

7. General Edgardo Mercado Jarrin and the colonels Jorge Fernandez Maldonado, Leonidas Rodriguez Figueroa, Enrique Gallegos and Rafael Hoyos. Hoyos would be the director of national intelligence during a substantive part of the Velasco years.

8. Reported in Kruijt, *Entre Sendero y los militares*, pp. 85-86, 101 ff., 113 ff.). I interviewed general Sinesio Jarama in February 1991.

9. Most of the following arguments comes from an interview with general Edwin Diaz, former chief of the *Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional* during the García and early Fujimori years (1986-91), September 11, 1992.

10. Analyzed in Kruijt, "Perú," pp. 96-96. I consulted also Palmer, "National Security."

11. Gorriti, *Sendero Luminoso*, pp. 223 ff.

12. Kruijt, *Revolution by Decree*, pp. 113ff.

13. Kruijt, *Revolution by Decree*, p. 121.

14. In the words of general Ramón Miranda, Minister of Education from 1975 to 1977 and army's Chief of Staff in 1981 and 1982; in Kruijt, "Perú," p. 83.

15. Interview with general Carlos Quevedo, president of the COAP from 1976 to 1980, in Kruijt, "Perú," p. 74.

16. See Rodríguez Beruff, *Militares*, on this subject.

17. Palmer, "Shining Path in Peru," p. 165.

18. Palmer, "Peru," pp. 73-76.

19. See the military report of Guerra, *Experiencia regional*.

20. See for a detailed account Starn, *Hablan los ronderos*.

21. See for an analysis of the informalization process around the presidency Abad Yupanqui and Garcés Peralta, "Gobierno"; Daeschner, *War of the End of Democracy*; Jochamowitz, *Ciudadano Fujimori*; and the memoirs of Vargas Llosa, *Pez*. The best analysis is González Manrique, *Encrucijada Peruana*.

22. Officially called the Communist Party of Peru, by the Shining Path of José Carlos Mariátegui, in honour of Peru's most original Marxist theorist. The best analytical publications about Shining Path are those of Tello, *Sobre el volcán*, and, *Perú*; Degregori, *FFAA*; Gorriti, *Sendero Luminoso*; and, Palmer, *Shining Path of Peru*.

23. The military high command in Lima consulted the presidential palace and obtained a "Don't worry!" But the army commander sent troops by helicopter to restore law and order and let the population vote again. See the interview with an—at his request—anonymous General Commander in Kruijt, *Entre Sendero y los militares*, p. 105.

24. Without any exception, all general commanders between 1980 and 1992—I interviewed most of them personally—blame Belaunde for his negligence and complete lack of interest.

25. Degregori, *Qué difícil es ser Dios*, p. 19, emphasises the fact that in Shining Path's hagiographic manuscripts Guzmán is always depicted as an unarmed teacher.

26. Quoted from "Sendero Luminoso en el Norte del País," an extensive unpublished document, written by United Nations-officials in May 1991, a team of sociologists with family ties in the departments dominated by Shining Path. Another interesting and detailed account (not used here) gives Strong, *Shining Path*.

27. Tarazona-Sevillano, "Organization," gives a coherent insight. I used her data, publications of the well informed *Si* (1991; 1992) and the update, published in the special number of *La Republica* of September 14 (1992), two days after Guzmán's arrest.

28. I used the reporting in *Si* and I interviewed related diplomatic and development representatives in September and October 1992.

29. Richter Prada was partly responsible for the discontinuation of the Land Reform in Ayacucho.

30. Tello, *Perú*, pp. 109-110.

31. See Palmer, "Shining Path in Peru," pp. 162-163; and González, "Sendero versus MRTA," "Coca," and, "MRTA."

32. Kruijt, *Entre Sendero y los militares* pp. 76-77.

33. See Haring, "Región amazónica peruana," for a description of the Peruvian drug economy in the 1960s and 1970s.

34. See Palmer, "Peru," p. 68, for a discussion.

35. The weekly magazine *Caretas* published sometimes a special report. The October 6, 1986 number related the names of five high-ranking police officers (four generals and a colonel) and a retired army general with mafia boss Reynaldo Rodríguez Lopez. His legal advisor was the now presidential advisor Vladimiro Montesinos.

36. The following data are quoted from a confidential briefing, offered by general Carlos Domínguez Solís, national director of DINCOTE, to representatives of the Diplomatic Corps on February 8, 1994.

37. The following analysis is based upon interviews in February 1994 with spokesmen, operating very close to the security and anti-guerrilla apparatus.

38. See the interview with general Adrián Huaman, the first army commander in Ayacucho, in Kruijt, *Entre Sendero y los militares*, pp. 86 ff., and the memoirs of his colleague, Noel Moral, *Ayacucho*.

39. See for a more detailed account the special number of *Ideele*, "Perú Hoy" (1993).

40. See on this subject Smith, *Ethnic Revival*, and, *Ethnic Origin* in general and the analysis presented by Burgler, *Eyes of the Pineapple* on the case of Kampuchea.

41. See for instance Psaila, *Redefining National Security*.

42. See for instance Aguilera, *Fusil y el olivo*; Figueroa, *Recurso del miedo*; Jonas, *Battle for Guatemala*; and Sohr, *Centroamérica en guerra*.