OUR BRAZIL WILL AWAKE!

THE ACÇÃO INTEGRALISTA BRASILEIRA AND THE FAILED QUEST FOR A FASCIST ORDER IN THE 1930S

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Cuadernos del Cedla

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>Associação Brasileira de Cultura</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACD</td>
<td>Annães da Câmara dos Diputados</td>
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<td>AIB</td>
<td>Acção Integralista Brasileira</td>
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<tr>
<td>AESP</td>
<td>Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo (São Paulo)</td>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>Arquivo Nacional (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
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<td>ANL</td>
<td>Aliança Nacional Libertadora</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>A Offensiva</td>
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<td>AP 47</td>
<td>Arquivo San Tiago Dantas</td>
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<td>APERJ</td>
<td>Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
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<td>AR/Npa</td>
<td>Archiv der Republik, Neues Politisches Archiv (Vienna)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BA Berlin</td>
<td>Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde</td>
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<td>BA Koblenz</td>
<td>Bundesarchiv Koblenz</td>
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<tr>
<td>BZ</td>
<td>Blumenauer Zeitung</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAN</td>
<td>Diário da Assembléia Nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOPS-SP</td>
<td>Departamento de Ordem Política e Social-São Paulo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESPS</td>
<td>Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DN</td>
<td>Diário da Noite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNN</td>
<td>Diário de Notícias</td>
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<td>DPL</td>
<td>Diário do Poder Legislativo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW</td>
<td>Deutsches Wollen</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIAL</td>
<td>Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDESPS</td>
<td>Fundo Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDGIE</td>
<td>Fundo Departamento Geral de Investigações Especiais</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGV-Cpdoc</td>
<td>Fundação Getúlio Vargas-Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação em História Contemporânea (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSPR</td>
<td>Fundo Secretaria da Presidencia da República</td>
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<tr>
<td>GV</td>
<td>Arquivo Getúlio Vargas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hahr</td>
<td>Hispanic American Historical Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQD</td>
<td>História: Questões &amp; Debates</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFZ Munich</td>
<td>Institut für Zeitgeschichte (Munich)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JB</td>
<td>Jornal do Brasil</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Jornal do Commercio</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCH</td>
<td>Journal of Contemporary History</td>
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<td>JLAS</td>
<td>Journal of Latin American Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>LBR</td>
<td>Luso-Brazilian Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCT</td>
<td>Legião Cearense do Trabalho</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEC</td>
<td>Liga Eleitoral Católica</td>
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<td>LSN</td>
<td>Lei de Segurança Nacional</td>
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<td>MHN</td>
<td>Museu Histórico Nacional (Rio de Janeiro)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MI</td>
<td>Monitor Integralista</td>
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<tr>
<td>MJNI</td>
<td>Ministério da Justiça e Negócios Interiores</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSDAP</td>
<td>Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei</td>
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<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>Arquivo Osvaldo Aranha</td>
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<tr>
<td>ÖSTA</td>
<td>Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (Vienna)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OJ</td>
<td>O Jornal</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA AA</td>
<td>Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Public Record Office (London)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRP</td>
<td>Partido de Representação Popular</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>Revista de Ciência Política</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIHGB</td>
<td>Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEP</td>
<td>Sociedade de Estudos Políticos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STE</td>
<td>Superior Tribunal Eleitoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAM</td>
<td>The Americas</td>
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<td>TSN</td>
<td>Tribunal de Segurança Nacional</td>
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Map of Brazil in the 1930s.
The 1930s were a period of political turmoil, social unrest, economic transformations, and ideological confrontations in Brazil. During the decennium, one revolution, a civil war, a failed communist-led uprising, a successful *autogolpe* avant la lettre, a foundered fascist putsch, as well as innumerable minor military revolts shook the country; it made the unusual experience of having three consecutive constitutions; and, just as rarely, the nation was ruled by four different regimes.¹ At the same time, women were enfranchised and new social classes were brought into the political arena, while the suffocating dominance of the landed oligarchy over the political system was markedly reduced. Equally, the balance of power between the states and the federal government changed in many important ways, with the latter greatly increasing its influence to the detriment of the former. Brazil saw, moreover, the rise of a strong, if short-lived, communist-led Popular Front organization as well as a relatively more long-lasting fascist movement, whereas political liberalism, an idea and ideal traditionally weakly rooted in society, was in retreat. Last but not least, the armed forces (re-)emerged as a central political actor. Even by the high standards of Latin America, the 1930s were certainly a rather turbulent time for the country.

As is known, historical periodizations are difficult to make and more often than not invite criticism. Without raising too many objections one can say however that late October and early November 1930 did indicate an important watershed in twentieth-century Brazilian his-
tory, and it certainly was a significant period as far as this Cuaderno is concerned. On 24 October, considerably weakened by the impact of the Great Depression on the country’s export economy and resented because of the imposition of yet another paulista, Júlio Prestes, Washington Luís resigned from the presidency. The rural oligarchy, which had dominated the political and socio-economic structures of the country since the establishment of the republic in 1889, had not been able to foster sufficient support to resist the rebellion by a heterogeneous coalition of disenchanted politicians from Rio Grande do Sul, Paraíba, Minas Gerais, and Pernambuco as well as young military officers, the tenentes, that had only started three weeks earlier. With the nomination of the insurgents’ leader – the defeated opposition candidate and former governor of Rio Grande do Sul, Getúlio Vargas – as head of the provisional government on 3 November, the ‘Old Republic’ was brought to an end. The ‘Revolution of 1930’ (cf. Fausto, 1997), as the changeover of power became subsequently known, would eventually signal the beginning of a new era. Brazil was about to change in many important ways. The multifarious transformations, which received a new impetus during Vargas’s eight years of authoritarian rule under the Estado Novo (November 1937-October 1945) (cf. Hentschke, 1996, pp. 523-559), lastingly reshaped Latin America’s biggest nation.

At the time of Vargas’s appointment these developments were by no means foreseeable. Brazil’s new leader only slowly revealed his plans and intentions. Indeed, initially, he did not come forward with a clear programme at all, leaving the nation in the dark about his goals. This lack of direction, essentially due to the heterogeneous nature of the coalition backing him, together with ‘constant political turmoil’ during the first two years of the provisional government (Hilton, 1975, p. 4), not only caused popular dissatisfaction with the regime (cf. PA AA, 1931a); it also reinforced the widespread feeling of anxiety and scepticism about Brazil’s historical development as well as her future course that gripped the country’s elite after the breakdown of the established order. As a result of this sentiment of uncertainty, a number of groups, intellectual circles, and publications – mainly, if not exclusively, on the (extreme) right of the ideological spectrum – emerged on the political and intellectual scene. They attempted to provide answers to, and to show ways out of, the perceived crisis. They did take up themes and ideas developed by earlier generations of right-wing Brazilian nationalists (cf. Deutsch, 1999, pp. 107-136); yet, crucially, to different degrees, they also were influenced by European fascism and proposed the restructuring of the political and socio-economic system along fascist lines.
At first, the tenentes, the movement of young military officers who had staged a series of abortive coups in the early 1920s, were at the forefront of this search for alternatives, speaking up for the centralization and ‘authoritarian transformation of the Brazilian state’ (Saes, 1996, p. 491). They were the driving force behind the Revolutionary Legions as well as the Clube 3 de Outubro, ‘the foremost tenente organization’ (Conniff, 1978, p. 64, italics in the original). The Legião Revolucionária of São Paulo and Minas Gerais, respectively, were the two most significant factions (Flynn, 1970, pp. 98-99). Especially the mineiro legion, led by Francisco Campos, at the time minister of education and later author of the constitution of the Estado Novo, ‘was modelled on Italian Fascism’, as not only the khaki shirts of its militants and its banner demonstrated (PA AA, 1931b; see also PA AA, 1931c). Another regional organization that reflected the growing influence of European fascism on Brazilian politics was the Legião Cearense do Trabalho (LCT) of the tenente Severino Sombra, founded in the north-eastern state in August 1931. Intellectual manifestations of this trend were various journals, such as Hierarchia and Revista de Estudos Jurídicos e Sociais, both published in Rio de Janeiro, and Política, produced in São Paulo, as well as the work of Olbiano de Melo, a journalist from Minas Gerais who developed plans to establish a national-syndicalist party (Trindade, 1988, pp. 67-75).

Plínio Salgado, the future leader of the Acção Integralista Brasileira (AIB), played an integral part in these activities. Born in a provincial town in the state of São Paulo in 1895, Salgado, who had acquired a name as a writer and ideologue of Verdeamarelismo, the nationalist current of Brazilian modernism, during the second half of the 1920s (cf. Velloso, 1993), had joined the paulista legion after the downfall of the ‘Old Republic’; and subsequently he had signed as the principal author of its revolutionary manifesto, published in March 1931. The document, according to the US-American consul in São Paulo ‘the first formal effort to state the revolutionary aims comprehensively’ (Flynn, 1970, p. 85), was characterized by its emphasis on a strong state and a central government; its attacks on big private landholdings, the latifundios, and international capitalism; as well as the nationalist idea of brasilidade and the claim that the country’s problems had to be resolved through Brazilian solutions; corporatism was another important feature (Flynn, 1970, pp. 86-87). Although the manifesto ‘had caused great repercussions when it was released’ (Dagnino, 1986, p. 112), the legions failed decisively to influence Vargas. They could not convince the provisional president of the necessity infinitely to
postpone the return to parliamentary democracy and perpetuate an authoritarian regime (Flynn, 1970, p. 93).

Disappointed with the limited achievements of the legion, which, because of its ‘deeply rooted authoritarian elitism towards the people’, had failed to develop a mass following (Dagnino, 1986, p. 201), Salgado, who had been impressed by a stay in Fascist Italy in 1930 (Plínio Salgado, 1936, pp. 18-21), began to pursue his own agenda; he started to write in the São Paulo-based journal _A Razão_ in June 1931 (cf. Trindade, 1988, pp. 50-63). A few months later, in February 1932, at a time when Vargas published the new electoral code (which made the vote secret, expanded the franchise to women, and lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen), taking the first step towards the return to constitutional rule, Salgado initiated the foundation of the Sociedade de Estudos Políticos (SEP) in São Paulo. Originally set up as a cultural organization, during the course of the first months of 1932 the society became the basis for the formulation of a broader political project. This process apparently reached its end in early May, when the SEP’s leader suggested starting a campaign of political action in order to disseminate its programme more widely. The name proposed by Salgado for the new group was Acção Integralista Brasileira (Plínio Salgado, 1936, p. 36).

The proclamation of its founding manifesto, essentially written by Salgado, had been scheduled for the beginning of July. The outbreak of the Constitutionalist Revolution, as the armed revolt of São Paulo against the federal government, its centralizing tendency as well as its hesitation to return to constitutional rule (cf. Hilton, 1982), had been christened, frustrated the plan, however. The future leader of the Brazilian fascists and self-styled saviour of the embattled nation had to wait three months before the circumstances allowed the presentation of its programme to the Brazilian public. Only with the collapse of the insurrection by the dominant state of the federation imminent, Salgado could finally launch the _Manifesto de Outubro_ in São Paulo on 7 October 1932. In front of a small audience gathered in the municipal theatre of the city, the AIB was finally born. And although nobody would have been surprised if it had disappeared as so many other factions before it, within the next five years it developed into a mass movement and a forceful political protagonist that would contribute to the restructuring of Brazil; the integralista movement would support the coalition of Vargas, his civilian confidants, collaborators, and the armed forces, that plotted the establishment of the Estado Novo (cf. McCann, 2004, pp. 403-439).
As the emergence of the various journals and the appearance of the more or less short-lived groups during the months following the collapse of the ‘Old Republic’ indicated, the emergence of the AIB was not an isolated political phenomenon; it was the result of increased activities on the (extreme) right (Carone, 1974, p. 194; Trindade, 1988, p. 67). Indeed, the majority of the above-mentioned factions and currents subsequently merged into the AIB, which was to become ‘the first nationally significant political party’ in Brazil (Lauerhass, 1986, pp. 117, 123; see also Loewenstein, 1942, p. 34). Even more importantly from our point of view, the movement expressed the need for national regeneration – an idea widely shared at the time (cf. Oliveira, 1979) – through its peculiar form of fascism. Like its European counterparts (cf. Eatwell, 1996, p. 11), Integralismo claimed that its hierarchical and socially integrated totalitarian order would overcome the social and political divisions created by Brazil’s regionally organized political parties and leave behind liberal capitalism and communist statism. Only on the basis of their fascist message, Salgado and his followers tirelessly maintained, the alleged decline of the nation could be overcome and a new era of national greatness would finally arise. Brazil, as the integralista hymn *Avante* stated, would awake and fulfil its potential. Equally, the AIB displayed other features that are commonly described as defining characteristics of fascism, particularly a ‘vitalist philosophy’, an extreme elitism, the Führerprinzip, the positive valuation of ‘violence as end as well as means’ and the trend ‘to normalize war and/or military virtues’ (Payne, 1995, p. 14).

That fascism could gain a foothold in Brazil in the 1930s – in the previous decennium only a Partido Fascista Brasileira had been set up by Italian immigrants (Carone, 1974, p. 194) – was invariably linked to developments in Europe. With the rapid advance of Adolf Hitler’s Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) in the early 1930s, which culminated in his nomination as German Chancellor in January 1933, ‘a new fascist Mecca’ arose (Woolf, 1980, p. 16). Indeed, ‘without the international standing of Germany as an evidently successful and rising world power,’ Eric Hobsbawm states, ‘fascism would have had no serious impact outside Europe, nor […] would non-fascist reactionary rulers have bothered to dress up as fascist sympathizers’ (Hobsbawm, 1995, p. 117). In contrast to Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany exerted influence beyond its immediate borders and immigrant communities, and the success of fascism in one of the leading industrial nations of the time significantly raised its attractiveness as a radical third way. Mussolini’s efforts to propagate Italian Fascism as a universal
model also have to be seen in this wider context. The timing – coinciding with Nazism’s rise – suggests that the Duce, who had previously underlined the peculiarity of Fascism and stressed its quintessentially Italian nature, recognized the growing influence of Hitler’s Germany over European and non-European fascists, and that he attempted to establish Italy as a viable alternative (cf. Ledeen, 1972).

Underlining the conjuncture of fascism’s rise as an universal phenomenon and the emergence of the Acção Integralista Brasileira does not mean on the other hand that Integralismo was a mere copy of European role-models, as Brazilian scholars, especially Gilberto Vasconcelos (Vasconcelos, 1979, pp. 18, 57) and José Chasin (Chasin, 1978, pp. 643, 651), stated. Arguing from an orthodox Marxist perspective, they brought the argument to bear that Brazil’s underdeveloped economic structure and her dependent status in the world economy meant that no autonomous fascist movement could emerge. Without going into detail about the limitations of Marxist theories of fascism (cf. Wippermann, 1981), various objections to this argumentation seem pertinent. Firstly, while the socio-economic situation in Brazil was certainly different from the one in the more developed Western European nations, particularly Germany, it was not unlike those in some Eastern European countries, as for instance Romania, which also saw the rise of a strong fascist movement in the interwar period, and especially the 1930s (Nagy-Talavera, 1970; Heinen, 1986). Secondly, although the Integralistas selectively borrowed from European fascism, and the influence shows especially in their trappings, they were nonetheless ‘deeply rooted in Brazilian nationalism and culture as well’ (Levine, 1970, p. 98).

In addition, by assuming such a position, one does not do justice to the specific way the AIB and its Chefe Nacional, as Salgado was referred to by his followers, interpreted Brazil’s problems, nor to the solutions they proposed, limited and undesirable as they might have been. The Integralistas did react to the widespread feeling of anxiety and insecurity that characterized Brazilian society in the early 1930s. Finally, by reducing the AIB to a merely mimetic movement, which allegedly transferred foreign models and ideas to Brazil, regardless of their applicability, one all too easily falls into the trap of seeing it as an agent of international fascism, or even the ‘fifth column’ of the European dictators. But the Brazilian fascists did not prepare the way for the annexation of Brazil by foreign powers, most notably the Third Reich, as its leftist opponents asserted in the 1930s (and some scholars in subsequent decades). The relationship between the unequal partners was indeed, as we will see, low-key and not without its problems, evolving around the question
of the Teuto-Brazilian communities’ future. In short, statements like Vasconcelos’s and Chasin’s do not help us to understand the nature of Integralismo as the peculiar Brazilian manifestation of fascism but rather obfuscate the issue. After all, the integralista movement was ‘a child of a changing society, and born under the impact of a new international situation’ (Trindade, 2001, p. 474).

Against the background of these national as well as international changes, this Cuaderno will tell the story and reconstruct the history of the AIB, covering the period between its establishment in October 1932 and its demise in early 1938. (In a concluding chapter the fate of the former Integralistas after 1945 will be outlined.) It will discuss the changing political actions (and fortunes) of the AIB, its relationships with other political protagonists, as well as the continuity and discontinuity of the integralista discourse as presented by its leading members, namely Plínio Salgado, Gustavo Barroso, and Miguel Reale. While ideological differences existed between these men and certain ideas dominated their thinking – the Catholic mysticism of Salgado (Araújo, 1978; 1988b), the anti-Semitism of Barroso (Maio, 1992), and the legalism of, and importance of corporatism for, Reale (Araújo, 1998a; Melo, 1994; Poletti, 1982) –, one must not forget that the movement’s ideology was founded on some basic principals and that, even more importantly, integralista militants overwhelmingly perceived it as a homogenous ideology (Trindade, 1988, pp. 149-159, 197-202; 1996, p. 320) represented and embodied by their leader, Salgado. Consequently, the varying emphases on certain aspects did not automatically transform Integralismo into a ‘frentista movement rather than an effective political party’ (Chasin, 1978, p. 84, italics in the original). The underlying message and overall objective of establishing a totalitarian regime on the basis of its fascist message of national regeneration and social rebirth were invariably accepted.

At a more general level, by discussing the development and activities of the dominant fascist organization in Brazil of the 1930s – two attempts to establish rival groups, both by the name of Acção Social Brasileira, failed during the decade (cf. Carone, 1974, pp. 202-204) – and in fact the strongest fascist group in Latin America during the decennium, this book wants to make a contribution to the ongoing debate about the nature of fascism in the subcontinent. Following a first wave of publications in the 1970s, which provided groundbreaking information on phenomena largely ignored until then (cf. Hennessy, 1991 [1976]), during the last ten years this discussion has received a new impetus. In various monographs, comparative studies, and articles
scholars from the Americas, Europe, and Israel have rounded off and partly corrected these earlier contributions, and thereby substantially increased our knowledge of fascist movements in Latin America, and especially in Argentina (Deutsch, 1999, pp. 143-247; Klein, 2001a; 2002; Spektorowski, 2003) and Chile (Szajder, 1993; Deutsch, 1999, pp. 143-192; Klein, 2001b). Brazil, on the other hand, with the notable exception of Deutsch’s chapter in her comparative work on the extreme right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (Deutsch, 1999, pp. 248-307) and the study by Cavalari (Cavalari, 1999), has largely been passed over in recent years. Based on the available secondary literature and archive material from Brazil, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Austria, some of it used for the first time, this Cuaderno will go some way to fill this lacuna.

At the same time, and looking beyond fascist movements, this book also reflects the growing interest in the Latin American right since the early 1990s, as the publication of a number of edited books (Chalmers, Campelo de Souza, and Borón, eds, 1992; Middlebrook, ed., 2000), comparative studies (Deutsch, 1999; Payne, 2000), and monographs on Brazil (Power, 2000), Argentina (Gibson, 1996), Chile (Pollack, 1999), and Mexico (Loaeza Tovar, 1999) underline. With these publications a startling gap in the scholarly literature on Latin America is slowly filled, for the left has been more carefully and closely studied than its opponents on the right, although the latter has ruled the nations south of the Rio Grande more often than the former during the twentieth century, and even when in opposition, profoundly influenced the course of their politics (Deutsch, 1999, p. 1). The AIB of Salgado, as this Cuaderno will show, is an illustrative example of this fact. While it never gained state power, representing a case of what Stuart Woolf has called ‘fascisms manqués’ (Woolf, 1980, p. 10, italics in the original), it certainly did influence the course of Brazilian politics during its brief existence.
Despite the prolonged period of time that passed between the formulation of the Manifesto de Outubro during the first half of 1932 and its public presentation in early October of that year, the document was ‘not a carefully reasoned exposition of political principles’; rather, it was ‘a statement in the form of an oration, a denunciation of existing evils, and a call to action’ (Broxson, 1973, p. 47). Apart from the commitment to private ownership, described as ‘natural and personal’ (AIB, [1932], p. 7), and the denunciation of foreign capitalism, the document completely ignored economic issues, for instance; it did not offer any concrete solutions to the crisis that Brazil went through in the early 1930s because of the impact of the Great Depression. Nor did it include any statements concerning the dependency of the Brazilian economy on coffee, the country’s main export commodity, and how it could be overcome. Nonetheless, the Manifesto outlined the new group’s ideas for national reorganization, spelled out the basic principles of its ideology, identified the causes of Brazil’s perceived decline and consequently the enemies of both the nation and the AIB. It formed the basis for the future discourse of the self-declared saviours of the nation and provided first insights into the ideological universe of Brazilian fascism.

In accordance with European fascist movements, and factions in Chile and Argentina as well, the Manifesto laid down Integralismo’s claim to present a radical third way that, through the mobilization of
national sentiments and the faith in the future, would create ‘a culture, a civilization, a genuinely Brazilian way of life’ (AIB, [1932], p. 6). It announced nothing less than the salvation of Brazil, described by the Manifesto as a country tormented by divisions and disunity – a country in which particularistic interests dominated the nation and prevented the realization of social harmony and progress –, from the ‘mistakes of the capitalist civilization, and the errors of the communist barbarity’ (AIB, [1932], p. 11). The objective of an ‘intimate and perfect unity of its children’ could not be achieved, the document stated, because there ‘exist states within the state; political parties fractioning the Nation; classes fighting against classes; isolated individuals exercising personal actions in the decisions of the government’ (AIB, [1932], p. 4).

The Integralistas’ aim was the reversal of this perceived decline by setting up a disciplined state, resting on the family – ‘the basis of happiness on earth’ – and the municipality – the ‘reunion of families’ (AIB, [1932], pp. 8-9). A corporatist regime would replace liberal democracy and political parties, which only pursued particularistic interests and thereby contributed to the decline of the nation. Brazilians would no longer act as individuals but as members of their social class. Reaching all levels of society and the state and thus constituting a genuine form of representation, the corporations of the future fascist order would be united in a single party (AIB, [1932], p. 4). It would be this regime – strong, unified, centralized, hierarchical and led by the ‘Chief of the Nation’ – which would guarantee ‘the unity of all provinces, the harmony of all classes, the initiatives of all individuals, the supervision of the State, the construction of national unity (todo nacional)’ (AIB, [1932], pp. 4, 6). This state of social harmony, the Integralistas contended in their founding manifesto, was the precondition for progress and development, both for individuals and the nation. And this integralista Brazil would be a shining example for the rest of the continent.

It was this message of national regeneration, summarized in the slogan ‘Family, Fatherland, and God’, which reflected their indebtedness to the country’s Catholic heritage (Levine, 1970, p. 82), which Salgado and his followers began to preach to their fellow countrymen (and -women). Since they did not have their own national publication until May 1934, when the first issue of A Offensiva, their main organ, appeared on a weekly basis in Rio de Janeiro, the Integralistas initially disseminated their ideas to an overwhelmingly illiterate population through public speeches. Besides São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, at first their efforts centred on the north-eastern and northern states, as
Salgado’s trip to Ceará in August 1933 as well as lengthy tours by other leading Integralistas through Sergipe, Pernambuco, Paraíba, Rio Grande do Norte, Pará, and Maranhão during late 1933 and early 1934 demonstrated (AN, n.d.; MI, 1st Fortnight, Jan. 1934, p. 2; 2nd Fortnight, Jan. 1934, p. 4). This focus on the poorest and most underdeveloped part of the country was the result of personal relationships Salgado had established with other like-minded men after the ‘Revolution of 1930’ and especially during his time at A Razão and the Sociedade de Estudos Políticos, namely the mineiro Olbiano de Melo and the cearense Severino Sombra (Melo, 1957, pp. 66-67).

Another reason for that early emphasis on the north-eastern and northern states was the membership of Gustavo Barroso in the AIB, a native of Ceará whose joining of the faction in the (Brazilian) spring of 1933 had had ‘great repercussions’ because of his ‘national and international prominence as a writer and historian’ (Melo, 1957, p. 69). It was also the president of the prestigious Academia Brasileira de Letras and director of the Museu Histórico Nacional who led the propaganda tour of the AIB through the region during late 1933 and early 1934, named the ‘Caravan Gustavo Barroso’ by the Monitor Integralista, the movement’s publication for internal affairs (MI, 1st Fortnight, Jan. 1934, p. 2). Southern Brazil, the future stronghold of the AIB, was, on the other hand, largely ignored during these first months. As against the north-eastern and northern states, Salgado and his followers had not established extensive contacts with men interested in the fascist message of national regeneration. The AIB’s leadership only corresponded with ‘some sympathizers’, but they were generally isolated and left to their own devices (Brandalise, 1992, p. 125). Only during the second half of 1934 would a delegation of Integralistas, led by Salgado, visit the region, giving a decisive boost to the progress of the movement.

An early indication of the growing importance of the AIB as the dominant force of the extreme right came in early August 1933, a few days after Salgado’s arrival in Fortaleza, the capital of Ceará. The leadership of the Legião Cearense do Trabalho, consisting of Hélder Câmara, Ubirajara Indio do Brasil, and Lieutenant Jeová Mota (who had founded one of the first local branches of the nascent integralista movement in the state as early as November 1932), decided unanimously to support the AIB without dissolving the LCT (Parente, 1984, p. 146). The adherence of the Nationalist Party of São Paulo, and (allegedly) all Italians of the Brazilian Fascist Party later that year (AN, n.d.), further underlined the rise of Integralismo as well as its growing appeal. With the creation of a local branch in Rio Branco, then in the remote national territory
of Acre, in February 1934, the group had achieved a national presence just fifteen months after its establishment by a handful of people in São Paulo. According to the figures published by the Integralistas, by the end of 1933 they had enlisted approximately 20,000 members all over Brazil. The number allegedly rose to 180,000 at the end of 1934 (Mi, 7 Oct. 1937, p. 4).

During the first half of 1933, the Integralistas adopted all the typical trappings of fascist movements. The ‘green-shirt’ came into use as the party uniform and with it the reference to the Brazilian fascists as the Camisas Verdes, although contemporary observers initially also spoke of the ‘Olive-shirts’ (DDN, 28 April 1933, p. 1; JB, 2 March 1934, p. 8), and the Greek letter ‘Sigma’, ‘∑’, was chosen as the AIB’s symbol. Centred in a white circle on a blue background, which demonstrated the ‘purity of sentiments and the sincerity of the integralista proposals’ and their unwillingness to accept the existing ‘political limits’ respectively, it represented the aspiration of the movement to ‘integrate all social forces of the country in the supreme expression of nationality’ (AIB, 1937c, p. 8). In combination with the Roman Salute, which in later years was euphemistically termed the ‘integralista gesture’, ‘Anauê’, a term from the Tupy language which translated as ‘you are my relative’, was adopted as its official greeting (AIB, 1937c, pp. 17-18). It began, moreover, to develop an elaborate system of rites and customs, which ‘made participation exciting and meaningful and provided a sense of identity and unity’ (Deutsch, 1999, p. 258; see also Bertonha, 1992). The Integralistas became, as one member later stated, ‘one immense family’, ‘one big family’ (Mondin, 2000, p. 183).

In spite of the emphatic claim to propose national solutions to Brazil’s problems, which the Manifesto de Outubro had identified as the precondition for the rejuvenation of the nation and the fulfilment of national greatness, and the fact that the AIB embraced a number of national heroes (AO, 6 July 1935, p. 1; 10 Aug. 1935, p. 1; Pujol, 1935, p. 25), including Alberto Torres (Salgado 1955 [1933], vol. 7, p. 80; for Torres, see McLain, 1967; Marson, 1979; Barreto, 1990), at the same time leading representatives deliberately sought the identification with European fascism. On the occasion of the first public march of Integralistas, which took place in the streets of São Paulo in late April 1933,13 Salgado set the tone; he did not differentiate between Integralismo and fascism but exemplarily and revealingly stated that ‘only fascism, that great organizing and disciplinarian force, will be able to elevate Brazil again. In order to achieve this goal, the Brazilian people have to take shelter under the banner of the Integralista Ac-
tion’ (*DDN*, 25 April 1933, p. 1). Barroso echoed this declaration a few weeks later, pointing out that it was the ‘straight, unmistakable line of Integralismo’ that could save the country from the abyss, because this ‘is the course of the modern world’ and ‘Brazil always reflects world developments (aspectos do mundo)’ (*DDN*, 31 May 1933, p. 1; see also Barroso 1934b, p. 120).

The inclusion of *As Bases do Nacional Socialismo* by Gottfried Feder, one of the old fighters of the NSDAP and author of a number of works on its worldview (cf. Tyrell, 1988), in the list of books recommended to Integralistas (*MI*, 2nd Fortnight, Aug. 1934, p. 12) was another example of the initial effort to portray the group as part of a worldwide phenomenon. Articles about fascist movements in a number of European countries, for instance one by Barroso on France (*AO*, 7 June 1934, p. 3), as well as the enthusiasm for Fascist Italy’s *Carta del Lavoro*, which Miguel Reale, National Secretary of Doctrine as of mid-March 1934, expressed (Reale, 1934, pp. 202-209), further underlined this emotional and ideational kinship. This obvious contradiction to the claim of the *Manifesto de Outubro* that Brazil suffered from the application of foreign models highlighted the problem of any fascist movement outside Italy and Germany during the 1930s. The *AIB* wanted to be seen as a national manifestation of a new universal phenomenon that was destined to conquer the world, thereby presenting itself as a force of the future and dissociating itself from other rightist groups. Yet, at the same time, it had to avoid accusations that it was only copying foreign role models. As the 1930s progressed and both the group’s standing and influence increased and Nazi Germany became increasingly seen as the ruthless dictatorship it was, this insoluble dilemma would haunt it.

While the Integralistas expressed admiration for their European co-religionists and adopted similar trappings, the internal structure of the *AIB* initially differed from the strictly hierarchical organization of other fascist movements, at least on paper. Officially a triumvirate, consisting of a leader, a secretary, and a treasurer, was responsible for the course of Integralismo, with Salgado provisionally assuming the first position. The structure was reduplicated at the provincial and local levels. Salgado was clearly the dominant figure, however. It was he who led the first public march of about three-dozen men and women through São Paulo, and Salgado also single-handedly nominated the integralista candidates in the city for the elections to the Constitutional Assembly in early May 1933 (*DDN*, 9 May 1933, p. 8). His commanding position became particularly apparent in the run-up to the first national congress of the *AIB*, which took place in Vitória, Espírito Santo, in late
February and early March 1934. In the convocation of the convention, in which Salgado already referred to himself as the Chefe Nacional, he made clear that he alone had decided to call. While members were encouraged to submit proposals that could be subsequently presented there, they had to be sent to him first, so that he could make the final decision as regards to their suitability. The idea was not, Salgado noted, to discuss them, because the AIB would ‘not hold a liberal congress’ (Mi, 1st Fortnight, Jan. 1934, p. 1).

His predominance was not unanimously accepted, though. Severino Sombra challenged Salgado immediately before the start of the conference. Opposed to the idea of a single leader, the founder and historical leader of the LCT, who had been increasingly sidelined, had proposed the retention of a triumvirate, consisting of Salgado, Barroso, and Melo. The triumvirate would have been seconded by a secretary-general, Sombra himself (Melo, 1957, pp. 71-72). An official declaration of the integralista leadership subsequently described this proposal as an attempt on the part of Sombra to become ‘the Stalin of Integralismo’ (JB, 30 March 1934, p. 7). Unlike Stalin, Sombra was not ruthless enough, however, nor did he find sufficient support for his ideas within the movement, and he therefore abandoned it. Contrary to the observation of the carioca daily Jornal do Brasil, his break with Salgado did not fatally undermine the group (JB, 25 April 1934, p. 7). Only a few dissidents joined him during the course of the following weeks (JB, 6 May 1934, p. 7). In the northeastern state of Ceará, the home of the LCT, it was his faction that lost out in the power struggle (Parente, 1984, pp. 155-156; JB, 6 June 1934, p. 8; AO, 1 March 1936, p. 2).

With Sombra’s resistance broken, Salgado, after theatrically resigning from his position as provisional leader of Integralismo because he had fulfilled his historic mission to create ‘for the first time after independence a genuinely national and absolutely disciplined movement based on a doctrine’, was formally enthroned as the leader of the ‘integralista Revolution’ (Mi, 1st Fortnight, May 1934, p. 1). The oath of total loyalty, which all Integralistas had to swear in a slightly modified way upon joining the AIB, was reflected in various parts of the new statute. Amongst his prerogatives were, inter alia, the leadership of all National Departments (clause a) – Doctrine, Finances, Propaganda, Culture, Political Organization, Militia – and the command of the integralista forces (b), as well as the nomination of all national secretaries (c) and provincial leaders (d). Moreover, the Chefe Nacional had the right, if necessary, to define the movement’s ideology (h) and to make the final
decision in all matters of doctrine and practical issues (m). Under the threat of expulsion, the statutes stated that Integralistas were not allowed to question any decision taken by the National Leader (article 5), comment on them, if not asked to do so, let alone criticize him (article 7) (cf. Mi, 1st Fortnight, May 1934, pp. 3-4). His power was, thus, at the same time centralized, total and permanent. The centralization of the power of the leader was so pivotal that all bodies and functions of the movement were outlined [sic] as delegations from his absolute power' (Trindade, 2001, p. 499, italics in the original).

The rejection of traditional party politics and democratic procedures, which exemplarily manifested themselves in Salgado’s convocation of the congress, his enthronement as leader of the AIB, as well as his power, underlined that liberalism was Integralismo’s declared enemy, particularly during its initial phase (cf. Trindade, 1974, pp. 248-249; Saes, 1996, p. 492), when the country was about to return to constitutional rule. In its struggle for the soul and the future of the nation the self-declared saviours of Brazil focused on political and economic liberalism because they had resulted in economic struggles and had deprived the people of real power. Indeed, as far as the Integralistas were concerned, liberalism was ultimately responsible for ‘the negligence of the economic traditions of the Brazilian fatherland, the repulsion of the eternal principles of the people’s religion, the gradual extinction of the sentiment of the family and the obligations that come with it’. In addition, the integralista propaganda contended that the predominance of the states over the nation was the fault of liberalism (Salgado, 1933, pp. 92-99).

Liberalism was, moreover, attacked because they had allegedly destroyed the spiritual values and the material bases of the nation, and thereby prepared the way for the rise of communism. In the integralista worldview communism, a term invariably used to describe and denounce all manifestations of leftist and progressive politics irrespective of their actual orientations and objectives, was their ally. Falling back upon widespread anti-Semitic prejudices, which described communism and liberalism as the two sides of the same coin, Salgado wrote in 1934 that the ‘communist campaign’ only aimed at the disorganization of the forces of national production, so as to subordinate us […] to the financial imperialism of the tycoons of gold. Two apocalyptic beasts threaten us, Rothschild and Trotsky. Both silently work on our disintegration, for our greater confusion, [what a] painful spectacle of decadent people. [On the one hand, i]nternational capitalism secretly foments separatist tendencies in order to
weaken the nation. [On the other,] Russian communism inculcates in the soul of the masses the idea that the Fatherland is nothing more than a conventionalism. We thereby lose, day by day, our national resistance. And as a result the influence of capitalism increases every day (Salgado, 1934b, p. 112).

‘Communism’, the Chefe Nacional consequently declared, ‘presents itself as the logical consequence of the socio-economic evolution of a detestable society without piety, without heart, and without God’ (Salgado, 1934b, p. 38). In order to reverse this development, the Integralistas argued that it was necessary to return to God and to make him again the ‘centre of everything’, just as in the Middle Ages, when men’s existence was guided by him (Salgado, 1955 [1933], vol. 7, p. 86; see also 1934a, p. 15). In the same vein, Barroso depicted the Middle Ages – a period, of course, which Brazil had never gone through – as an era of social harmony, based on the spiritual leadership of the Church (Barroso, 1934b, pp. 140-146). Yet, despite the reverence for religion in general and the Catholic Church in particular, the Integralistas noted, albeit in a subdued way, that the state would still have the final say in any future fascist order (Reale, 1934, p. 199). This ambivalence, characteristic of the Brazilian fascists’ position vis-à-vis the Church during the best part of the AIB’s existence, suggested that the movement’s leadership feared a more outspoken position could alienate the Catholic hierarchy, seen as a potential ally in its struggle for a new Brazil.

On a more worldly level, the Brazilian fascists demanded a more active state; it had to intervene on behalf of the nation, putting an end to the principle of the free interplay of market forces. The existing state, which was described as ‘weak’, ‘anaemic’, and ‘gelatinous’ and which ignored the plight of the people, would be abolished (Salgado, 1933, pp. 51-52). ‘We have to enter openly into the sphere of production, regulating the salaries in agreement with prices, establishing, this is, the managed (dirigida) economy’, Miguel Reale wrote in 1934 (Reale, 1934, p. 210). At the same time, the increased role for the state notwithstanding, the economic visions of the Integralistas were limited, for this interventionist state would not stimulate industrial development. Especially the National Leader of the AIB was an outspoken proponent of the superiority of agriculture, as he explicitly referred to the ‘proper laws of the Classical Economy’ when stating that the predominance of agricultural products over industrial products will be inevitable in this century, a destiny that comes from technical progress itself. This day, which is not far away,
the countries with great landholdings will exert economic hegemony. We should not have any doubts that before the end of the twentieth century South America, and especially Brazil, will play a decisive economic role in the world (Salgado, 1934a, p. 76).

This emphasis on comparative advantages showed how deeply rooted liberal traditions were. Not even the prophets of the new era of national greatness could completely free themselves from these ideas. In fact, demands for an active industrial policy, especially a national steel industry, were only voiced towards the end of the AIB’s existence (Reale, 1983 [1937], pp. 129-134; AIB, 1936, p. 4), but even then they did not assume an important place in integralista doctrine, let alone in its propaganda. In this respect the Integralistas were out of tune with both Vargas and the military, as well as the Brazilian elite in general. Its importance for national development (and defence) was an accepted fact (Hilton, 1975, pp. 15-17; McCann 2004, pp. 356-357, 362). The rejection of the social legislation enacted by the Vargas regime, which attempted to broaden its base of political support against its still powerful enemies of the Old Republic, the oligarchies, by luring industrial and white-collar workers (Levine, 1998, p. 26; French, 1991, p. 20), was equally telling. Reale denounced the idea of the minimum wage as ‘cafiaspirina’ and demagoguery. He could not understand why it was so popular amongst the working classes (Reale, 1935, p. 122; 1983 [1935], p. 284).

The opposition to the calling of the Constitutional Assembly in 1933 was the logical consequence of the AIB’s anti-liberal positions. For the Brazilian fascists the return to democracy did not hold any promises; it was only seen as a recipe for disaster. They did not believe, Salgado stated a few days after the elections to the body, that ‘the Constitutional Assembly will succeed in saving itself from ridiculousness before the Nation. It is a conclave of old mentalities and what will come out of it can only be [an] old thing in disagreement with the progress (marcha) of the world and the supreme national interests’ (DDN, 9 May 1933, p. 8). The subsequent rejection of the new constitution, adopted in July 1934, as just another example of liberal democracy’s inability ‘to organize the political structures of the nations’ (AO, 19 July 1934, p. 1), did not come as a surprise, hence. Despite the fact that it included some corporatist elements in the form of classista deputies, i.e., members of congress elected as representatives of different occupational groups, and that it, for the first time, ascribed to the federal state a significant role in the economy (cf. Ferraz, 1993), for them nothing had changed.
‘Stay with your Constitutional Charter, we will stay with the revolution’, Salgado announced in *A Offensiva* (*Ao*, 19 July 1934, p. 2).

The denigration of universal suffrage, and Salgado’s claim – implausible in view of his embrace of revolutionary means – that his faction would pursue the realization of its objectives outside the established political order by peacefully conquering the spirit of the people, had not ruled out the participation in the elections to the Constitutional Assembly, however (*Ao*, 19 July 1934, p. 2). Indeed, Salgado, ignoring the obvious violation of one of the movement’s basic principles, acknowledged that electoral campaigns provided it with a platform for the dissemination of its totalitarian ideas. At the same time, elections offered the Brazilian fascists an opportunity to destroy liberal democracy by its own means. Salgado frankly conceded that this was the final objective of the *AIB*. In no uncertain terms he stated the Integralistas despise it [i.e., the Constitution] so much that [they] will use it in order to destroy it. Oh! The Integralistas will go to elections. Why? To put an end to the right to vote, to elect men who raise their voice in congress so that voting, elections and deputies, parties and liberal democracy are definitively abolished (* Ao*, 16 Aug. 1934, pp. 1-2).

In the same vein, Reale explicitly referred to the example of Hitler to hail the effectiveness of the electoral strategy outlined by his leader. The German Chancellor, the National Secretary of Doctrine stated, had revealed ‘to the world the extreme usefulness of the formalistic democratic regime’ (Reale, 1934, p. 144).

Especially at the federal and state levels Integralismo’s electoral advances remained very limited, though, a fact that can partly be explained by the timing of the elections, which mostly took place in late 1934, at a time when the Brazilian fascists had just started to build up their organization and disseminate their message of national salvation. Moreover, the federal *interventors*, all appointed by the Vargas regime after the ‘Revolution of 1930’, largely succeeded in controlling their outcomes. In the elections to the Constitutional Assembly, for instance, the parties linked to the temporary governors achieved overwhelming victories, winning eighty per cent and more of all seats in their states (Pandolfi and Grynspan, 1987, pp. 16-22). In the end, the Integralistas had one representative in the assembly, but he, Jeová Mota, like many other men from various parties, had officially run on the ticket of the *Liga Eleitoral Católica* (*LEC*), a Catholic pressure group that had been established by the Church to further its interests in politics and to re-Catholicize Brazil (cf. Beozzo, 1995, pp. 304-324; Williams, 1974b).
Only in October 1934, in the elections to the new congress, when Integralismo received 42,000 votes (out of a total of slightly less than two million), he was elected deputy on the platform of the AIB. Another small victory was the election of João Carlos Fairbanks to the state assembly of São Paulo in October of the same year. After the elections in Alagoas and Ceará the movement was also represented in the state congresses with one and two deputies. One of the cearense deputies was Ubirajara Indio do Brasil (Mi, 25 Aug. 1935, p. 3; Parente, 1984, p. 157; Carone, 1974, p. 209).

As the limited electoral success of the AIB amongst Brazil’s small electorate showed, it took time for the Integralistas to gain a foothold amongst the people. They found it difficult to convince a significant part of the three and a half million Brazilians, or ten per cent of the population, who were entitled to vote, the high rate of illiteracy being the reason for the small number of voters (cf. Love, 1970), to support them. The Brazilian fascists, praised as the new ‘conscious militia’ by their National Leader, faced an arduous struggle. Indeed, there is reason to believe that the population in general only slowly accepted their message of fascist salvation and regeneration.
Until late 1934 the Aliança Integralista Brasileira (AIB) could disseminate its totalitarian message of national redemption undisturbed by both the federal government and the authorities of the states. The participation of Integralistas in the Independence Day parade on 7 September 1934 in the streets of Rio de Janeiro even suggested official approval, an impression reinforced when both Vargas, elected president by the Constitutional Assembly in mid-July for a four-year term, and General Pedro de Góes Monteiro, ‘Vargas’ military eminence grise’ (Skidmore, 1967, p. 26, italics in the original) and minister of war at the time, returned the fascist salute (Deutsch, 1999, p. 259). The baiano government of Juraci Magalhães, who in mid-1933 had still expressed admiration for Salgado and his men (FGV-CPDOC, 1933), was the only one that took measures against the Brazilian fascists. Because ‘quite a number of police officers and some of those of the Federal garrison’ had joined the AIB, which had ‘about 500’ militants in the state (PRO, 1934), the new strong man of Bahian politics (cf. Pang, 1979, pp. 195-201) banned members of the police forces from becoming Integralistas in November 1934 (AN, 1934).

The indifference of the Vargas administration as well as the overwhelming majority of the state governments suggests that the growth of the group was not as impressive as its leaders claimed it was. In spite of the structural impediments and the untimely date of the elections, its weak showing at the ballot boxes reflected its real following at the time.
more accurately than the figures released by the movement. Tellingly enough, an initiative by leftist *classista* deputies to outlaw militarized formations, submitted to (and subsequently overwhelmingly rejected by) the Constitutional Assembly in July 1934, only explicitly referred to the purported activities of the local organization of the NSDAP in southern Brazil; it did not mention the Brazilian fascists of the AIB (cf. *DAN*, 12 July 1934, p. 5047; 14 July 1934, p. 5112; *MI*, 2nd Fortnight, Aug. 1934, p. 1). Even more significantly, in a report written in late 1934, Antonio Emilio Romano, the chief of the Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social (DESPS), the specialized force created by the Vargas regime in 1933 to monitor political and social organizations, stated that at the moment Integralismo posed no real danger to Brazil’s democracy (*APERJ*, 1934).

Romano was by no means complacent or sanguine about future developments, however. In his report he also pointed out that the situation would soon change if the group were allowed to continue with the aggressive propagation of its ideas of national regeneration and a new totalitarian order. ‘There is reason to believe’ that the integralista movement, the director of the political police stated, was about to turn into a serious threat for the regime and democracy. In its very fiery (*inflamadissimos*) speeches it constantly preaches the revolution and the following banishment of the current leaders of the Country ‘after they have been held responsible for the crimes committed against the Fatherland’ (*APERJ*, 1934).

He thought that it would perhaps be necessary to restrict individual liberties should the government fail to ‘neutralize the insidious propaganda of disparagement on the part of the “indigenous fascists” against the government and against the regime’; otherwise, they could soon form a ‘state within the state’. The situation was particularly dangerous because they enjoyed the strong support of members of the armed forces and the police. This, Romano argued, also undermined discipline within the barracks (*APERJ*, 1934).

Heeding Romano’s advice, although with a delay of some weeks, Vargas brought the project for the Lei de Segurança Nacional (LSN) before parliament in late January 1935. Notwithstanding the fact that the public in general and the ‘better press circles’ in particular saw it primarily as a means to control ‘the “communistic” danger’ (*PRO*, 1935a), which seemingly had gained new urgency after leftist organizations and especially the Brazilian Communist Party, taking advantage of the opening of the political system after the return to constitutional rule in July 1934, had increased their militancy and staged a series of
strikes, the law was not only directed against Communists; it aimed at the activities of both them and their most violent opponents, the Brazilian fascists of the AIB. The government implicitly acknowledged this, justifying the project with references to the recent rise of hostile encounters between ‘ambitious persons’; these confrontations were a ‘crime against the fatherland’ that could not be tolerated any longer. It was necessary to confront the ‘dissolving and destructive elements’, which threatened to destroy Brazil’s ‘most legitimate victories (conquis-tas) as civilized and cultivated people’ (DPL, 27 Jan. 1935, p. 638).

Leftist militants as well as Integralistas – the representatives of these ‘destructive elements’ who had repeatedly clashed in late 1934\(^\text{15}\) – were well aware of the possible consequences of the law for their future political existences. Immediately after the project had been sent to congress, the classista deputy Alvaro Ventura, for instance, attacked it as the ‘monster law’ that aimed at the oppression of the fundamental ‘interests of the proletariat and the popular masses of Brazil’ (DPL, 27 Jan. 1935, p. 648). The reactions of the Brazilian fascists were even more aggressive and they became its ‘most outspoken opponents’ (PRO, 1936b). An editorial in *A Offensiva*, published in the first issue after the submission of the proposal to the Chamber of Deputies, denounced it as a means of the liberal-democratic regime to ‘safeguard the disorientation’ of the political establishment against ‘a programme of national reconstruction’. The initiative wanted to prevent, the integralista organ contended, ‘that Brazilian politics, by the influence of new currents (ventos) and the contact with new ideologies, manages to dignify itself, to elevate itself, to attain greatness and means of action capable of promoting the well-being of the national community’ (AO, 31 Jan. 1935, p. 2).

The Chefe Nacional, while initially denouncing and dismissing the proposal as a conspiracy of Jewish imperialism to weaken the only force capable of opposing communism (*AO*, 24 Jan. 1935, pp. 1-2; *OJ*, 29 Jan. 1935, p. 3; *AO*, 31 Jan. 1935, pp. 1, 3), also recognized the danger it posed to Integralismo. In a lengthy article, published at the end of the month in *A Offensiva*, he denied, in open contradiction to earlier statements as well as acts of his followers, the revolutionary intentions of the organization he led. Indeed, in reaction to the administration’s initiative Salgado reversed the AIB’s policy of openly challenging the federal government. He suddenly claimed that his movement did not aim at the subversion of the regime, nor did it intend to struggle against Vargas, as he had stated as late as October 1934 (cf. *AO*, 24 Oct. 1934, p. 1). The AIB simply embraced the unity of the fatherland and was
in favour of national representation, albeit by means of a corporatist regime; therefore, the leader of the Brazilian fascists stated, Integralismo was not an extremist faction that the proposed law was directed against (*AO*, 24 Jan. 1935, p. 1).

A series of measures adopted in the following weeks reaffirmed the strategic reorientation Salgado had expressed in *A Offensiva*. Officially, the changes approved at the second national congress of the AIB in Petrópolis in early March, while the Brazilian congress discussed the LSN, only clarified the statutes adopted in Vitória one year earlier, ‘avoiding confusions concerning the objectives of the AIB’ (*MI*, 7 May 1935, p. 7). Yet, the modifications (which did not affect Salgado’s absolute power as Chefe Nacional, nor the anti-democratic nature of the AIB’s internal organization) did not just clarify its aims. In article 3, which laid down the goals of the party, Integralismo explicitly renounced revolutionary means to carry out its programme of national redemption; it now expressed its adherence to democracy. The AIB, the revised statutes stated, only aimed at the reform of the State through the formation of a new philosophical and legal culture. On the basis of the norms laid down in the Constitution of July 1934 and the existing laws, the Brazilian people will be able freely to decide about their definitive future, avoiding struggles between Provinces, classes, races, groups of any kind, and, above all, armed rebellions (*MI*, 7 May 1935, p. 7).

The second major alteration was the nominal abolition of the integralista militia, which all militants aged between sixteen and forty-two formally had to join (although they could choose the degree of involvement and military training they wanted to receive) (cf. Trindade, 1988, pp. 95-98). While the official step was only taken after the congress had ended and Vargas had finally signed the law in early April (cf. *MI*, 7 May 1935, p. 5), the decisive measures were taken in Petrópolis. The transformation of the Secretaria Nacional da Milícia into the Secretaria Nacional de Educação Moral e Physica, with Barroso, who had been National Commander of the militia since its establishment in Vitória in March 1934, remaining the head of the unit, was hastened by amendments to the project of the national security law, initiated by leftist deputies in the final stages of the debate (cf. *DPL*, 23 March 1935, p. 2006; 24 March 1935, p. 2075; 26 March 1935, p. 2100). The adopted version made it the exclusive prerogative of the federal government to establish militias, outlawing other ‘paramilitary groups characterized by hierarchical subordination, gangs (*quadros*) and bodies of troops (*formações*)’ (*DPL*, 28 March 1935, p. 2180). The *carioca* newspaper
Jornal do Brasil appropriately termed it the ‘Green-Shirt amendment’ (Jb, 28 March 1935, p. 8).

Subsequent developments showed that the integralista leadership had taken a wise and foresighted step; it most certainly had pre-empted punitive actions on the part of the federal government against its paramilitary force, which had been responsible for the rise of attacks on the part of the self-declared saviours of the nation on the ‘traitors of the Fatherland’ (Trindade, 1974, p. 206). In response to an enquiry submitted by the governor of Rio Grande do Sul, José Antonio Flores da Cunha, in late April 1935 concerning the legal status of the integralista militia in view of the recently promulgated Law of National Security, both the legal counsellor of the ministry of justice and the chief of the Desps, who had earlier warned of a possible integralista threat to the established order, explicitly stated that the law would have affected the AIB. However, as Romano also made clear in his memorandum, which was more detached and objective than the one by the legal counsellor – he used extensive quotes by both Salgado and Barroso to back up his conclusion that the reformed National Secretariat of Moral and Physical Education was not affected by the LSN –, the transformation of the paramilitary unit meant that the law no longer applied to the Brazilian fascists (AN, 1935a; 1935b). From the point of view of the authorities in Rio de Janeiro, the Integralistas complied with it and no further steps were necessary, at least for the time being.

Yet, the national security law was not the Chefe Nacional’s only problem. At the same time as he had to ward off the challenge of Vargas’s project, Salgado also had to deal with the decisions of the ministry of war (APERJ, 1935a; 1935c) and the Conselho de Almirantado that prohibited soldiers and officers from joining the AIB. As in the case of the LSN, the problem had initially been raised by Romano’s report and the timing of the initiatives, both coming in early 1935, suggests the co-ordinated actions of the federal government and the military high commands. The main issue was the oath of unconditional adherence Integralistas had to swear to Salgado as the leader of the movement. The Conselho do Almirantado, which explicitly described the AIB as a subversive faction, concluded that a member of the armed forces cannot swear an oath that implies loyalty and obedience to any political doctrine, nor join organizations or political parties that seek to implement in the country a new regime or institutions different from those that the Constitution of 16 July [1934] sanctifies (APERJ, 1935b). To eliminate a source of friction with the increasingly influential armed forces, which wanted to avoid the further politicization of the officer
corps and dampen the ‘general spirit of indiscipline in the barracks’ the ‘Revolution of 1930’ had caused (Hilton, 1975, p. 110; see also McCann, 2004, pp. 301-02), in late June 1935 Salgado exempted, if only belatedly, all members of the army, the navy, and the state militias from swearing the integralista oath (Mt, 25 Aug. 1935, p. 5).

After the enactment of the National Security Law, which, although exclusively used against leftist organizations, hung like the sword of Damocles over the heads of the Brazilian fascists, Salgado and other leading figures emphasized the non-revolutionary nature of Integralismo and avoided statements or actions that could have been interpreted as unlawful challenges to the established political order (cf. Salgado, 1935, p. 204; Barroso, 1935, p. 12). In early August 1935, the chief of Salgado’s personal cabinet, Osvaldo Robinson, reminded provincial and local leaders that written orders and articles must not employ the terminology that had been used while the militia was still legal. The same reservation applied to public speeches as well as private conversations in which ‘elements alien to Integralismo’ were present. It was important he advised subordinated institutions in a circular, that its enemies had no opportunity to portray the National Secretariat of Moral and Physical Education as a ‘simulacrum and a continuation of the ex-militia’, especially because integralista publications in general and the National Leader in particular constantly affirmed that the AIB operated within the existing laws. Moreover, the criticism had to focus on ideas and not persons, for ‘this avoids passionate controversies, lawsuits and violent reprisals, which could always damage Integralismo’ (APERJ, 1935e).

The timing of the internal circular, while generally reflecting the new line of the Integralistas, was no coincidence. The integralista leadership was obviously afraid that the movement could face the same fate as the Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL), the Popular Front organization backed up and supported by the Communists and led by Luís Carlos Prestes, ‘a man well known in the country, respected if not beloved even by people who had little or no connection with the Communist Party, having in Brazil and in Latin American the halo of a national and popular hero’ (Caballero, 1986, p. 112; see also Levine, 1970, pp. 58-80; Pinheiro, 1991, pp. 269-286; Prestes, 1997). The ANL, which had ‘succeeded in rallying large numbers of perplexed middle-class voters who were prepared to supplement their earlier liberalism with a dose of the progressivism symbolized by the appeal of’ Prestes (Skidmore, 1967, p. 21), had been banned in July 1935, just four months after its establishment, after its de facto leader had defied the federal
administration in a violent speech. Overestimating the strength of the Alliance as well as the prospects for revolutionary action on the left, on the one hand, and underestimating the determination of the president, on the other, Prestes had called for an end to ‘the hateful government of Vargas’ and the establishment of a ‘revolutionary national popular government’ (as quoted in Skidmore, 1967, p. 22).

The Chefe Nacional had reacted quickly and unambiguously to the speech, even more rapidly than Vargas himself. His movement, Salgado had proclaimed immediately after Prestes’s statement, when everybody expected the government to deal with the challenge of the ANL’s de facto leader, had nothing in common with the National Liberation Alliance, because it, unlike ‘Stalin’s slaves’, did not receive any instructions from abroad, nor did it want to implement a foreign ideology (AO, 6 July 1935, pp. 1-2). The AIB’s registration as a national party at the Superior Tribunal Eleitoral (STE) in late April 1933, which had been seen as a necessary compromise in order to propagate its anti-democratic message of national salvation (Broxson, 1974, p. 60), had been presented as the main argument for why it was genuinely democratic (AO, 20 July 1935, p. 1). In fact, after the dissolution of the National Liberation Alliance in mid-July the AIB, whose message of anti-communism and the resurrection of order, tradition, and religion attracted more intellectuals than the revolutionary propaganda of the ANL (Levine, 1970, p. 91), was the ‘only truly national’ party, organized in all states of the federation (ÖSTA, 1937a). Otherwise the political system was, just as during the ‘Old Republic’, dominated by regional parties and groups based on personalistic relations.16

The intentona comunista, planned by the Comintern and directed by the Brazilian Communist Party, which broke out in the northeastern garrisons of Natal and Recife as well as Rio de Janeiro in late November (cf. Hilton, 1991, pp. 53-72; Pinheiro, 1991, pp. 287-307; Carneiro, 1994), ‘appeared to be a godsend’ for the Integralistas (Hilton, 1972, p. 4). It confirmed their earlier warnings about the dangers of communist subversion and shifted attention away from them – less than two weeks earlier the Chamber of Deputies had approved a non-binding motion that had accused the integralista movement of aiming at the violent overthrow of the ‘existing political and social order’ (DPL, 17 Nov. 1935, p. 7863). Moreover, it provided Salgado with an opportunity to back up his anti-communist rhetoric with deeds. The Chefe National, declaring his ‘absolute solidarity with the government of the Republic in the defence of order, national security, honour of the home, and the dignity of the fatherland’, offered the unconditional support of
100,000 Green-Shirts. (He carefully avoided, however, any reference to the dissolved integralista militia.) In 'co-operation with the glorious armed forces of the country', they would 'fight communism', Salgado promised. Vargas, who declined the offer, nonetheless expressed his gratitude for the 'spontaneous and patriotic manifestation' and the 'noble proposal to collaborate in the national defence', an attitude he described as 'comforting evidence of the civic vitality of the nation, which in this manner knows that in any hour it can count on the energy and dedication of all good Brazilians to make it stronger and more and more respected' (Ao, 30 Nov. 1935, p. 1).

Taking advantage of the widespread feeling of insecurity in the aftermath of the *intentona comunista*, which was 'scarcely more than a typical military uprising (the classic Spanish *pronunciamiento*) both in theory and fact' and 'easily and rapidly defeated by the government' (Caballero, 1986, p. 109, italics in the original), as well as Vargas's reaction to his offer, the Salgado again emphasized that communism was the only real threat to the nation. Integralismo, on the other hand, did not use violent methods to achieve its objective of assuming power and establishing a new order; it would do so peacefully. Revealing his true intentions and passing over the degree of violence involved in both cases, the National Leader mentioned the examples of Italy and Germany to back up his claim (Ao, 7 Dec. 1935, p. 3). Despite the reference to the fascist dictators, the President did not react to this declaration, or to the vote of the Chamber of Deputies. On the contrary, a statement released in early 1936 by Filinto Müller, the chief of the police of the federal district and close confidant of Vargas, suggested that the administration had no intentions of dissolving the movement. The *AIB*, Müller concluded, did not stand ‘in conflict with the principles which the police authority defends (cumpre defender)’ (Ao, 2 Feb. 1936, p. 1).

The publication of the *Manifesto-Programma da Acção Integralista Brasileira* in late January 1936 signalled the final point of Integralismo’s rhetorical and formal conversion to democracy, a development that had started with the discussion about the Law of National Security twelve months earlier. Statelier than the *Manifesto de Outubro* of 1932, the *Manifesto-Programma*, which would form the basis for the presidential campaign of the AIB, repeated the Brazilian fascists’ recently discovered reformist convictions. It stated that an integralista state would preserve the ‘republican, federal and democratic structures’, albeit on the basis of a corporatist system. Liberalism was still rejected, but Integralismo, the manifesto claimed, was neither anti-democratic nor totalitarian,
as its new order would be implemented according to ‘processes indicated by the Constitution of July 1934, the Electoral Law, the Law of National Security, state constitutions and normal legislation in force’ (AIB, 1936, p. 3). Irrespective of ideological and party differences, an ‘integralista government’, the document consequently contended, will seek to ‘bring together all Brazilians […] around the majestic and fascinating work of creating a great South American nation’ and ‘undertake, above all, the reorganization of the political, social and economic structures of the nation, giving them a uniform and definite rhythm’ (AIB, 1936, p. 2).

Given the initially outspoken anti-democratic statements and acts of the Brazilian fascists, which had only been toned down because of the political changes taking place during the first half of 1935, doubts about the sincerity of these professions seemed certainly justified. And indeed, in spite of the modifications, with the constant reiterations of the AIB’s commitment to democratic rules, the rule of law, and the Constitution of 1934, the document still revealed their true inclinations; the objective of a fascist regime had not been compromised, only the means to achieve it had changed. The central role of the state in the future integralista order, as originally outlined in the Manifesto de Outubro, was also at the heart of the Manifesto-Programme, if now couched in less aggressive terms (AIB, 1936, pp. 3-5, 11). The British Embassy highlighted the contradiction between the assertions of the document and its actual content, especially referring to the preamble, which stated that Integralismo was ‘the theory of discipline and the practice of liberty’; this claim, the embassy’s report noted, was ‘difficult to reconcile […] with the programme, which makes provisions for the control by the Integralist State of every sphere of corporate activity’ (PRO, 1936a). Agreeing with its British counterpart, for the German Legation the Manifesto-Programma was just a tactical measure on the part of Salgado to avoid the ban of the AIB on the basis of the Law of National Security (PA AA, 1936a).

Most of the state governments were equally unimpressed. They continued to doubt the rather sudden commitment of the Integralistas to democracy. And they, unlike the federal administration, were also willing to take steps against the Brazilians fascists. Especially in states in which the AIB had started to enlist a considerable following that threatened, or at least showed the potential to unsettle, the balance of power, repressive measures were enacted. Santa Catarina was an illustrative example. Reacting to the report of his chief of police, Claribalte Vilarim de Vasconcelos Galvão, who in July 1935 had concluded that
the integralista militia was still active and that Salgado, despite giving the organization a new name, had not changed its ‘nature’ (essencia) (APERJ, 1935d), Governor Nereu Ramos had banned the public use of green shirts and other symbols as well as marches of the AIB. In addition, public servants who belonged to the group had been dismissed from their posts by governmental degree (APERJ, 1935f; JB, 24 July 1935, p. 8; AO, 10 Aug. 1935, pp. 1, 12; 17 Aug. 1935, p. 12).

Santa Catarina, one of the smaller states of the federation, with only around one million inhabitants and approximately 100,000 voters, also attracted interest, far beyond its national significance, because of the considerable number of Teuto-Brazilians who had joined the integralista movement. Their participation in the faction raised the question of the relationship between Integralismo and Nazism, not least because the German-Brazilians, traditionally the object of criticism because of their closed areas of settlement and the preservation of their language and traditions, were widely, albeit unjustifiably, suspected of working for Hitler’s regime (Gertz, 1989, p. 158). Although in the case of Rio Grande do Sul, a state with even larger German communities than Santa Catarina that had also emerged as a main centre of the Brazilian fascists’ activities since 1934 (cf. Gertz, 1987, pp. 158-172), ethnic Italians constituted a major source of the AIB’s support as well (Brandalise, 1992, pp. 139, 162; Bertonha, 1998, pp. 252, 256, 265), it was the perceived threat of ethnic Germans to the Brazilian nation which preoccupied the public and threatened to dominate Integralismo’s image.
THE INTEGRALISTAS, THE TEUTO-BRAZILIAN COMMUNITIES, AND THE THIRD REICH

Southern Brazil was a relative latecomer to the integralista message of national redemption. The local branch in Blumenau, a município in the heartland of German settlements and a future integralista stronghold in Santa Catarina, was, for instance, only set up in mid-June 1934, more than eighteen months after the foundation of the AIB in São Paulo and four months after the establishment of the first local branch in the remote national territory of Acre. It was not until September 1934, on the eve of the elections to the federal and state parliaments, that Salgado made his first trip to Santa Catarina, during the course of which he also visited the city. In spite of its until then only brief existence, the small group of Integralistas obtained a respectable result in the elections to the state assembly, receiving more votes than the ruling Liberal Party in Blumenau (Müller, 1997, p. 221). During 1935 the Chefe Nacional visited the region two more times. In response to its growing importance for the development of Integralismo, he convened the first Congress of the Southern Provinces, i.e., the federal district, the states of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Minas Gerais, Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul, in Blumenau in early October 1935.

One of the groups that embraced the integralista message of national salvation most enthusiastically was the Teuto-Brazilians, and especially the youth, a fact invariably noted by contemporary German and German-Brazilian observers. Karl-Heinrich Hunsche, the leader of the German-Brazilian Association, ‘the most important centre for the elaboration of the ideology of Brazilian Germanness (Deutschum)’ in
the 1930s’ (Gertz, 1987, p. 150), and author of the first major study about the AIB (cf. Hunsche, 1938b), stated, for instance, that as of October 1934 half of the movement’s leaders in Rio Grande do Sul were of German descent (Hunsche, 1935, p. 2). Another example of the strong presence of members of the communities could be found in Blumenau itself, where, apart from Jaime Ferreira da Silva, the editor of the Portuguese-language daily Cidade de Blumenau, all other 24-founding members of the local branch had German ancestors (Müller, 1997, p. 220). In November 1935 the German Consulate in Florianópolis reported, moreover, that not only ethnic Germans supported the Brazilian fascists but Reich citizens and members of local groups of the NSDAP as well (PA AA, 1935e).

Diplomatic representatives of Nazi Germany in the southern states and leaders of the Teuto-Brazilian communities alike, all interested in preserving the distinct German identity of the colonists, warned of the negative impact of this collaboration on the local Germanness. While not all of them shared the extreme view of some German-Brazilians, who concerning the questions of race and nation did not hesitate to treat Integralismo as equivalent to Communism, both aiming at the destruction of the nation in general and the (German) people in particular (Hunsche, 1935, p. 6; 1937, p. 18; Bathke, 1936; Dohms, 1937; D.S., 1937), they generally underlined that involvement with Integralismo alienated youths, the future pillars of the Teuto-Brazilian society, from their communities and speeded up their incorporation into the Brazilian nation. ‘The ethnic German who wears a green-shirt today’, the German Consul in Florianópolis noted in November 1935, ‘will be the gravedigger of his Germanness in the long term’ (PA AA, 1935e; see also PA AA 1935a; 1935d; BA Koblenz, 1935). In the same vein Deutsches Wollen, the organ of the Berlin-based Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP, warned of ‘the danger of Integralismo’ (DW, 30 Aug. 1935, p. 6), and the organization’s leadership described the participation of ethnic Germans in the movement as ‘a big mistake’ (BA Koblenz, 1936b).

From the Integralistas’ point of view the situation was, of course, altogether different. The Manifesto de Outubro had already embraced the concept of brasileidade and outlined the AIB’s commitment to the creation of a homogeneous nation, an objective that allegedly underlined its spiritual superiority in comparison to European fascisms, which only had to revitalize their nations (Salgado, 1935). In the new ‘national spirit’ there was, quite simply, no room for ethnic differences. Moreover, and directly related to this point, the Integralistas saw the
Brazilian nation as a product of miscegenation. Salgado described this process in an idealized and paternalistic way as the fraternal unification of Indians, Blacks and Whites, in which the latter put aside all ‘prejudices to embrace his brothers’ (Salgado, 1934a, p. 139). Unlike the majority of right-wing nationalists, but in agreement with Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna, the Integralistas generally did not focus ‘on the spirit more than the body’, hence (Borges, 1993, p. 255; for Vianna, see Needell, 1995, pp. 11-20).

Indeed, the AIB, standing in the tradition of Brazilian nativism, wanted to incorporate the descendants of European immigrants into the nation, speeding up the ‘whitening’ of the Brazilian society. It represented policies that were widely shared by Brazil’s political establishment at the time (cf. Skidmore, 1990 and 1993; Santos, 2002). The Constitution of 1934, for example, included provisions that aimed at the strengthening of education in Portuguese amongst the immigrant communities, not least the German and Italian ones, and stipulations that restricted the immigration of Japanese settlers, who were generally perceived as a threat to a whiter, i.e., more modern and European nation (Lesser, 1999, p. 161). In accordance with these widely held prejudices, the Integralistas, while actively seeking to enlist black and indigenous Brazilians (Deutsch, 1999, p. 281), would run a vicious campaign against Japanese immigrants in A Offensiva between June and August 1936. Notwithstanding statements to the contrary (Lone, 2001, p. 100), they specifically targeted them. In various front-page articles Japanese settlers were described as ‘undesirable’, for they were, the Brazilian fascists stated, inassimilable and, because they allegedly attempted to infiltrate the Amazon, a threat to ‘national security’ (AO, 13 June 1936, p. 1; 14 June 1936, pp. 1, 4; 19 June 1936, pp. 1-2).

The integralista leadership made no secret of its nationalist position, not even in southern Brazil. As Reale made clear in December 1934, when he responded to an inquiry by a local leader of the German Nazi party in Santa Catarina about the fate of German schools under an integralista state, Portuguese would be the language in which lessons were conducted, with German or Italian taught as foreign languages only. The National Secretary of Doctrine equally stated that the AIB, while not generally opposed to the continued participation of ‘Brazilians in foreign associations’, i.e., German (as well as Italian) cultural institutions, would only accept that as long as these centres did not prevent ‘the fusion of the German-Brazilian with the national community’ (BZ, 6 Dec. 1934, p. 2). The overall objective of national integration, the descendent of Italian immigrants made clear, would not be compro-
mised. Membership in the movement of the self-declared saviours of the Brazilian nation implied unreserved adherence to *brasilidade* and cultural assimilation.

The reaction of the *Blumenauer Zeitung*, an established Teuto-Brazilian publication sympathetic to both the local organization of the German National Socialists and the Brazilian fascists (cf. Seyferth, 1979) in which Reale’s declaration was published, tellingly enough ignored its nationalist aspects and underlined the integralista commitment to foreign language classes. The paper, which was edited by Federico Kasperek, one of the founding members of the AIB in the city, deemed the preservation of a distinct German identity less important than the support for the integralista movement in its struggle for what he and his fellow Teuto-Brazilian fascists saw as a new and better Brazil. An article published in the newspaper a few weeks after Reale had reasserted the primacy of integration underlined this point. Adopting Salgado’s claim that the AIB was the last and only hope against the communist danger, it argued that even if the future integralista state banned German schools and associations, it would still be the duty of the German-Brazilians to contribute to its realization, ‘because today there is only the choice between Integralismo and communism, an interim solution no longer exists’ (*BZ*, 12 Jan. 1935, p. 1).

Less prominent members of the Teuto-Brazilian communities voiced identical opinions. In a letter to Joseph Goebbels, the Third Reich’s minister of popular enlightenment and propaganda, Ewald Baericke, one of the founding members of the local nucleus of the NSDAP in Blumenau, wrote in March 1936 that he had left the National Socialist party four years earlier and had become a Brazilian citizen because otherwise he would not have been allowed actively to intervene in politics. As the assimilation process was unstoppable, Baericke stated, the integralista movement not only offered him and other German-Brazilians who saw Brazil as their ‘fatherland’ the possibility to struggle against the ‘common enemy of the people’ (*Volksfeind*) – ‘international Jewry’ and ‘communism’ – but also gave them an opportunity finally to become ‘equal (*vollwertige*) Brazilian citizens’. As the German Consulate in Florianópolis, to which the letter was attached, pointed out, Baericke’s argumentation was widely shared; his motives for joining the AIB were representative of a large part of the ethnic German communities in southern Brazil, and especially in Santa Catarina (*PA AA*, 1936d).

Contemporary German and Teuto-Brazilian observers noted that German-Brazilian youths, disappointed with the failure of traditional parties and liberal democracy, joined a group that offered them an op-
portunity for political participation and integration into a society that until then had largely marginalized them (FA AA, 1935e; BA Koblenz, 1936a; Lechler, 1935; Kahle, 1935; 1937, p. 115). The argument that the enthusiasm for a new way of life was due to the influence of German National Socialism, and that the membership in the AIB was a substitute, a factor invariably noted by these observers, has to be treated with some caution, for it overemphasized the significance of the developments in Germany. Still, it is certainly correct that in southern Brazil Integralistas carefully stressed the similarities between their own movement and National Socialism, thereby exploiting the Teuto-Brazilians admiration of Hitler’s New Germany (cf. Müller, 1997, pp. 207-209). Salgado contributed to the perception by comparing the development of the AIB with the NSDAP’s, and by underlining the ideological congruencies between them, for example as regards the struggle against communism (Müller, 1997, pp. 234-235). At least during his first stay in Blumenau Salgado also played with anti-Semitic stereotypes, describing ‘Jewish world capitalism’ as the driving force behind the yoke of liberal democracy (Bz, 20 Sept. 1934, p. 1). The Integralistas adopted the same strategy vis-à-vis Italian Fascism when dealing with Italo-Brazilians in Rio Grande do Sul (Brandalise, 1992, pp. 145, 151; Bertonha, 1998, p. 264).

The unequivocally positive assessment of National Socialism and the Third Reich in southern Brazil made way for a more ambiguous attitude in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which was characteristic of the AIB at the national level throughout its brief existence (cf. ÖSTA, 1936). Articles in A Offensiva and speeches by Salgado oscillated between open praise for the achievement of Hitler’s regime, as for instance on the second anniversary of the Führer’s assumption of power (Ao, 31 Jan. 1935, p. 3), and fierce criticism of its racism and imperialism. On the occasion of the assassination of the Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß, who was killed during the course of a failed Nazi coup in Vienna in late July 1934, A Offensiva had been equally at pains to stress the AIB’s rejections of these events and the ideas underlying them (Ao, 9 Aug. 1934, p. 1). Salgado expressed these reservations vis-à-vis the Third Reich even more forcefully concerning its relationship with the Catholic Church in February 1936, stating that by persecuting Catholics Hitler’s ‘pagan nationalism’ violated the ‘most sacred natural and human laws’. The leadership cult, with its deification of the Führer, was, the Chefe Nacional stated, an example of Nazism’s ‘political artificiality’ and a sign that it lacked ‘a specific spiritual vocation’ (Ao, 14 Feb. 1936, p. 2).
The contradictory positions were the result of the AIB’s attempt to combine hardly reconcilable positions, and to satisfy divergent expectations and demands. On the one hand, by expressing its admiration of the achievements of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, and by describing Integralismo as part of a worldwide phenomenon, it attempted to benefit from the positive perception of Hitler and Mussolini (and not necessarily the regimes they led) amongst the immigrant communities. On the other, the AIB also had to keep enough critical distance from them in order to avoid accusations that it was a mimicry or even the prolonged arm of European fascism that prepared Brazil’s annexation, an assertion that some Communist historians kept alive until the 1960s (cf. Hell, 1966). Too close an identification with the dictatorships, and especially the Third Reich, also would have undermined Integralismo’s identification with religion and indeed its ‘Christian foundation’ (Ao, 14 Feb. 1936, p. 2). Salgado’s criticism of the National Socialist Church policies, for example, had been the direct result of an attack by the archbishop of Porto Alegre, João Becker, who had maintained that under an integralista regime the Church would be in the same situation as in Germany, facing persecution and the restriction of its liberties (PA AA, 1936a).

The critical comments of leading Integralistas about German Nazism and the Third Reich at the national level notwithstanding, the support of the German colonists provided an excellent excuse for their adversaries to attack them. For Abguar Bastos, one of the founding members of the by then banned National Liberation Alliance, the integralista congress in Blumenau had already conclusively proven the ‘close relations between Brazilian Integralismo and German Nazism’ (DPL, 15 Nov. 1935, p. 7813). The impressive success of the AIB in the municipal elections of March 1936, when Alberto Stein, the integralista leader of Blumenau, secured his victory with almost seventy per cent of the votes cast in the city, and the party won seven more municipalities – Jaragúa, Joinville, Timbó, São Bento, Harmonia, Rio do Sul, and Brusque – gave new impetus to these accusations. Opponents of the Brazilian fascists, who achieved their best results in the elections in municipalities dominated by German-Brazilians (Müller, 1997, p. 222), subsequently described the southern states as strongholds of Nazism, and warned of their imminent ‘Hitlerization’ and ‘Mussolinization’ (PA AA, 1936b).

The governor of Santa Catarina, Nereu Ramos, was at the forefront of these attacks, for Integralismo threatened to undermine the balance
of power in his state (PA AA, 1936b). For him, ‘Hitlerism’, not Integralismo, had won in the local elections in his home state, because there the integralista phenomenon does not present itself with the same characteristics that the party has in other states of the federation. In all municipalities in which Integralismo gained the upper hand the German element (elemento teuto) dominates. The flag is not Salgado’s; it is Hitler’s. If one asks the colonist, are you an Integralista? And he responds, I am a Hitlerite! (O Estado de S. Paulo, 19 March 1936, p. 1)

In order to reverse this trend and further the nationalization of the ethnic minorities, Nereu Ramos demanded the establishment of more state schools. Meanwhile, however, following on from the policies enacted by his administration in mid-1935, he continued to harass the Integralistas in Santa Catarina, as the provincial leader of the movement in the state, Othon D’Eça, complained in various letters to President Vargas during April 1936 (cf. AN, 1936a; 1936b; 1936c).

Despite the insistence of the catarinense governor, the AIB was not an instrument of German interests however, as A Offensiva justifiably underlined in its reaction to his attack (cf. AO, 29 March 1936, p. 9). At the local level, the collaboration between militants of the AIB and members of the NSDAP, mentioned by the German Consulate in Florianópolis, was a temporary phenomenon, in the end eclipsed by the endeavours of both organizations to influence the Teuto-Brazilians with their respective, and ultimately mutually exclusive, forms of fascism (Müller, 1997, p. 239). Indeed, these contradictory aims could not be reconciled. They proved an insurmountable obstacle for any closer collaboration between Nazism and Integralismo, the positive statements about the Third Reich on the part of leading Integralistas notwithstanding. As early as April 1935 the German Legation had concluded that Germany could not ‘expect anything from the movement’ (PA AA, 1935a; 1935b), for the AIB, while warmly welcoming ethnic Germans as voters and organizers, did certainly not defend their interests as Germans (PA AA, 1936b). In this respect the situation in Brazil was similar to the one in Chile. There, too, the initially close relationship between the Chilean fascists, organized in the National Socialist Movement, and local Nazis as well as militant German-Chileans ultimately foundered because of the different ideas about the future of the German-Chilean community (Klein, 2004).

At the national level, German diplomats and members of the AIB only maintained informal social and cultural contacts. Those existed especially between Barroso, the most outspoken admirer of the Third
Reich in integralista leadership circles, and Arthur Schmidt-Elskop, 
the head of Germany’s diplomatic representation in Rio de Janeiro.\footnote{21} 
The relationship between the two men dated back to late 1934, when 
Barroso had asked for propaganda material for the first time (PA AA, 
1934b). The German diplomats viewed the leader of the integralista 
militia positively, because he frequently referred to Joseph Goebbels 
and the virulently anti-Semitic journal *Der Stürmer*, edited by Julius 
Streicher, in order to back up his crude theories of a Jewish world 
conspiracy (PA AA, 1936a).\footnote{22} After Schmidt-Elskop had returned to 
Germany, Barroso only corresponded with the Hamburg-based Fichte- 
Bund (APERJ, 1937a), an organization that was part of the Third Reich’s 
propaganda machine, and was in touch with Kurt Barwich, the repre- 
sentative of the Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro in Rio de Janeiro (PA AA, 
1938d). Especially the contact with the latter, a subordinate official of 
Nazi Germany in Brazil, indicates that Barroso’s links with German 
oficials were low-key after Schmidt-Elskop had left the country.\footnote{23} 

In addition, unlike Fascist Italy, which would grant financial sup- 
port to the integralista movement during 1937 in order to counter 
the alleged influence of the Third Reich (cf. Trento, 1982; Seitenfus, 
1984; Bertonha, 2000), Nazi Germany refused to do so. An approach 
for financial contributions, made by a local secretary of the AIB from 
a provincial village in the state of São Paulo, José Zamarim da Testa, 
who, as it turned out, had not initially informed Salgado about his 
move, was deemed ‘inappropriate’ and ‘extraordinarily dangerous’ by 
Schmidt-Elskop in June 1935 (PA AA, 1935b). The Auswärtige Amt 
even rejected the proposal, made by Zamarim da Testa, to invite a repre- 
sentative of the AIB to Germany. Contrary to the German Legation, 
which supported the idea, the Wilhelmstraße thought it could have 
unwelcome political consequences (PA AA, 1935c).\footnote{24} Thus, apart from 
some anti-Semitic articles integralista publications received through 
Herbert Kühne, a Nazi agent who maintained contacts with lead- 
ing Integralistas in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo (BA Berlin, 1937a), 
throughout its existence the AIB only benefited from the fact that Ger- 
man enterprises doing business in Brazil, such as Siemens, the Banco 
Alemão Transatlântico and Condor/Lufthansa, placed advertisements 
in *A Offensiva* and that the main integralista organ received wires of the 
German news agency Transocean (Müller, 1997, pp. 232-233).

The advertisements and wires, the latter delivered free of charge or at 
least at reduced prices, can be interpreted as indirect means of support 
(Müller, 1997, pp. 232-233), but there is no evidence that German 
authorities directed these efforts. Nor are there any indications that
they led to an ‘indirect financial dependence’ of the Integralistas on the Third Reich, let alone that they consequently refrained from further attacks on their supposed benefactor, as some authors have argued (Müller, 1997, p. 233). There was (and still is) no evidence that the AIB received money from German institutions. Rulings by Brazilians courts, which rejected such accusations (Ao, 22 Oct 1937, pp. 1, 3), did not convince its leftist opponents, however. What counted for them was Integralismo’s sympathies for the European dictators, its similar trappings and uniforms, and, last but not least, its strong support amongst the Teuto-Brazilian communities. Even though, as A Offensiva understandably and justifiably pointed out in reaction to the frequent accusations that foreigners supported the organization, only Brazilian citizens were entitled to vote (Ao, 22 March 1936, p. 2), its enemies hammered home the message that the AIB was a foreign movement and that it acted as the prolonged arm of the Third Reich’s allegedly imperialist aspirations. Until its demise, time and time again Salgado and his followers would face such accusations (cf. ÖSTA, 1937b).
As the attacks of the *catarinense* governor Nereu Ramos on, and the measures taken by his administration against, the Integralistas showed, they had turned into political protagonists that could no longer be ignored. They were gaining in strength, becoming a force to be reckoned with at both the state and the national level. Especially the *intentona comunista* of November 1935, which had ‘inspired real fear in the hearts not only of the politicians in power, but also of the propertied classes and the bourgeois’ (PRO, 1935c, italics in the original), had proved beneficial for Integralismo’s development; it had ‘greatly strengthened’ its prestige as an anti-communist force, as Hans Henning von Cossel, the leader of the local Brazilian organization of the NSDAP, noted in early December 1935 (Hilton, 1972, pp. 4-5). In the same vein, but from a rather different ideological point of view, in October 1936 a report of the British Embassy also still noted that ‘there is no doubt that the Integralist movement is growing – probably, it is true, chiefly through fear of communism, which, though scotched, is by no means killed, and still excites fear in the minds of the upper classes’ (PRO, 1936d).

By early 1936 the AIB claimed to have approximately 800,000 members, around half a million of them men, 200,000 women, and the rest children – some of them as young as two (APERJ, 1937c) – in some 2,000 local branches. By the end of the year the figure rose to almost 1,300,000 militants, organized in, the Integralistas asserted, 3,000 centres around the country (AO, 29 Jan. 1936, p. 2; 22 Feb. 1936, p. 2; 19 Sept. 1936, p. 3; 11 Nov. 1936, p. 2). At the time, in
addition to its six members in state assemblies and the sole parliamentarian in Rio de Janeiro, the AIB had 25 prefects and 463 aldermen all over Brazil. (In early 1937 it gained another seat when a deputy in the assembly of the northern state of Maranhão switched his allegiance to the Integralistas [Caldeira, 1999, p. 97].) In an attempt to give credit to the *Manifesto de Outubro*’s claim that Integralismo would lead the revival of the continent, party organizations in other Latin American countries, namely Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and the Antilles (*Ao*, 18 June 1936, p. 2) were set up, without much success, though.26

The Brazilian fascists run, moreover, more than 1,200 schools, in which members learned to read and write, thereby acquiring the literacy requirements for the enrolment in the electoral register. Six daily and 82 weekly papers, mainly produced in smaller provincial cities and towns, as well as one popular weekly magazine spread and popularized the integralista message of national regeneration and future greatness on the basis of its totalitarian order across the nation (cf. *Mi*, 7 Oct. 1937, p. 10). At the national level, *A Offensiva*, which finally appeared as a daily as of January 1936, was the most important publication, mainly publishing lengthy and repetitive programmatic articles that were subsequently reproduced in the smaller integralista dailies and weeklies (cf. Cavalari, 1999, pp. 79-80).27 In addition, Salgado, Barroso, Reale, and Melo, who continued to tour the country and to participate in various regional conferences, produced a growing number of books. By 1936, Salgado had written eight, Barroso seven, Reale six, and Melo four, many of them published in several editions. All in all, the followers of the Sigma were supposed to read 35 books (cf. Cavalari, 1999, pp. 114-115).28 Radio, the most advanced and modern means of communication, did not play an important role, on the other hand. During the five years of the AIB’s legal existence Salgado only used it on four different occasions, once in 1935 and three times in 1937 (Cavalari, 1999, p. 126).

The federal government, which, benefiting from ‘a nearly universal outpouring of support […] and a demand for strong measures to rid the nation of Communists’ in the aftermath of the *intentona comunista* (Hilton, 1991, p. 73), had received special powers ruthlessly to suppress its opponents, showed no inclinations to take actions against the movement, as Filinto Müller’s statement from January 1936 strongly suggested. Rather, in co-operation with the armed forces, the Vargas administration itself slowly but surely moved towards the right after the failed insurrection. Indeed, taking advantage of the changed national situation, which gave Vargas and his allies in the military more
scope of action (Hentschke, 1996, p. 349), they began to prepare the way for the destruction of Brazil’s young and fragile democracy. The democratic regime was seen as an obstacle to the restructuring and the modernization of the state, the economy, and last but certainly not least the armed forces. ‘In defense of family, religion, and tradition’ the president ‘unleashed a campaign of violence, hatred, and fear’ (Bakota, 1979, p. 209). In March 1936, for instance, in complete disregard of their parliamentary immunity, five pro-AnL members of parliament – one senator, Abel Chermont, and four deputies, Otavio da Silveira, Domingos Vellasco, Abguar Bastos, and João Mangabeira – were arrested in congress and subsequently tried.

Meanwhile, Integralismo’s advances were marred by the outbreak of an internal conflict. In mid-April 1936, the carioca daily Diário da Noite ran a headline in which it alleged that the Chefe Nacional had ordered the execution of Barroso. According to the newspaper, the reason for this drastic measure was a confrontation about a ‘very violent’ anti-Semitic article the leader of the transformed militia had published in a minor integralista weekly, Seculo XX, after José Madeira de Freitas, the editor of A Offensiva, had rejected it. The claim that Salgado wanted the ‘Brazilian Roehm [sic]’ to be killed seem farfetched (DN, 13 April 1936, 7th ed., p. 1), but Barroso was certainly punished, if less drastically; his articles did not appear in the main organ until approximately September of that year. Barroso, who continued to write for smaller publication during this period, not least Seculo XX (Levine, 1968, p. 51), told a German diplomat that this ban was due to ‘momentary inappropriateness’, without giving away any further information concerning the reasons for this measure (PA AA, 1936d).

Contrary to the account of the Diário da Noite, there are good reasons to believe that Barroso’s anti-Semitic article was not the real issue. Firstly, prior to the incident, Barroso had already written a considerable number of openly anti-Semitic pieces, which had been published in, inter alia, A Offensiva; and, secondly, all his books were published under the symbol of the Sigma. Therefore, the Secretaria Nacional de Doutrina, in accordance with guidelines published in mid-October 1935, had approved them (cf. Ao, 19 Oct. 1935, p. 2). Consequently Salgado, as leader of the AIB, had implicitly expressed his agreement with the books’ contents. Moreover, though Barroso’s position as the dominant anti-Semite within Integralismo, and in fact Brazil’s leading anti-Semite of the 1930s, was undisputed (Carneiro, 1988, pp. 355-374), Salgado as well as Reale regularly made statements that echoed those of Barroso (Deutsch, 1999, pp. 277-279). One just has to re-
member Salgado’s earlier declaration about the alleged links between liberalism and communism, which he had identified with Rothschild and Trotsky, the synonyms for Jewish internationalism. His reaction to the Law of National Security, in which he had explicitly referred to the purported revelations of Barroso’s *Brasil, Colonia de banqueiros* – the activities of Jewish bankers in Brazil and their hatred of Integralismo – had been equally telling (*Ao*, 24 Jan. 1935, p. 2).

Reale, on the other hand, deemed it necessary to confront the allegedly dominant influence of the ‘numerous Jewish forces of financial capitalism’ (Reale, 1934, p. 191); the national secretary of doctrine also justified the Third Reich’s anti-Semitic legislation as the ‘self-defence of the national organism’ (Reale, 1983 [1935], p. 251). *Acção*, the newspaper he edited in São Paulo as of October 1936, was explicitly anti-Semitic, too (Carneiro, 1988, pp. 403-416). Another clear indication of the inherently anti-Semitic nature of the AIB, which was more sustained and systematic than their rejection of Japanese settlers, the other group that attracted the hatred of the self-declared saviours of the beleaguered Brazilian nation, was the first directive of the Departamento Nacional de Segurança de Policia, the movement’s security force, signed by Francisco de Paula Queiroz Ribeiro. Jews headed the internal list of the AIB’s enemies, followed by communists and liberals. Provincial and district leaders were accordingly instructed to gather all available information on the activities of these enemies and to forward them to the department (*APERJ*, n.d. a), possibly for further use after the Integralistas had assumed power.29

There remains the question, what did cause the confrontation then? Circumstantial evidence suggests that strategic and programmatic issues were at the heart of the dispute. The main reason seems to have been Salgado’s strong endorsement of Vargas, expressed in *A Offensiva* a few days before the *Diário da Noite* broke the news about the alleged instruction to kill Barroso (cf. *Ao*, 5 April 1936, p. 2). The National Leader, facing the petition of the Partido Trabalhista do Brasil, according to *The New York Times* a forefront organization of the Brazilian Communist Party, to cancel the registration of the AIB as a political party at the Superior Tribunal Eleitoral, attempted to win the goodwill of the president with his statement (Broxson, 1973, pp. 186-187). For other leading Integralistas, amongst them Barroso, this had been one conciliatory declaration too much; for them, it had been yet another example of Salgado’s weak leadership. In view of earlier criticism of his style and reformist approach, voiced by the cearense Joevá Mota and the
João Leães Sobrinho in private letters (An, 1935c; FGV-CPDOC, 1934), this explanation is even more probable.

Salgado was unimpressed, however, and he it was who ultimately prevailed, as Barroso’s ban from A Offensiva had already suggested. In the course of the reorganization of the AIB, which was a precondition for the subsequent dismissal of the case by the court (JC, 2 June 1936, p. 5), he considerably weakened the internal opposition to his rule. By establishing the Supremo Conselho Integralista, the Câmara dos Quarenta, and the Côrtes do Sigma, he ‘arranged for the involvement of many more persons in the exercise of his authority and in the carrying out of his decision’, thus meeting the demands of the Ste; ‘yet he [did] not arrange for the sharing of his authority with any other person’ (Broxson, 1973, p. 193). As a result of this process Barroso, together with the majority of the national secretaries (including Reale), was relieved from his position and installed as a member of the Supreme Council. The fact that Salgado personally took charge of Barroso’s Secretariat of Education and Physical Culture, the old militia, is a clear indicator of the profundity of the disagreement as well as the Chefe Nacional’s strength (cf. Ao, 22 April 1936, p. 3; 17 June 1936, p. 2; 21 June 1936, pp. 9-10; Mt, 15 May 1936, pp. 7-8).

In accounting for the conflict an additional factor has to be taken into consideration, although it seems to have been of subordinated significance. Salgado also faced accusations of nepotism, caused by the nomination of José Loureiro Júnior, his future son-in-law, and J. F. Dantas Filho, his brother-in-law, to the Gabinete da Chefia Nacional. The cabinet was the crucial link between Salgado and the subordinate institutions of the AIB. It was, inter alia, responsible for deciding which matters reached the National Leader and it also represented him in his absence. The institution effectively controlled the access of people and information to Salgado. Ernani de Morães, a leading Integralista in the federal district, voiced his reservations to these decisions in a personal letter to his leader the day after their publication in A Offensiva in mid-June. He reminded him that this ‘favouritism’ ‘reverberated very badly within the movement’, because it contradicted fundamental ‘postulates of [its] doctrine’ (Aperyj, 1936a). Since the AIB had put great emphasis on breaking with the politics of personal favours, a feature of the Brazilian political system it had castigated as one of the reasons for the nation’s decline, the establishment of a personal fiefdom at the helm of the movement called its claim into question.

Morães’s criticism highlighted one more fundamental contradiction of Integralismo’s pretensions and the reality of the group. In spite
of the Chefe Nacional’s insistence that the ‘misfortune of Brazil [was] the personalization of all movements’ and the ‘repeated and ridiculous reverences to persons’ (Salgado, 1955 [1935], p. 252), the Brazilian fascists had developed an elaborated leadership cult, replete with allusions to Catholic liturgy. In January 1935, an editorial in Anauê!, the popular integralista magazine published in São Paulo, had described Salgado, for example, as the ‘incarnation of Integralismo, our Brother, our Friend and our Leader’ and assured him – ‘in spite of all his interdictions’ – of his followers’ ‘impassioned allegiance’, ‘immortal gratitude’, and ‘eternal love’ (Anauê!, Jan. 1935, n.p.). A book about integralista rules of etiquette and rituals, published in early 1937 and no less than seventy-five pages long, included, moreover, detailed instructions for the faithful regarding baptism of children, weddings, and funerals. The professed faith in Christianity notwithstanding, it provided the followers of the Sigma with an alternative religion (cf. AIB, 1937c, pp. 45-49). Just as in the case of the ideational relationship with European fascism, which had increasingly been toned down – by December 1934 Feder and other non-Integralistas had disappeared from the list of authors Integralistas were advised to read (see MI, 1st Fortnight, Dec. 1934, p. 10) –, Salgado attempted to reconcile contradictory interests. He wanted to ensure the socialization of his followers in the integralista spirit, yet defend the claim that his faction differed from traditional Brazilian politics.

Whatever the shortcomings and contradictions of Salgado and Integralismo might have been, the internal tensions did not result in an open split of the AIB. Salgado re-established his grip and for the time being other prominent Integralistas bowed to him. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936, coming only a few weeks after the reorganization of the leadership circles, provided the National Leader with an opportunity to distract from the movement’s internal problem and to reaffirm its self-ascribed role as the sole defender of God and the Christian traditions of the nation in the face of communist subversion. Drawing parallels between Integralismo and José Antonio Primo de Rivera’s Falange Nacional, which was equally ‘denounced as extremism of the right’ by its enemies on the left, the National Leader stressed that the AIB stood for ‘national pride, the struggle against bolshevism, the defence of the families, the veneration of the Fatherland and of God’ (Ao, 9 Aug. 1936, p. 2). In a world divided between the godless left and the patriotic right, Salgado made clear that Integralismo sided with the latter, for it represented ‘the sacred union around the flag of the Fatherland, of the national traditions[;] it is the virtue, the purity,
the heroism, the religiosity, the delicacy of feelings, the individual and collective modesty, the sacrifice, [and] the honour of a Nation’ (AO, 7 Aug. 1936, p. 2). And as an earlier attack by a ‘band of “Integralistas”’ on the offices of the Spanish Embassy had demonstrated (PRO, 1936c), the self-declared defenders of the Brazilian nation were still willing to act in accordance with their ideals.

Yet, the state governments believed, it seemed, the left rather than Salgado. The government of Paraná, for example, had closed the local branches of the movement, searched its provincial headquarters and banned the dissemination of integralista propaganda in July 1936, justifying these steps with the AIB’s ‘subversive propaganda’ and the purported membership of foreigners in the organization (AO, 5 July 1936, p. 1). The Bahian administration also became active. In early September Juraci Magalhães ordered the arrest of the provincial leadership and the complete closure of the movement in his state, the stronghold of Integralismo in northeastern Brazil. ‘[P]robably the party’s most vigorous adversary’ (Hilton, 1972, p. 7; see also Carone 1974, p. 218), the governor, irritated by the Integralistas’ continued efforts to win new adepts amongst the state’s police force, claimed that they had been preparing an armed rebellion against his government. Magalhães explicitly accused Belmiro Valverde, the national treasurer of the AIB, and Joaquim de Araújo Lima, the movement’s provincial leader, of having masterminded the plan, claiming that Salgado must have known about it. For him, just as the National Liberation Alliance had been a ‘simple mask’ for the ‘subversive intentions of the communists’, so the AIB was only a ‘disguise’ for the ‘detestable plans’ of the ‘Brazilian fascists’ to assume power by revolutionary means (APERJ, 1936b). The state governments of Santa Catarina, Alagoas, and Espírito Santos swiftly followed Bahia’s lead.

The opponents of Integralismo in the Chamber of Deputies seized the opportunity to revive their attacks on the group. Luís Martins e Silva, a classista deputy from the northern state of Pará who had supported the closure of the ANL, demanded ‘energetic and radical measures’ against the AIB. If the federal government did not take the necessary steps Brazil, he contended, would repeat the ‘painful’ experience of Spain (DPL, 6 Sept. 1936, p. 16703). Café Filho, Vargas’s vice-president during his second term in office in the early 1950s but then in opposition to the president, was equally outspoken, but also more polemical, describing the AIB as a forefront organization of German Nazism that simply imitated all the features of the latter, including ‘the leader’s moustache’. The movement, the deputy claimed, was ‘a faithful
copy of what is done in Germany’ and it intended ‘to transform Brazil […] into a German colony’ (Acd, 16 Sept. 1936, pp. 181-182). Both deputies subsequently signed a project submitted by Amaral Peixoto Filho, a former leading militant of the Revolutionary Legions, which proposed the ban of all factions and groups that aimed at the transformation of the ‘democratic regime’ – ‘through violent means or not’ – during a state of war (Dpl, 10 Sept. 1936, p. 16837). Since Brazil was in a permanent state of war as of March 1936, this measure would have effectively stymied the activities of the AIB.

Amidst the widespread front of condemnation, the Brazilian fascists also found significant supporters in congress, however. Barreto Pinto, who represented municipal and federal public servants, defended the Integralistas; he hailed their idealism and underlined the legal status of the AIB, referring to its registration as a party of national scope at the Superior Tribunal Eleitoral (Dpl, 5 Sept. 1936, p. 16484). Even more important was the explicit endorsement the movement received on the part of Adalberto Correia, a deputy from Vargas’s home state of Rio Grande do Sul and the particularly zealous first president of the Comissão Nacional de Repressão ao Comunismo, an institution set up by the president in January 1936 as part of his post-insurrection drive against leftist organizations. Correia stressed the anti-communist struggle of Integralismo and stated that even if the group had acquired arms, as Magalhães asserted, it would only have done so in order to be prepared for the ‘surprise attacks (golpes de surpresa) by Moscow’s henchmen’. He accepted ‘that the Government resort[ed] to Integralismo’, for the communist menace required the alliance of all Brazilians of good faith (Acd, 15 Sept. 1936, pp. 99, 101).

There is no indication that Correia made this statement with the prior approval of Vargas, or that the president knew about his intentions. But the gaucho deputy certainly expressed an ideational affinity between the AIB, important sectors of the federal government, and the military, which had become increasingly apparent during the course of the year. On various occasions leading members of the armed forces, namely Generals Góes Monteiro and Pantelão da Silva Pessôa, the army chief of staff at the time, had hailed its anti-communist struggle and praised its nationalist propaganda. Góes Monteiro, an admirer of Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin and proponent of a state that, as he wrote in 1937, had the power ‘to regulate the whole of collective life and to discipline the nation’ (as quoted in Rouquié and Suffern, 1994, p. 242),31 had also defended the registration of the AIB as a party at the Superior Tribunal Eleitoral (Hilton, 1972, pp. 15-16). The president
shared this attitude. Vargas’s appeal to defend ‘fatherland, family, and religion’ – the integralista slogan – against communists, made a few days after the ban of the local organization in Bahia (Ao, 8 Sept. 1936, p. 3), repeated themes that he had already voiced on the occasion of his New Year’s address. In contrast to the state governments, the federal administration still did not see any reason for action. Vargas, while officially reassuring Magalhães that he was ‘confident’ that ‘only very serious motives’ determined his decision against the Integralistas in Bahia (AN, 1936e), privately believed that the governor was the victim of a communist plot (Vargas, 1995, vol. 1, p. 543).

By late 1936 the leadership of the Brazilian fascists, representatives, and confidants of Vargas – especially prominent members of the army –, maintained informal contacts at various levels; General Pessôa held several meetings with Integralistas in which their anti-communist activities were discussed (Hilton, 1972, p. 17). The Liga da Defesa Nacional, an organization founded in 1916 with the explicit aim of fostering Brazilian patriotism and which during the 1930s also focused its energies on the struggle against communism, provided an additional informal platform for meetings. Pessôa, who presided over the institution, ‘welcomed Integralista cooperation’ (Deutsch, 1999, pp. 109-111, 290). This rapprochement of Integralistas and leading officers of the armed forces, carefully prepared by overtures on the part of the former – the Manifesto-Programma da Ação Integralista Brasileira had called, *inter alia*, for increases in the military budget and the nationalization of state militias (AIB, 1936, p. 5) – marked an important development since the tensions of early 1935 about the integralista oath of allegiance to Salgado.

While as early as December 1936 rumours circulated within integralista circles in São Paulo that Salgado and Vargas maintained contacts (AESP, 1936b), secret negotiations about the establishment of a co-ordinated political alliance, if still an unofficial one, only got under way in early 1937. Osvaldo Aranha, who had been acquainted with the Chefe Nacional since their joint involvement in the Revolutionary Legions in the early 1930s and who regularly received information about the activities of AIB from friends and relatives involved in it (cf. FGV-CPDOC, 1934; 1935a; 1935b), was Vargas’s choice for these meetings. During an encounter with Aranha, which took place in São Paulo in February 1937, the National Leader claimed that he had already held talks with the minister of justice. On that occasion Agamenon Magalhães had promised him the support of the federal administration against the *baiano* government. Whether this meeting took place is not
entirely clear, although in view of subsequent events rather likely, but Aranha was sufficiently impressed by Salgado. In a brief note prepared for Vargas, the close political ally and life-long friend of the president stated that they ‘could count’ on him, and proposed Loureiro Júnior, Salgado’s son-in-law, as a go-between (FGV-Cpdoc, 1937a).

No formal agreement was reached at that time. But as earlier events had demonstrated, the federal government was indeed willing to protect the AIB against legal measures that aimed at its dissolution, and it thereby transformed the Integralistas into tacit allies of its own efforts to weaken Brazil’s democracy. The Vargas administration had not only ignored the project of Amaral Peixoto, which was finally adopted in mid-December 1936 (cf. Dpe, 11 Dec. 1936, pp. 22853-22858; 12 Dec. 1936, p. 22929), but openly defied the Chamber of Deputies. In early 1937, in response to a parliamentary enquiry about the existence of undemocratic groups submitted five months earlier, Agamemnon Magalhães issued an official letter in which he stated that all organizations that ‘aimed at the destruction of the democratic regime in force’ had been dissolved. The AIB, as a ‘legally registered’ party, was not affected (Mi, 20 Feb. 1937, p. 2). In addition, both the Supremo Tribunal Militar and the Tribunal de Segurança Nacional (TSN) – another repressive institution was established after the intentona comunista which finally took over the case of the Bahian government against the AIB in March 1937 – hailed the anti-communist struggle of Integralismo and concluded that the documents submitted by Juraci Magalhães did not prove an armed conspiracy (Ao, 29 Dec. 1936, p. 1; An, 1937a).32 During the course of 1937, courts lifted the restrictions imposed on the AIB by several state governments, including the baiano one.
THE LIMITATIONS OF INTEGRALISMO

The contacts with the military and Vargas – the man who had repeatedly expressed an ideational kinship with Integralismo and who, still more importantly, was at the centre of Brazilian politics – did not arouse the opposition of the Integralistas. At that stage they did not view the rapprochement between their leader and the president as well as leading representatives of the army with scepticism or open hostility, possibly because nothing concrete came out of it and because the benevolent attitude of the federal authorities helped them to gain some freedom of action. It was Salgado’s intention to put himself forward as the AIB’s presidential candidate, accepted as a certainty within the movement at least as early as November 1936, which did not go down well within leadership circles. Members of both the Supremo Conselho Integralista, to which Barroso and Reale belonged, as well as the Câmara dos Quarenta privately voiced their misgivings about Salgado’s plan (AESP, 1936a).

Salgado, who a report of the British Embassy described at the time as ‘not a person of any great distinction’ (PRO, 1936d), attempted to counter this resistance by publicly appealing to his followers through A Offensiva. With the public display of loyalty by Integralistas behind him, which he had received at the final joint-session of the first Conclave Parlamentar Meridional, the first Congresso Nacional Feminino, and the first Assembléia das Côrtes do Sigma in Rio de Janeiro in mid-October (MI, 5 Dec. 1936, p. 2), he praised his own work as the leader of a truly national force. In view of the success he had achieved over...
the years, the unfavourable circumstances of Brazil’s vast territory and
the lack of means of communications and transport notwithstanding,
Salgado demanded unrestricted loyalty. He claimed that
those who are not with me are not with Brazil, because I only
want the greatness and happiness of my People [and] do not
seek the reward in the ephemeral world, nor in the weakness of
human hearts, but in bosom of the one for whose love I wish for
a Great and Illuminated Nation (Ao, 3 Nov. 1936, p. 2).

While other great Brazilians before him had only been politicians,
orators, philosophers, or sociologists – namely Pinheiro Machado,
Farias Brito, Silvio Romero, Tobias Barreto, and Rui Barbosa —, the
Chefe Nacional, who had criticized the leadership cult of German Na-
zism and traditional Brazilian politics, which was haunted by what he
had called the ‘repeated and ridiculous reverences to persons’ (Salgado,
1955 [1935], p. 252), contended that it was he who had finally united
all their characteristics in one person. Pictures of the graves of ‘the great
Brazilians precursors of Integralismo’, reproduced on the front-page
of the same issue of A Offensiva, further underlined his pretension to
personify all the nation’s outstanding sons (Ao, 3 Nov. 1936, p. 1). Sal-
gado, in an act of self-glorification that bordered on the hubris known
from other fascist leaders, obviously saw himself as the only man who
could bring about the future greatness of Brazil. He was the leader the
nation needed to fulfil its destiny. Attacks on him amounted to nothing
less than attacks on the harbinger of a better future.

Neither the endorsement received by the integralista delegates in
October nor his unashamed self-praise silenced his internal critics one
month later, though. Rather, the tensions lingered on throughout the
(Brazilian) summer of 1937, and in March the carioca daily Diário da
Noite, like in April 1936, finally made them public. Without identify-
ing any names, the newspaper reported that the ‘truly idealistic current
of the movement’, mainly made up of young men, was very critical of
Salgado’s cautious and reformist approach. They not only wanted the
implementation of the integralista dream of a new totalitarian order;
they wanted to achieve this goal through ‘integralista methods’ (DN,
27 March 1937, p. 1), a barely veiled hint at the revolutionary and
violent means Salgado and the AIB had had to renounce with the LSN
two years earlier. An internal enquiry by the provincial leadership of
the carioca AIB, carried out in early 1937, supported the assertion of
the daily, indicating that the course pursued by the leadership since early
1935 had had a negative impact on the enthusiasm of the Sigma’s fol-
wowers. Local leaders had identified the renunciation of a revolutionary
strategy and the adherence to democratic politics as the primary reasons for the declining spirit and the decreasing participation of integralista militants in the training sessions of the transformed militia (cf. APERJ, 1937b). The annual ritual commemoration during the ‘Night of the Silent Drums’ (see Deutsch, 1999, pp. 295-296) provided, it seems, little consolation.

The convocation of an integralista plebiscite to choose the AIB’s presidential candidate, a decision taken by Salgado in early 1937, further fuelled the apprehension of the dissident sectors. It reaffirmed the Brazilian fascists’ formal adaptation to democratic procedures, as Madeira de Freitas’s enthusiastic endorsement of the decision in A Ofensiva underlined (Ao, 10 April 1937, p. 2; see also Salgado, 1937a), and, as was to be expected, strengthened the position of the National Leader vis-à-vis his internal critics. Unsurprisingly, the Chefe Nacional emerged as the clear victor in this integralista exercise of democracy, receiving almost 850,000 votes. Barroso and Reale, who came second and third respectively, obtained less than one per cent of his share (Ao, 12 June 1937, p. 1). Typical in this respect was the result of the elections in the municipal branch of the AIB in Pedreiras, in the northern state of Maranhão, where 146 out of a total of 147 Integralistas voted for their National Leader (cf. Caldeira, 1999, pp. 130-134). Without any sign of restraint, A Ofensiva subsequently claimed that Salgado was the ‘candidate of the people’. The two main contenders for the presidency – José Américo de Almeida, a former tenente with authoritarian and populist leanings from the northeastern state of Paraiba who was widely seen as the government candidate, and Armando Salles de Oliveira, the successful governor of São Paulo and spokesman for liberal constitutionalism – lacked this democratic legitimacy; they had been nominated by the political establishment (Ao, 16 June 1937, p. 2; see also ÖSTA, 1937a).

Besides the open humiliation of Barroso and Reale, who had finally been allowed to resume their former positions as national secretaries of the transformed militia and doctrine in early April 1937 (cf. Mt, 12 May 1937, pp. 5, 16), the high turnout pursued another and more important objective; it was also designed to make an impression on the Brazilian public as well as Vargas. Although it was known that not all Integralistas who had participated in the internal plebiscite were entitled to vote in the presidential elections, because they did not fulfill the literacy requirements of the electoral code, the strong showing backed up earlier claims about its substantial popular support. The British Embassy was certainly impressed, reporting to London that
the ‘number of votes cast in the plebiscite affords striking proof of the strength of the movement.’ For the British representation, which noted that ‘[i]t is, of course, highly unlikely that Sr. Plinio Salgado will be elected President’, it was nonetheless ‘clear that such a large and organized body is a force to be reckoned with’ (PRO, 1937a). While doubts about the official number of militants seem justified, the turnout suggests that the AIB had more than 200,000 followers at the time (see Deutsch, 1999, p. 281).

Despite Salgado’s triumph, and probably even because of it, a few days before his proclamation as the official presidential candidate of the Brazilian fascists on 12 June, Jeová Mota left the movement. A group of young paulista militants followed him soon thereafter. While Barroso was sent to Ceará, his and Mota’s home state, ‘to stabilize the situation’ (Broxson, 1973, p. 288), there are no indications that the breakaway seriously weakened the AIB (AO, 20 June 1937, pp. 1-2; AN, 1937b), let alone that it prompted ‘an exodus’ of Integralistas (Deutsch, 1999, p. 275). Only the federal leader of the state of Amazonas followed the sole integralista deputy and the young men from São Paulo (Broxson, 1973, p. 288). But the declarations of these dissidents highlighted the unease with Salgado’s conformist policies and his emphasis on traditional values. In his letter of resignation Mota, who had been an ineffective member of the Chamber of Deputies, rarely taking to the floor and never submitting any project, voiced his discontent with the bourgeois character of the movement he had joined in late 1932. Criticizing the AIB’s elitism and messianic inclinations, he declared that

> my revolutionary anxieties no longer find satisfaction or use [within the movement]. I do not see how under these circumstances a revolutionary can find the adequate instrument for his aspirations in the struggle for Social Justice, the National Organization, and the culture and liberation of the people (AO, 8 June 1937, p. 2).

The lack of revolutionary zeal is even more forcefully admonished in the statement of the Integralistas from São Paulo, where the Brazilian fascists, just as in the second most populous state, Minas Gerais – together they accounted for around forty-two per cent of the electorate (cf. DPL, 5 Dec. 1936, p. 22527) –, had not made any significant headways (Love, 1980, p. 123; Wirth, 1977, p. 126). Echoing Mota, the dissidents stated that they had joined the AIB in order to carry out the liberation of the Brazilian people, ‘enslaved by national and foreign capitalism’. Their aspirations were frustrated, however, because Integralismo had abandoned its objectives and ‘today follows an ab-
absolutely capitalist-bourgeois political line of clearly fascist nature [sic], which means that it is in complete disagreement with the desires of the working masses of Brazil’ (AESP, 1937a). In the same vein, in a letter to his cousin Osvaldo Aranha, Patricio de Freitas Valle, who had previously been critical of Salgado’s presidential candidacy (cf. FGV-CPDOC, 1937b) and now was one of the signatories of the paulista manifesto, complained that members of the bourgeoisie had ‘seized control of countless leading positions (postos de destaque), thwarting everything that had been made in favour of the syndicalism preached by the Doctrine and promised in the ‘Manifesto-Programma’ [...] They no longer advocated the conciliation of classes but its exclusive hegemony, as if Integralismo were the instrument of the bourgeoisie (FGV-CPDOC, 1937c).

These observations were not unfounded, at least as far as the democratization of the movement and its class structure was concerned. The leadership of the AIB, and this finding applies especially to the national as well as the provincial levels, indeed consisted predominantly of young, white male members of the rising urban middle classes. At the local level the popular sector was better represented, but the bourgeoisie was still clearly dominant (cf. Trindade, 1988, pp. 105-113; Gertz, 1987, pp. 169-171; Brandalise 1992, pp. 126, 161; Parente, 1984, pp. 148-149). More than half of the members of the Câmara dos Quarenta had, as the ‘doctor’ before their names indicates, a university degree and six were military officers, but it did not include a single worker, or any women. The social composition of the Câmara dos Quatrocentos, which was set up in 1937 as the future corporatist chamber of an integralista regime, was also biased towards the middle classes, while the working classes were clearly underrepresented. Almost half of them had a university degree, but less than one-fifth were workers, and only around two per cent were women (cf. Mi, 21 July 1937, pp. 10-11).

Salgado’s claim that almost half of the AIB’s militants were urban and rural workers reflected his wish to portray Integralismo as a truly national movement, as a movement that united, as the Manifesto de Outubro had announced in 1932, all social classes; it did not reflect the social composition of its membership, however (Ao, 19 Sept. 1936, p. 3). Even Integralistas privately conceded the failure to attract workers. In August 1936, the provincial leader of Bahia, Araújo Lima, wrote for instance that ‘[a]lmost the entire working class of the province remains outside our movement’ (AN, 1936d). A contemporary observer,
Ernest Hambloch, was even less restrained in his assessment, stating that especially the working classes in São Paulo, in terms of numbers the strongest in the entire republic, while they ‘dislike Italian fascism’, ‘detest Brazilian Integralism’ (Hambloch, 1937, p. 484). The only partial exception to this rule was Maranhão. In this predominantly rural and underdeveloped state, which had a weakly organized and politically divided working class, they enlisted a considerable number of workers (Caldeira, 1999, p. 56).

The belated and feeble attempts to substantiate its proclaimed faith in corporatism indicated the lack of interest in the fate of the Brazilian working classes as well as Integralismo’s weak following amongst them, especially in the most industrialized states of the country. It took the AIB four years to establish the Serviço Syndical Corporativo and to organize the first Grande Convenção Syndical. The convention, which was held in December 1936 to reaffirm the purported ‘working-class (trabalhista) nature’ of Integralismo (AO, 1 Sept. 1936, p. 7; 15 Nov. 1936, p. 1; 9 Dec. 1936, pp. 1-2), did not result in increased activities amongst workers; it ‘represented its high-water’ (Broxson, 1973, pp. 224-225). Mota, the leader of the Serviço Syndical Corporativo and the driving force behind these efforts, was soon sent to São Paulo to lead the provincial organization of the state, presumably because Salgado regarded the integralista federal deputy ‘as too leftist’ (Deutsch, 1999, p. 274). On the occasion of the ‘great proletarian meeting’ on 1 May 1937 (AO, 30 April 1937, p. 1), the first and only time the AIB celebrated Labour Day at the national level, Mota made his last public appearance before he left the movement.34

The scant representation of women also raises doubts about the official figures released by the AIB, and it undermines claims that up to one fifth of Integralistas were women (Broxson, 1973, p. 197). Of the approximately 850,000 voters in the internal plebiscite, only around 50,000 (or less than six per cent) had been cast by women. The relatively weak support of women reflected their general subordination and marginalization in Brazilian society at the time (Hahner, 1990, p. 180), and more specifically the AIB’s emphasis on virility and military values. Its publications and official declarations spoke out against emancipation and reaffirmed Integralismo’s commitment to natural hierarchies and what it saw as the ‘feminine nature’ (AO, 1 March 1936, p. 15; 13 Sept. 1936, p. 14). In the integralista discourse women were invariably described as ‘saint’, ‘sacrificer’, ‘benefactress (bondosa)’, and ‘angel’ (Cavalari, 1999, p. 61). O Decálogo da bôa esposa summarized the Brazilian fascists’ thinking on gender, and clearly expressed their
traditionalist and paternalist views. In no uncertain terms it reminded women of their social and conjugal duties. They should look after the house, be happy wives and mothers, and worship their husbands (Anauê, Aug. 1935, p. 22).

Irene de Freitas Henrique, the Secretaria Nacional de Arregimentação Feminina e dos Plinianos, which, tellingly enough, was responsible for both women and youths, was the sole woman in a leading position. Moreover, the female section of the movement was only established in 1936, and the first female congress of the Brazilian fascists, which was ‘largely social in nature’, took place four years after the establishment of the AIB (Broxson, 1973, p. 212). The Green-Blouses, as the women members were called, were essentially involved in social work programmes, for example the running of health clubs in favelas and night schools for illiterate Integralistas. In fact, the formation of new voters was their main responsibility (MI, 12 May 1937, p. 3). Without ignoring their contributions to the dissemination of the integralista propaganda to ‘many areas otherwise untouched by the movement’, it seems problematic to state that the female section ‘played a major role’ in integralista activities (Levine, 1970, p. 92). As the British Consul in Bahia had noted on the occasion of the creation of the provincial female section in February 1935, ‘Brazilian women take no part in politics or public affairs’, and therefore the branch did ‘not impress’ him ‘as being of much importance’ (PRO, 1935b).

Nor did the Integralistas make substantial inroads in rural areas, where the vast majority of the Brazilian population still lived (cf. Hentschke, 1996, table 25, p. 662). The belated establishment of the Diretoria Nacional de Organização Rural in August 1937 (MI, 7 Oct. 1937, p. 17), coming almost five years after the foundation of the movement, indicated that during its brief existence the AIB had been unable to penetrate the paternalistic power structures that still characterized rural areas in the 1930s (Mainwaring, 1999, p. 68). Indeed, in spite of some statements and claims that the agricultural sector would form the backbone of the fascist regime, they had never paid sustained attention to ‘the problem of latifundia’, with ‘a few discussions of this topic in’ Acção, the paper edited by Reale in São Paulo as of October 1936, the only exception (Deutsch, 1999, p. 271).

In the end, whatever the structural impediments might have been, the interests of the urban middle class were always closer to the heart of the bourgeois leadership of Integralismo than the lot of the Brazilian proletariat or its rural population. Both Salgado and Reale, undermining statements that Integralismo united all social classes and
transcended social barriers, had repeatedly praised the middle class as the truly revolutionary force (Salgado, 1933, p. 57). In 1935, Reale had exemplarily stated that it was

the suffering class from whose fertile bosom [...] the highest expressions of talent have emerged in all times. It is the class that makes the revolution, because it is the harbinger of the Idea. The other social sectors, the superior and the inferior ones, receive from it the vivifying energy (Reale, 1983 [1935], pp. 225-226).

Given their own background as well as the fact that no specific party politically represented the interests of the urban middle class, this strategy followed certain logic. The receptivity of many members of this social sector to the anti-communist message of the AIB after the *intentona comunista* indicated, moreover, that they presented the best hope for Integralismo to increase its following as well as its political weight.
In the few months before the establishment of the Estado Novo the AIB reinforced its message of order, tradition, and the defence of religion on the one hand, and the attacks on communism on the other. On the occasion of his official nomination as presidential candidate, Salgado set the tone for the integralista propaganda. Couched in religious rhetoric, he professed his faith in God and proclaimed that the future integralista state ‘comes from Christ, is inspired by Christ, acts for Christ and moves towards (vae para) Christ.’ ‘I believe in the Eternal God’, Salgado announced,

I believe in the Immortal Soul; I believe in the optative, deliberative power of the Human Soul and its capacity to interfere in historical events, lifting the masses and leading them. I believe in Christ and the light that emanates from Him. I believe that those who pray to Him, who beg him humbly for inspiration, who modestly ask for his wisdom, power, [and] hope, hear the mysterious harps of the Archangels that one-day will awaken the simple and good-spirited people to praise the Lord. For Christ I will raise; for Christ I want a great Brazil; for Christ I teach the doctrine of human solidarity and social harmony; for Christ I struggle; for Christ I cry out simultaneously with you; for Christ I lead you; for Christ I will fight (Ao, 13 June 1937, p. 1).

Symbolic expression was given to the claim that Integralismo represented and defended religious interests, was inspired by, and acted
in accordance with them, by the popular integralista magazine Anauê!, which published this part of Salgado’s speech in the shape of a cross (Anauê!, 11 Aug. 1937, p. 11). A Offensiva, on its part, forthwith termed its Chefe Nacional the leader of the ‘nationalist and Christian revolution’ in Brazil (cf. Ao, 21 July 1937, p. 5; 25 July 1937, p. 1). Beyond this rhetoric changes, an internal circular of the Secretaria Nacional de Corporações e Serviços Eleitorales went out to the heads of local branches, instructing them to increase their propagandistic efforts and win new adherents. They should primarily focus their attention on ‘religious persons’ and ‘simple and sincere individuals’, because they had ‘great love for fatherland and family’ (APERJ, n.d. b). In addition, the waiting period for new member was significantly reduced. Instead of three months, they only had to wait five minutes before swearing the oath of allegiance (Cavalari, 1999, pp. 168-169).

As warnings of an immediate communist coup increased during the (Brazilian) winter of 1937, Integralismo stepped up its attempt to convert frightened Brazilians to its message of national salvation. The AIB was described as the last and only bulwark against the ‘tremendous communist conspiracy’ and the ‘Soviet invasion of our fatherland’, which the Comintern was allegedly preparing (Ao, 6 Aug. 1937, p. 1; 13 Aug. 1937, p. 1). The Brazilian fascists appealed to Catholics to side with them in order to prevent the rise of the ‘Anti-Christ’ and ‘the kingdom of the devil’ (Salgado, 1937b, p. 30). These efforts to strengthen the standing of Integralismo amongst potential Catholic voters were backed up by intellectual efforts, which were meant to demonstrate the congruencies between Integralismo and the doctrines of the Catholic Church. Taking the papal social encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno as the basis of his analysis, Barroso claimed that the AIB was a ‘political and Social Christian movement’; he went at great length to show that the faction strove for the realization of a Christian state (cf. Barroso, 1937, pp. 7, 121-229). The emphasis on Catholicism, which had always played an important role in the integralista propaganda, marked a tactical deviation from previous statements that had suggested the primacy of the state in any future order.

It also indicates that at that crucial time a possible backlash from Protestant Teuto-Brazilians Integralistas, who had viewed the latent Catholicism of the movement with some apprehension (Lechler, 1935, p. 9; Kaminski, 2000, pp. 38, 40-41), was deemed less important than the possible endorsement by the Catholic hierarchy. With Salgado’s presidential campaign faltering – by early August Integralistas accepted its failure because he could only expect some 400,000 votes, or a little
more than ten per cent of the electorate (AESP, 1937b) –, the leadership of the AIB presumably hoped to receive the official support of the Catholic Church, something it had already unsuccessfully attempted to achieve in 1933, on the occasion of the elections to the Constitutional Assembly (Williams, 1974b, p. 308). Such a move would undoubtedly have strengthened Salgado’s overall position, not only in the presidential race, in which José Américo and Armando Salles were the clear front-runners, but also vis-à-vis the president. After all, first tentative talks between the Integralistas and representatives of Vargas had got under way at the time, and with the backing of the Church the position of the Brazilian fascists would have improved considerably.

There were precedents for a collaboration between the AIB and Catholics at the local level, namely in Rio Grande do Sul, Ceará, and Maranhão, where the Church had actively supported Integralismo, endorsing its struggle and urging believers to join the party (Brandalise, 1992, p. 162; Parente, 1984, p. 157; Caldeira, 1999, pp. 63, 99). Moreover, over the years both dignitaries and lay leaders had frequently praised the movement. A Ordem, a Catholic magazine directed and edited by Alceu Amoroso Lima, the influential de facto head of the Electoral League and a man with marked authoritarian inclinations (cf. Medeiros, 1974b), assumed an ‘attitude of veiled sympathy’ for the AIB throughout its existence (Velloso, 1979, pp. 142, 149). The Catholic newspaper A União was even less restrained. In late January 1937 it had published favourable statements of various archbishops and bishops as well as Amoroso Lima about the Integralistas and their work. They invariably underlined, as the bishop of Campinas exemplarily stated, their ‘defence of the moral principles of the Brazilian fatherland’ (APERJ, n.d. c). In addition to the ideological affinity, which rested on the shared sympathies for corporatism as well as the rejection of liberalism, capitalism, and above all atheistic and materialistic communism, personal links existed. Helio Vianna, San Tiago Dantas, Antonio Gallotti, and Thiers Martins Moreira, all distinguished members of the Centro Dom Vital, an important centre of Catholic intellectuals, were leading militants of the AIB (Williams, 1974a, pp. 437-438, 443).

Despite the more or less open cordiality towards the movement, the programmatic congruencies, as well as the efforts on the part of both Salgado and Barroso to convince the hierarchy that the AIB acted in accordance with Catholic doctrine and that it could only gain under a new fascist order, at the national level the hierarchy was nonetheless ‘[c]areful never to ally the Church formally to Integralism’ (Williams, 1974a, pp. 433-435). From the point of view the Church this was a
sensible decision, based on an assessment of the current political situation and the pros and cons of an alliance with the AIB, with the negative consequences far outweighing possible gains. By withstanding the fascist temptation it avoided the open identification with a totalitarian organization, which had tainted its own image and also undermined the position of its lay organizations, the Catholic Action as well as the Liga Eleitoral Católica. Especially the LEC was an important instrument of the Church to influence political developments, as the incorporation of all its demands into the Constitution of 1934 had demonstrated (Serbin, 1996, p. 728). Moreover, by not siding with the Brazilian fascists, it preserved the close relationship Cardinal Sebastião Leme da Silveira Cintra, the archbishop of Rio de Janeiro, had developed with the Vargas administration (Lustosa, 1976, p. 529). This was not only important because of Vargas’s influence, but also because it ensured that the Church did not forfeit the allocations from federal and state budgets that it received since 1930 (cf. Serbin, 1992, pp. 5-9).

In the end, Salgado’s apocalyptic, quasi-religious rhetoric and the increasingly violent confrontations between the followers of the Sigma and leftist militants, which went hand in hand with the former, only raised the rancour of its opponents. In August 1937, in the course of a parliamentary debate about the bloody event in Campos, which had ended with the death of at least eleven people when leftist militants had attacked an integralista rally in support of Salgado’s presidential candidacy (AO, 17 Aug. 1937, p. 1), César Tinoco, a left-wing deputy from the state of Rio de Janeiro, ridiculed the Chefe Nacional’s assertion that he was an “envoy of God” and a “messenger from heaven” (DPL, 21 Aug. 1937, p. 39533). Café Filho claimed, on the other hand, that the incidents of integralista violence ‘are by no means directed against communism, but directly against the prestige of the authorities’ (DPL, 20 Aug. 1937, p. 39408). The leftist deputy Domingos Vellascos even accused the movement of striving for the establishment of a ‘Nazi-Integralista state’, which would be directed by Filinto Müller and Salgado, the ‘agents of the Fascist International’. The Brazilian fascists provoked ‘serious disturbances’, he stated, ‘in order to create an atmosphere of terror among the people, [and] at the same time […] exploit the Communist scarecrow and threaten not only its opponents but even unconcerned persons (indiferentes)’ (DPL, 17 Aug. 1937, p. 38884; 20 Aug. 1937, pp. 39417-39418).

The suspicion that Vargas and the Integralistas had reached some form of agreement or that the president was at least ‘flirting with’ them, as the British Ambassador, Sir H. Gurney, had stated back in June when
Vargas, much to the indignation of the opposition, had received a delegation of Integralistas which, led by Araújo Lima, had handed over the formal inscription of Salgado’s presidential candidacy (PRO, 1937b), was shared by some Brazilian authorities as well. The Chefe do Serviço Especial of the police of São Paulo, the home state of Armando Salles, equally concluded that the Catete palace protected, and possibly even collaborated with, the self-declared saviours of the Brazilian nation. In a memorandum prepared for the Superintendente de Ordem Política e Social of São Paulo in mid-August 1937, J. Agostinho stated that the ‘Federal Government, for some time, is giving prestige to Integralismo, with the intention of surrounding itself with a solid political base that [would] permit it to maintain in its hands the reins of power, which Democracy is denying it’. The final aim of the rapprochement was, he continued, ‘if not the victory of Integralismo in Brazil, at least the establishment (installação) of a totalitarian regime’ (AESP, 1937c).

Although there is no evidence that the two parties had made a formal deal as of August 1937 – Salgado’s request for a meeting with Vargas, presented through intermediaries at the beginning of the month, did not result in an encounter (Vargas, 1995, vol. 2, p. 63) –, the developments during the course of the year had suggested that the AIB enjoyed the goodwill of the federal government. Together with his closes allies Vargas, who made his own contribution to the destabilization of the political system by releasing left-wing political prisoners throughout the (Brazilian) winter of 1937 after congress had refused an extension of the state of war in June, continued to protect the Integralistas. In open contradiction to an official statement by the ministry of justice, which described Integralismo as a right-wing extremist movement that aimed at the overthrow of the constitutional regime (JB, 21 Aug. 1937, p. 7), the chief of the federal police sided with the AIB. Two days after the declaration of the ministry, which was led by José Carlos de Macedo Soares, a Catholic constitutionalist who had apprehensions about the increasingly anti-democratic course of the administration, Filinto Müller stated that ‘the police authorities guarantee [the] absolute right of legally recognized political organizations’ to continue their activities for the presidential campaign (JB, 22 Aug. 1937, p. 6). The AIB, as a legally registered party, had the official approval to continue its violence.

According to Salgado’s own account of events, direct talks between him and Francisco Campos, one of Vargas’s confidants, author of the Constitution of 1937 and, as the foundation of the revolutionary legion of Minas Gerais had suggested, a man with marked authoritarian
inclinations (cf. Medeiros, 1974a, pp. 68-102), started in September. In three consecutive meetings Salgado agreed in principle to Campos’s proposal to second the government’s plan for a coup and support the enactment of a new authoritarian constitution. In return for his support, the leader of the Brazilian fascists subsequently recorded, Campos promised him that Integralismo would be at the heart of the new order and that it would be allowed to preserve its identity as a ‘truly religious order’. Talks with Filinto Müller, General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, the minister of war at the time, and finally Vargas himself confirmed his impression that the AIB would play an integral part in the new regime (FGV-CPDOC, 1938a, pp. 4-7; Vargas, 1995, vol. 2, p. 78).

Subsequent developments suggested that both sides initially honoured their agreement. The first step was taken by the Vargas administration, which strove for the renewed suspension of constitutional rights. The government justified the move with the revelation of an alleged communist conspiracy that the Estado Maior do Exército had suddenly, and rather timely, seized in late September. Doubts ‘as to the authenticity of this document’ – the Plano Cohen, as its had been christened – were voiced, and ‘[m]ost competent observers believe’, the British Embassy reported, ‘that the danger of any real “Communist” outbreak is greatly exaggerated, and that the request for the state of war is the first blow in Sr. Vargas’s campaign […] to secure his own continuance in office, or to set up a military dictatorship or some form of provisional Government.’ It was ‘generally felt that the chances of either Sr. Armando de Salles Oliveira or of Sr. José Americo becoming the next president’ were ‘sensibly lessened’ by the developments (PRO, 1937c).

In spite of the justified reservations – the Plano Cohen was indeed a forgery, fabricated by the chief of the integralista police, Captain Olímpio Mourão Filho, who was also a member of the Estado Maior (Melo, 1957, pp. 103-104; Silva, 1970, pp. 385-386) – congress acquiesced to the president on 1 October, two days after the publication of the document. Given the origins of the plan, it was no surprise that A Offensiva stated that it ‘affirms the formidable speeches’ of the Chefe Nacional, and proved the accuracy of his earlier warnings of ‘Bolshevik machinations’ (AO, 1 Oct. 1937, p. 1). Salgado, who had officially been informed about the existence of the plan in one of the meetings with Campos, subsequently defended the suspension of basic rights and the introduction of press censorship as necessary steps in view of the apparent inadequacy of the existing regime. The support of the president and the armed forces was the ‘duty’ of the Integralistas, ‘and
we must not shirk it if we want to save our Fatherland’, Salgado wrote in the integralista main organ (AO, 2 Oct. 1937, as quoted in Hilton, 1972, p. 22). The government also became active. Through the institution responsible for the execution of the state of war, the Comissão Superintendente do Estado de Guerra, which included General Newton Cavalcanti de Andrade, a known sympathizer of Integralismo and personal acquaintance of Salgado, it gave orders to halt press criticism of the Brazilian fascists (Hilton, 1972, p. 22).

By early October the partnership was widely visible, at least for those willing to see it (BA Berlin, 1937b). This obvious collusion between the government and the AIB caused considerable unease within Integralismo, though. In various private and official meetings Salgado, who had asked for complete secrecy of his talks, rejected suggestions voiced by concerned followers that he had struck a deal with Vargas. During an encounter with Valverde, the National Leader vehemently denied, as the treasurer of the movement later recorded, that he was involved in any kind of negotiations with the government (APERJ, 1937d). On the occasion of a meeting of the Câmara dos Quarenta, which took place in mid-October, he again reassured his comrades that the AIB would not collaborate with the president (Melo, 1957, p. 109). The attitude suggests that Salgado feared that the apprehensions of his followers might lead to the outbreak of open resistance to his policy, which would have threatened the accord with Vargas. He wanted to confront his movement with a fait accompli. Olbiano de Melo, the secretary-general of the Câmara dos Quarenta, later wrote that Salgado informed him and other leading Integralistas about the on-going talks only after he had met Vargas, i.e., at the end of October (Melo, 1957, pp. 111-114), when an agreement had been reached.

The staging of an integralista march through the streets of Rio de Janeiro on 1 November, and especially Salgado’s speech on the same night, finally dispelled any remaining doubts about the true nature of the relationship between the two unequal partners. In his address, which was broadcast on radio, the leader of the Brazilian fascists assured both the ‘Leader of the Nation’, as he referred to the president, and the armed forces – the driving forces behind the abolition of democracy – of the Integralistas’ ‘intentions to esteem and to support a New Order’. In view of the necessary confrontation that the nation faced today, the followers of the Sigma ‘swear, together with me [and] before their children’, Salgado proclaimed, ‘that they will not allow the nationalist work to be undermined by political groups and, ‘if necessary’, struggle ‘for the victory of their Fatherland’. ‘Fully confident of
the President, the Army and the Navy’, the followers of the Sigma, the National Leader concluded, will let the insincere feel that some works are too noble to end as novels’ (Ao, 2 Nov. 1937, p. 2).

While the British Ambassador spoke of an ‘imposing and deliberative display of strength of the movement’ (Pro, 1937d), and the march also seemed to have been ‘decidedly impressive to Cariocas who watched’ (Dulles, 1967, p. 166), Vargas’s perception differed markedly. In his diary the president noted that approximately 20,000 Integralistas had marched past him (Vargas, 1995, vol. 2, p. 79), and not the 50,000 mentioned by Salgado. If the National Leader had intended to make a big impression on the ‘Leader of the Nation’, and demonstrate the strength of his following, he had failed. Within less than two weeks the Estado Novo was a reality, but the AIB and Salgado, who was not informed about the date of the decisive move (cf. FGV-Cpdoc, 1938a, p. 8), were not at the centre of the regime. On the contrary, just as all other political party or groups, so the integralista movement was excluded from power. Vargas, together with his collaborators in the military high commandos, had indeed used the Brazilian fascists and their leader, as the British Ambassador had surmised a few days before the autogolpe, ‘for his own ends’ (Pro, 1937d).

The decision not to side openly with the AIB, then, was not just the result of Vargas’s insecure position in late 1936 and early 1937 (Hilton, 1972, p. 18). Because the president did not even take this step on the eve of the Estado Novo, when he (more or less) controlled the situation, other factors have to be taken into consideration. By assuming an attitude of supportive neutrality, Vargas did enough to ensure both the group’s continued existence and its benevolence. Through their acts of violence the Brazilian fascists contributed, moreover, to the feeling of insecurity, thereby furthering the conspirators plans of undermining Brazil’s weak democracy. They did the dirty job for Vargas and the army under Dutra and Góes Monteiro, helping them to create a political climate that was propitious for the creation of an authoritarian regime. In comparison to Integralismo, ‘a loyal force in the struggle against communism and liberalism’ (Camargo et al., 1989, p. 199), Vargas emerged as a moderate. The Chefe Nacional, on the other hand, because of the ‘realities of electoral statistics and the infeasibility or unattractiveness of alternative methods of achieving power’ (Hilton, 1972, p. 20), thought that he had concluded ‘a satisfactory deal’ (Pro, 1937b) with the president. It seemed to secure a place for himself and his movement in any future settlement. Salgado was to be bitterly disappointed.
On 10 November 1937, Vargas announced the new order, which he had conspired to establish together with the armed forces, to the Brazilian public. The federal congress, the state governments as well as the state assemblies and municipal councils were dissolved, and the Constitution of 1934 unceremoniously annulled. Since the new, authoritarian constitution was never formally ratified however, the president was ‘empowered to issue decrees on all matters of legislation of the Union’, as article 180 of the constitution stated. ‘These simple words embody the essence of the Estado Novo’, Karl Loewenstein wrote in 1942, ‘and all the rest of one hundred and eighty-six articles are legal camouflage. Vargas knows it. So do the Brazilian people’ (Loewenstein, 1942, p. 48). Until the breakdown of the regime in late 1945, the strong man of Brazilian politics, supported by the military, and especially the army, which became ‘the core of the dictatorial Estado Novo’ (McCann, 2004, p. xv), would indeed rule by decrees.

Despite the fact that Vargas had not made any reference to Integralismo in his declaration about the end of Brazil’s brief experiment with democracy and the establishment of the New State, the day after the announcement Salgado published a statement in A Offensiva in which he accepted that the AIB had effectively ceased to exist as a political organization. He declared that his movement, in accordance with its original objectives, would forthwith increase its educational and cultural activities. Consequently, orders went out to the leaders of the AIB’s local branches to strengthen the non-political aspect of Integralismo’s work
and to collaborate, as before, with the authorities in maintaining law and order (Ao, 12 Nov. 1937, p. 1). Before the Câmara dos Quarenta, which met two days after the autogolpe, the Chefe Nacional reaffirmed his position. He expressed his unrestricted support of Vargas, not least because the constitution, as some Integralistas as well as contemporary observers thought, carried out many of the ideas they had advocated, for instance the centralization of power in the hands of the federal government (APERJ, 1938c; Hunsche, 1938a).

In the immediate aftermath of 10 November it may well have seemed that not everything was lost for the AIB, as it could still continue its propaganda activities and enrol new members (cf. Ao, 14 Nov. 1937; 17 Nov. 1937, p. 1; 18 Nov. 1938, p. 1; 25 Nov. 1937, p.1). But Salgado later complained that the Integralistas, ‘since the first day of the putsch’, were ‘treated as enemies’. The press, under the firm control of censorship, stepped up its attacks on the movement as well as its leader (FGV-CPDOC, 1938a, p. 8). After less than ten days Campos, as of the beginning of November minister of justice, informed Salgado that he could only enter the government as minister of education – a post he had been offered – after the dissolution of his organization. In addition, in the name of the regime, Campos proposed to take over some of the AIB’s debts, which were quite considerable (FGV-CPDOC, 1938a, pp. 9-10; APERJ, 1938b). The leader of the Brazilians fascists rejected this proposal, and accepted the imminent end of his group, which seemed only a question of time, without any apparent resistance (FGV-CPDOC, 1938a, p. 10; Vargas, 1995, vol. 2, p. 88).

Indeed, after the promulgation of decree-law 37, which, coming into effect on 3 December, banned all political organizations, Salgado acquiesced to the changing situation. Repeating earlier statements, in his reaction to the measure he noted that that the AIB would obey the law and pursue its cultural and social objectives (Ao, 8 Dec. 1937, p. 1). There was not even a hint in his declaration, let alone his acts, that he would resist the regime’s decision or encourage his followers to oppose it. As all political parties were dissolved, and the use of distinctive party symbols was prohibited, in his last formal act as Chefe Nacional of the AIB Salgado initiated the transformation of the movement which he had led for the last five years into the Associação Brasileira de Cultura (ABC) (Ao, 4 Dec. 1937, pp. 3, 5; 7 Dec. 1937, p. 1; 12 Dec. 1937, p. 1). For the German Embassy, the leadership of the Integralistas, and namely Salgado, had failed at a crucial moment. His ‘unmanly (wenig männliche) statement’ (PA AA, 1937c) was a clear sign of Integralismo’s
‘remarkable weakness’ in view of Vargas’s ‘stronger personality’ (PA AA, 1937b).

The Chefe Nacional’s lack of leadership in the weeks following the establishment of the New State certainly did not help to strengthen the interests of the AIB, nor did it boost the confidence of his faithful followers – maybe he really was, as Kurt Loewenstein observed, more of ‘a littérateur than […] a man of organizing abilities and leadership qualities’ (Loewenstein, 1942, p. 32, italics in the original). In fact, the Integralistas’ morale sharply declined as the hopes of gaining power, or at least some form influence in the regime, faded away. The day after the publication of the decree-law the paulista police reported that the militants of the Sigma in the city were ‘disorientated’ (AESP, 1937d).

As the full meaning of the effective dissolution of the movement sank in, the feeling of uncertainty became widespread amongst the rank and file, as Araújo Lima, at the time chief of Salgado’s cabinet, conceded in mid-December. His advice, directed at the increasingly despairing and doubting Integralistas, to have ‘confidence, perseverance, [and] patience’ demonstrates that disorientation was not a prerogative of the common Brazilian fascists (APERJ, 1937f); even leading figures seemed to have been helpless and overwhelmed by the new situation.

But then, whatever the shortcomings of Salgado as a leader might have been, his options were very limited in the face of the united front of Vargas and the armed forces. Apart from the unlikely scenario of an insurrection, it is difficult to see what he could have done against such formidable and committed opponents. Neither Vargas nor the military could accept an independent political force that had the potential to challenge the new balance of power and possibly unsettle their plans for Brazil (cf. McCann, 2004, p. 437). And they acted on the basis of this assumption. Without completely rejecting foreign policy considerations, particularly Vargas’s attempt to disperse fears of the United States that fascism had finally come to Latin America, which the German Embassy saw as the driving force behind the regime’s policies (PA AA, 1937c; 1938a; 1938b), the measures were essentially determined by internal factors. Useful as an ally in the run-up to the Estado Novo, the elimination of Integralismo was a necessary step in order to prevent the emergence of an independent political actor. It was ‘[f]or practical political reasons [that] Vargas could not allow the Integralistas to continue; they were a threat to his rule’ (McCann, 1969/70, p. 20). In the new order there was not ‘room for two masters’ (Camargo et al., 1989, p. 199).
From the Integralistas’ point of view, the decisive problem was that the penetration of the military proved shallow. Previous statements about the strong following amongst the officer corps of both the army and the navy, even though they may have been true before 10 November, did not result in active support of Salgado and the Integralistas after the political situation had changed. Particularly in the wake of the publication of the decree-law 37, which included a provision that prohibited members of the armed forces from joining transformed associations, i.e., the Brazilian Association for Culture, their support of Integralismo sharply declined. Later on Salgado told a confidant that he maintained personal contacts with ‘a little more than half a score (dezena)’ of army officers after 3 December (AN, 1938c). They were obviously not willing to threaten the institutional unity of the military, the pillar of the Estado Novo. Only Newton Cavalcanti, who criticized the decree-law in a letter to Dutra, was discharged from his commando by Vargas (APERJ, 1937e), and ten generals, who had also pronounced themselves against the measure, ‘were forced into retirement’ (Carvalho, 1982, p. 209).

Reports of the diplomatic representations of both Germany and Britain noted the hostile attitude of the armed forces’ high commandos towards the Brazilian fascists. As early as mid-November the German Embassy had stated that the ministers of the armed forces – the army and the navy – particularly resisted the inclusion of any Green-Shirt into the cabinet (PA AA, 1937a). A report by the British Embassy from the end of the month had also underlined the negative attitude of the military, pointing out that the Chief of Staff, General Góes Monteiro, like Campos, was ‘in favour of closing down the Integralists altogether’ (PRO, 1937e). Vargas did not yet bow to their demands, however. The regime only stepped up the repression of integralista activities. In early 1938 the police forces repeatedly clashed with dissatisfied Brazilian fascists, arrested militants of the Sigma, and seized some arms (AN, 1938a; 1938b; Silva, 1971, pp. 79-80). In Petrópolis, for instance, centres of the former AIB ‘were raided and closed as a result of police investigations, which, according to the press reports, showed that they continued to be utilized for Integralist meetings’ (PRO, 1938b). The administration gave the ‘utmost publicity’ to these incidents, in an attempt ‘to convey the impression that the present regime stands as a bulwark against extremism’ (PRO, 1938a).

Since, at the same time, the authorities did not take any measures that aimed at the complete dissolution of the AIB – something it would have been capable of, as its action against the National Liberation Al-
liance in 1935 suggested –, it seems that Vargas wanted to keep the way open for an agreement. Negotiations between the former allies certainly dragged on behind the scenes for some time (Dulles, 1967, p. 179; FGV-CPDOC, 1938b; APERJ, 1938a). One can only surmise that both parties still assumed that they could reach some kind of settlement, albeit for very different reasons. While Vargas may have hoped to enlist the leader of the by then illegal integralista movement – the transformation of the AIB into the ABC was never formally approved – and thereby achieve his goal of weakening Salgado on the one hand, and strengthening the support of his regime on the other, the Chefe Nacional’s intention are more difficult to understand. Did he hope to secure an institutional role for his group in the new regime? In view of the Integralistas’ treatment after November 1937 this possibility seemed rather slim, even in retrospect. And since the Câmara dos Quarenta rejected Salgado’s joining of the government as minister of education at the end of January, a post he had accepted during a meeting with Campos in late November (Vargas, 1995, vol. 2, pp. 88-89), his room for manoeuvre was very limited indeed.

Whatever the (mutually exclusive) motives of the two men might have been, the talks finally broke down when the police uncovered an insurrectionist plan of Integralistas in March 1938 before it could be executed. The government cracked down on the remnants of the AIB and ordered the closure of A Offensiva. Almost six years after its foundation, and after 741 issues, the main organ of the movement, which after the establishment of the New State had intensified its anti-Semitic attacks (cf. AO, 29 Jan. 1938, p. 1; 30 Jan. 1938, p. 1; 1 March 1938, pp. 1, 4) and, not least because of the strict censure of news about national politics, had markedly increased its coverage of international news, especially the Third Reich (cf. AO, 12 Jan. 1938, p. 1; 21 Jan. 1938, pp. 1-2), finally disappeared from the news stands. The closure of A Offensiva signalled the last nail in the coffin of Integralismo. The movement lost its main means to disseminate its messages and inform the faithful about the activities of Salgado, who the integralista organ, presumably because of the censorship, had simply addressed as ‘Senhor Plinio Salgado’ after 3 December 1937, and no longer as National Leader (cf. AO, 4 Dec. 1938).

Two months later the regime was taken by surprise. A small group of Integralistas, led by Belmiro Valverde and Severino Fournier and supported by other opponents of the Estado Novo, staged a coup, subsequently known as the intentona integralista (cf. Silva, 1971, pp. 66-80; Carneiro, 1992; Contreras, 1994). Badly organized and basically
limited to Rio de Janeiro, this last desperate attempt to seize power failed within hours on the night of 10 May. Rumours were circulating ‘that the plot was assisted by, if not engineered from, Germany’ (PR, 1938c); Vargas fuelled the speculation, which reflected the growing tensions between the New State and Germany because of the nationalist policies of the Brazilian regime aimed at the Teuto-Brazilians in southern Brazil (Harms-Baltzer, 1970, pp. 43-144), by claiming that the insurrectionists “were compromising with foreign support, the very sovereignty of Brazil” (as quoted in PR, 1938c). After a few days of hesitation, and only due to the consistent intervention on the part of the German Ambassador, Karl Ritter, who denied ‘the truth of the accusation, pointing, incidentally, in refutation to the very inefficient manner in which the movement was carried out’ (PR, 1938c), the regime publicly declared that they were unfounded (PA AA, 1938c), as indeed they were (Müller, 1997, pp. 240-241).

Salgado’s role in the event is not entirely clear. Although defendants mentioned conspiratorial meetings at his residence after the establishment of the Estado Novo during the course of a trial before the Tribunal de Segurança Nacional, the court concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to charge him (AN, 1938f). The TSN followed Valverde, who during his interrogations had assumed full responsibility for the failed putsch and repeatedly stated that Salgado had not been involved in its preparations, because he allegedly opposed armed revolts (AN, 1938d). Nevertheless, one can assume that Salgado was the intellectual father of the *intentona integralista* (Silva, 1971, p. 130). Given the history of the Integralistas and the Chefe Nacional’s repeated defence of violent acts on the part of his followers, the statement of the former treasurer of the AIB were not entirely plausible. Valverde, it seems, wanted to protect his Chefe, their earlier confrontation about the collaboration with Vargas in the run-up to the New State notwithstanding. Only after the Second World War had ended he would change his position, identifying Salgado as the mastermind behind the failed coup attempt (Szvarça and Cidade, 1989, p. 201).

Barroso, on the other hand, contrary to his protestations and in spite of his unanimous acquittal by the TSN (AN, 1938e), had played an active role in the coup preparations. Unknown at the time, the former leader of the integralista militia and ardent anti-Semite had approached the representative of the German news agency, Kurt Barwich, on the eve of the rebellion. Barroso, Barwich told the German Ambassador a few weeks after the failed putsch, had asked for German arms for the Integralistas should one of their men become minister of naval affairs
Cool-headed and calculating as he was, the director of National Historical Museum, who was suspended from his post during the investigations (which lasted from mid-May to mid-August), subsequently asked the minister of education and health, Gustavo Capanema, for the retroactive payment of his salary (MHM, 1938). It is not known if he received the salary in question, but he certainly continued his work as director of the museum (cf. Williams, 2000, pp. 136-150).

At the time of the failed putsch, ‘the only internal political challenge that Vargas would face until 1945’ (Hilton, 1975, p. 174), Integralismo had ceased to exist as an organized political protagonist, and the events further contributed to its demise. Former Green-Shirts were persecuted and a considerable number imprisoned because of their involvement in the intentona integralista. As one of the leaders of the insurrection, Valverde, for instance, was sentenced to ten years in prison, only being released in April 1945 as part of a general amnesty decreed by Vargas (APERJ, n.d., d). During the remainder of the Estado Novo former adherents of the Sigma were only able to set up small cultural and sporting associations, such as Cruzada Juvenil da Bôa Imprensa and Apolo Esporte Clube. Closely observed by the police, these clubs and organizations remained insignificant, restricted to Brazilian fascists who attempted to preserve the spirit of the AIB of old by commemorating and re-enacting its holidays and rituals. Cruzada Juvenil even adopted an old march of Integralismo ‘Ergue-te Mocidade’ as its hymn (APERJ, 1941), but to no avail. Integralismo was a thing of the past.

The former Integralistas still adored their Chefe Nacional, however, who was forced into exile in June 1939, after having briefly been arrested twice earlier that year. From Lisbon, where he stayed until 1946, Salgado maintained contacts with close collaborators, especially Barroso as well as Raimundo Padilha, a former member of the Supremo Conselho Integralista and provincial leader of the AIB in Rio de Janeiro who also acted as the provisional leader of the movement during his forced absence. While Salgado repeatedly expressed his support for the Estado Novo during these years (FGV-CPDOC, 1941), and nothing came out of efforts to win him over for a propaganda campaign orchestrated by the Third Reich (PA AA, 1943a; 1943b), at the same time he did have close ties with Nazi Germany. Driven by ideological affinities between Integralismo and Nazism and believing, as so many others did during the first stages of the war, that the Axis would be victorious, Salgado reported on developments in Brazil (Hilton, 1981, pp. 273-274). Just like many ordinary Integralistas back in Brazil, who were motivated
by ‘a special grudge against the regime’ because of the suppression of the AIB after establishment of the authoritarian Estado Novo and the admiration of ‘the strong regimes in Italy and Germany’, Salgado, who denied these contacts (FGV-CPDOC, 1943), worked against his own country (Hilton, 1981, p. 87).
After the return from his exile Portugal in August 1946, Salgado once again became directly involved in Brazilian politics. The former National Leader of the AIB immediately joined the Partido de Representação Popular (PRP), a party that had been established under his spiritual guidance by former Integralistas one year earlier; he assumed its official leadership only a few weeks after his homecoming, during the second congress of the PRP in October 1946. Enjoying the same veneration and adulation he had received from his followers as the leader of Integralismo during the 1930s, and effectively taking all political decisions single-handedly, the former collaborator of the Third Reich, who ‘would never stand trial for that offence’ (Hilton, 1981, p. 279), remained the party’s undisputed National President until its end in 1965 (Calil, 2001, pp. 159-167), one year after the military had assumed power and ordered the dissolution of all parties. In so far as the dominant role of Salgado was concerned not much had changed since the heydays of the integralista movement.

The same can be said about Salgado’s, and consequently the PRP’s, emphasis on nationalism, the central role of municipalities in the political system, spiritualism and Christianity, as well as anti-communism; these were elements that had figured prominently in the propaganda and programme of pre-war Integralismo (Calil, 2001, pp. 213-252, 283-343). Yet, some crucial differences to the 1930s have to be noted, too. These changes, which reflected the necessity to come to terms with the new national and international situations, concerned the fascist and
anti-democratic nature of Integralismo. After 1945, claims that fascism was the force of the future were incredible, and the identification with the Third Reich, decisively defeated in the Second World War and found guilty of monstrous crimes, held no appeal. On the other hand, democracy had just returned to Brazil. Consequently, Salgado and his followers attempted to distance him, and the movement he had led, from the past. Indeed, the former admirer of the Third Reich and wartime collaborator even sought to portray himself as the leader of a faction that had opposed Nazism, passing over positive comments and referring only to critical statements in his pre-war integralista publications. In the same vein, he described the AIB militia as an exclusively anti-communist force, and the intontona integralista as a democratic movement that, supported by liberal opponents of Vargas and the Estado Novo, had simply aimed at the restoration of the Constitution of 1934 (Calil, 2001, pp. 104-114, 121). While these attempts were not particularly convincing, the PRP, was more democratic than the AIB.

Contrary to its name, the new party was never particularly popular, though; it remained a small organization at the fringe of the political system. Until its dissolution, the PRP rarely obtained more than five per cent of the votes at the ballot box (Brandi and Soares, 1984, p. 3059). Even Salgado conceded that he could not induce all former integralista militants to join the PRP. While the majority of the AIB’s former provincial leaders stayed at his side, for instance Raimundo Padilha (Rio de Janeiro), Joaquim de Araújo Lima (Bahia), and Olbiano de Melo (Minas Gerais) (Calil, 2001, p. 100), the two most prominent national figures of Integralismo besides Salgado, Gustavo Barroso and Miguel Reale, did not take that step. Barroso, who after 1945 mainly focused on his work at the National Historical Museum, became a member of the Partido Trabalhista Nacional (Kaminski, 2000, p. 61, n. 17). Reale, who initially took the same decision but subsequently joined the Partido Social Progressista of Adhemar de Barros, emerged, moreover, as an outspoken opponent of Integralismo’s re-articulation, claiming that his first-hand experience of Mussolini’s Italy during a visit in 1938 had convinced him of the undesirability of corporatism (Calil, 2001, pp. 96-99).

While in the presidential elections of December 1945, which had been necessary because of Vargas’s forced resignation from the presidency (cf. Hilton, 1987), the PRP had supported the victorious candidacy of General Dutra, minister of war under the New State, and five years later unsuccessfully opposed Vargas’s return to power, in 1955 the party finally nominated the former Chefe Nacional as its
candidate. Salgado obtained more than 700,000 votes (or eight per cent) nationwide, and almost forty per cent in Curitiba, the capital of Paraná (Szvarcza and Cidade, 1989, pp. 182, 203). With his noteworthy success he decisively contributed to the victory of Juscelino Kubitschek and João Goulart over Adhemar de Barros (Brandi and Soares, 1984, pp. 3059-3060). In accordance with his deeply held anti-communist beliefs, Salgado subsequently supported the military coup of 1964, voted for General Humberto Castelo Branco in congress (to which he belonged as a deputy for Paraná since 1958), and joined the official government party Aliança Renovadora Nacional. Until his retirement from parliament in 1974, one year before his death, he was an outspoken defender of the military regime and its repressive policies.

In recent years admirers of Salgado and the pre-war integralista movement have discovered the virtual world of the Internet. Through various websites they attempt to preserve the memory of the National Leader and his oeuvre and provide a platform for the dispersed groups of likeminded people around the country. Occasionally, they even meet in centres named after the late leader of the Brazilian fascists, and in January 2001 they launched a manifesto that relatives of Salgado, for instance Maria Amélia Salgado Loureiro, a daughter, and Genésio Pereira Filho, a nephew, had endorsed. Based on the scant number of people accessing these pages, the even smaller number of people attending the public meetings as well as the fact that some of these pages have disappeared without leaving any traces, the situation, let alone the future, of the followers of the Sigma in Brazil seem bleak. But then, whatever the shortcomings of this latest generation of Integralistas may be, Brazilian fascism has died a long time ago.
The AIB was a fascist movement. Throughout its brief existence Integralismo proclaimed its faith in national regeneration and the need to establish a new revolutionary order. First on the basis of force and once the political conditions had changed with the Law of National Security through the formal adherence to democratic procedures the AIB pursued its idea of establishing a fascist regime. The embrace of democracy was never more than a tactical concession. The strong emphasis on religion and the revival of traditional values in the integralista discourse and propaganda also have to be qualified. The religious aspect was certainly predominant in the final phase of its existence, but this should be primarily seen as an attempt to gain the institutional support of the Catholic Church and thereby strengthen Salgado’s faltering presidential candidacy as well as his position vis-à-vis Vargas. Equally, the faith in the superiority of agriculture and a corporatist regime, the latter more important than the former, does not necessarily transform it into a conservative force (cf. Chauí, 1978, pp. 44-45; 1986, pp. 27-29, 36). Rather, as Araújo has pointed out, the conservative themes help to explain its progress, especially after the intentona comunista had thoroughly frightened Brazil’s middle class (Araújo, 1988b, pp. 107-108).

Doubts about the official number of its following are certainly justified; the more than one million followers of the Sigma Salgado...
claimed on the eve of the Estado Novo seem inflated. Still, there is
good reason to believe that at its peak the AIB had more than 200,000
militants, and that it can be described as a mass movement. Up to
eight hundred thousand Brazilians followed its message of national
regeneration. Whatever justified reservations one may have against
the ideology and the objectives of the Brazilian fascists, and there are
certainly many, given the country’s vast territory and poor infrastruc-
ture as well as the AIB’s brief existence, one has to accept that this was
no small achievement. Moreover, after the dissolution of the National
Liberation Alliance of Luís Carlos Prestes in mid-1935 the AIB was
the only party with a national projection. In a country still ruled by
regional parties and dominated by personalistic politics the Brazilian
fascists offered an alternative, if only a misguided one. Indeed, the AIB
belies claims that no modern mass party existed in Brazil prior to 1945
(Mainwaring, 1999, p. 65).

Notwithstanding the accusations voiced by its opponents, as well
as some scholars later on, the Integralistas were not the prolonged
arm of the European dictatorships. The Third Reich, the regime that
attracted the interest of contemporary politicians and observers, never
supported it financially. Nor did it manage to exert influence over its
activities, let alone control it. The collaboration between the Brazilian
and the German fascists at the local level was, moreover, a temporary
phenomenon. The irreconcilable ideas concerning the future of the
Teuto-Brazilian communities amounted to an obstacle that could not
be overcome. Officials of the Third Reich as well as German and Teuto-
Brazilian observers viewed the Integralistas relatively strong support
amongst the German-Brazilian youths of southern Brazil, especially
Santa Catarina and to a lesser extent Rio Grande do Sul, with consider-
able apprehension. If the AIB had assumed power, this question would
have led to an insurmountable confrontation between an integralista
Brazil and the National Socialist Germany. Given its orientation, one
may assume that an integralista Brazil would have pursued the same
nationalist policies the Estado Novo effectively implemented after
November 1937.

Nor did the Integralistas simply imitate European fascism. The
influences were undeniable, as particularly the rallies, trappings, and
uniforms demonstrated; the idea of a corporatist regime as the basis of
the future political-economic order also followed European examples,
and Reale explicitly hailed the Carta del Lavoro of Fascist Italy as a role
model. Yet, the Brazilian fascists were firmly rooted in their national
traditions, too. Particularly the concept of brasilidade and the aim to
integrate the immigrant communities into the Brazilian nation, not least the Teuto-Brazilians of southern Brazil, belies any claim that the Integralistas were blind followers of foreign ideas. That they attempted to carry out their dreams of national regeneration and future greatness through fascism proved to be problematic, however. Like any other fascist movement outside Italy and Germany in the 1930s, the AIB was invariably caught in a net of contradictions it could hardly break.

The integralista ideology was, contrary to the assertions of leading members who consistently stressed its intellectual superiority and presented it as the solution to all the nation’s problems, theoretically poor. The Integralistas did not develop a logical line of reasoning and, based on that, present intellectually convincing conclusions. Brazil’s dependency on coffee was, tellingly enough, never an issue for the self-declared saviours of the nation, nor did they emphasize industrialization. Yet, at the same time, this apparent weakness of Integralismo was in fact its greatest strength. By reducing complex political, economic, and social questions to simple terms and a few popular concepts of an enemy – abstract ones, like liberalism and communism, or seemingly real ones, like Jews –, the Integralistas were able to channel sentiments and stimulate actions (Chauí, 1978, pp. 33-39; Bertonha, 1992, pp. 100-101).

After all, appealing to sentiments, emotions, and prejudices was, and is, a more effective tool of mobilization than rational and intellectual expositions. Brazil and the AIB were no exceptions to that rule.

The relatively easy destruction of the AIB after the proclamation of the authoritarian New State in November 1937, and its subsequent failure seriously to challenge the regime of President Vargas, was due to a combination of two factors. Salgado’s indecisive leadership after 10 November, and especially after the de facto ban of the AIB in early December, did not help. But it was above all its inability sufficiently to penetrate the armed forces and, to a lesser extent, the Catholic Church that explain Vargas’s success. While accepting the Chefe Nacional’s movement as a welcome ally in the struggle against the threat from the left, more imagined and fabricated than real after the failed communist insurrection of November 1935, it was above all the military that was unwilling to tolerate an organization that could have potentially challenged its dominant position under the Estado Novo.

In the end, the integralista movement’s quest for a fascist order had failed long before Salgado started the secret negotiations with the representatives of Vargas and the president himself about the role of his Integralistas in the New State. In spite of statements to the contrary, they never had any real chance of assuming power (Silva and Calil,
2000, p. 12; Calil, 2001, p. 15). As a matter of fact, their project was doomed with the *intentona comunista*, once Vargas, supported by the military high commands, began to conspire against Brazil’s fragile democracy. The event strengthened Integralismo’s appeal, but it also provided Vargas with the convenient excuse to take steps that increasingly limited the political space of all political actors, the Brazilian fascists included, and finally led to the establishment of the New State. Like its opponents on the left, they became, thus, victims of the country’s weak democratic culture and the commitment of Vargas and the military to pursue their own aspirations of a new order. Given the two alternatives, undesirable as both were, the Estado Novo was, however, still the better solution.
Strictly speaking, of course, the 1930s only began in 1931 and therefore neither the ‘Old Republic’ nor the Constitution of 1891 should be included in this account. Since normally, if erroneously, 1930 is seen as the start of the new decennium (and not as the least year of the 1920s), I decided to follow this convention however.

Hentschke (1996, pp. 196-201), following Saes (1985, pp. 70-75), emphasises that the tenentes were not a heterogeneous movement. There were three currents. The most important and influential one, which ‘left its mark on tenentismo’, was the ‘national-revolutionary’ current led by, inter alia, Juárez Távora (Hentschke, 1996, p. 198, italics in the original; see also Saes, 1996, p. 489). I have this current in mind when talking about tenentismo.

This is a slightly updated version of his doctoral dissertation, which he submitted in Paris in 1971. Difel in Säo Paulo published a Portuguese translation under the title Integralismo, o fascismo brasileiro na década de 30 in 1974 (Trindade, 1974).

For the ongoing debate about this new fascist consensus, see Griffin (2002) and Payne (2000), as well as Roberts, De Grand, Antliff, and Linehan (2002).

The Legião do Cruzeiro do Sul, an organization founded in mid-1921 in Rio de Janeiro which is generally considered the first such faction in the country’s history, bore all the hallmarks of a traditional counterrevolutionary force. Emerging in response to labour unrest in the early post-war years, the social basis of Cravo Vermelho, the new name of the group after its merger with another organization soon after its establishment, was mainly made up of police officers and soldiers. Supported and protected by the state authorities, it was employed as a shock-troop against the rising tide of working class protesters in the city (Dias, 1977, p. 110). The group, which disappeared as the labour militancy declined, remained an ephemeral phenomenon.

For a useful criticism of both Vasconcelos and Chasin, see Trindade (1996).

Following a Us official, who estimated in 1940 300,000 Argentine Nacionalistas, Deutsch (1991, p. 239) concludes that, in terms of percentage of the local population, the Argentine fascists ranked first. This figure, as Deutsch concedes, has to be treated with some caution. I would be even more careful. As I have argued elsewhere (Klein, 2001, p. 115), even the strongest and most significant Argentine nacionalista organization of the late 1930s and early 1940s, the Alianza de la Juventud Nacionalista, had probably not more than 11,000 members, suggesting that the Nacionalistas were considerably weaker than the Us official thought. In addition, I believe that the Atb had more than 200,000 members, as Deutsch (1999, p. 281) states.

In 1932, coffee accounted for almost 72 per cent of all Brazilian export revenues. See Hentschke, 1996, table 11, p. 649.

There was only one attempt on the part of the Integralistas to make coffee an issue, but even then their proposal did not strive for a reduction of coffee production, nor did it suggest ways to reduce the country’s dependency on it. Rather, the campaign ‘coffee for the people’, which the integralista organ A Offensiva run on its front-page for about one week in mid-March 1937, should be seen against the background of the Atb’s endeavours to increase its support and thereby strengthen the position of Salgado in the confrontation for the presidency. For a discussion of this point, see below, chapter 8.
Barroso had only returned to his work at the National History Museum at the end of 1932. Because of his support of Júlio Prestes in the presidential elections, the revolutionary government of Vargas had suspended him for almost two years from his position, from early December 1930 until mid-November 1932.

A similar memorandum in the Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo (AESP, n.d.), without indicating any year, states that dissident members of the Partido Socialista Brasileira joined the AIB, and not Italians of the Partido Fascista Brasileira. Based on the evidence presented by Bertonha, who demonstrates the significant support of young Italo-Brazilians for the integralista movement, the report in the Arquivo Público do Estado do Rio de Janeiro seems the more plausible one.

Broxson (1973, p. 58, n. 1) states that its adoption might have been due to its similarity with the greeting of the Italian Fascists, 'A Noi'.

According to the Resolution no. 316, dated 10 June 1937, which created the Quadro dos Veteranos do Sigma, the following persons participated in the march, Miguel Reale, Alpinolo Lopes Casale, Iraí Gayaara de Moura Costa, Antonio Figueiredo, Francisco Marcondes Carvalho, João Climaco do Sousa, Alvaro Klein, Angelo Simões de Arruda, Ulysses Paranhos, Italo Zacaro, Waldomiro Candido, Vicente Tumolo Neto, Antonio Petinelli, Teodósio Sabatini, Mario Demetrio Henrique, Orlando Barros, André Perfidio, Antonio Fortunato de Godoy, Germano Cavalieri, Felício Bruno, Francisco Perfidio, Achilles Stanizato, Jaime Pimentel, Pimentel Júnior, José Loureiro Júnior, Maria Amelia Salgado, Regina Reale, Ida Reale, Felicidade Reale, Eurico Guedes de Araújo, João Ferreira Fontes, Pompeu Salgado, Paulo Caserato, Miguel Juliani, and Miguel Dedei. In addition, 27 men are listed who belonged to the AIB at the time but did not take part in the march because they were not in São Paulo.

The proclamation was signed by the following representatives of the provincial organizations, A. Magalhães (Espírito Santo), Madeira de Freitas (Distrito Federal), Jeová Mota (Ceará), Milciades Ponciano Jaquiera (Bahia), Olbiano de Melo (Minas Gerais), Andrade Lima Filho (Pernambuco), Aurino de Sá Cavalcante (Amazonas), Jaime Feireira da Silva (Rio de Janeiro), João Vianna (Acre), Francisco de Paula Queiroz Ribeiro (Rio Grande do Norte), Eduardo Graziano (Maranhão), João Leães Sobrinho (Rio Grande do Sul), João Marcelino da Silva (Piauí), Ziegler de Paula Bueno (Paraíba), Loureiro Júnior (Pará), Pedro Melo (Mato Grosso), José Mayrink de Sousa Mota (Goiás), Joaquim Santos Maia (Santa Catarina), Francisco Stella (São Paulo), Antonio da Costa Gama (Sergipe), and Moacir Ferreira (Alagôas). The representative of Paraná is not identified. See Mi, 21 July 1937, pp. 9-10.

Only four days after the death of the ‘first hero of Integralismo’ in the state of São Paulo, who had sacrificed his life for a ‘new stage of history’ (AO, 11 Oct. 1934, pp. 1, 3), leftist militants had shot at participants of an integralista rally in the city of São Paulo, leading to the death of six persons (AO, 11 Oct. 1934, pp. 1, 5, 7). It was in his response to this ‘high point of the antifascists’ struggle against the Integralistas’ (Dulles, 1973, p. 518, n. 7) that Salgado had directly challenged the government and threatened to attack Vargas, as Romano subsequently stated in his memorandum.

Of the 148 parties that were founded between the ‘Revolution of 1930’ and the proclamation of the Estado Novo, only 28 did not have any references to a state or a region in their names. Indeed, almost all of these parties, which, on average, existed for just over three years, were restricted to one state. See Hentschke, 1996, p. 380, and table 46, p. 679.
The question of the Teuto-Brazilians’ support of the local organization of the NSDAP and their attitude towards the Third Reich is beyond the scope of this *Cuaderno*. For a useful discussion of this relationship, by no means as straightforward as contemporary observers asserted, see Müller, 1997, pp. 151-209.

There are only data for 1940 available. Of the approximately 645,000 Brazilians who used German as their main language around 177,000 lived in Santa Catarina and 394,000 in Rio Grande do Sul. See Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, *Recenseamento, 1940* (Rio de Janeiro, 1940), as quoted in Seitenfus, 1988, p. 275.


There was one only German diplomat who did not share this assessment, the consul-general in São Paulo. In a letter to a German magazine, which had published a critical article about the AIB, he wrote that ‘Integralismo shows a lot of sympathy for the new Germany. For the most part the integralista press […] supports Germany one hundred per cent.’ See PA AA, 1936c.

Schmidt-Elskop was the German Legate in Brazil and as of June 1936, after the diplomatic relations had been upgraded, the Third Reich’s first ambassador.

In a rare occasion of interest shown by German publications in the AIB (cf. Gertz, 1996), the latter consequently described Barroso’s *Brasil – Colonia de banqueiros*, in which he denounced a secretive Jewish plan to dominate the world and destroy Christian civilization through the combined onslaught of communism and capitalism (Barroso, 1934a), as a ‘masterpiece’ (Barroso, 1936, pp. 228-230).

At the same time, not even Barroso, certainly the most outspoken pro-Nazi Integralista and a man who was proud of his German mother, accepted the Third Reich’s claim on the Teuto-Brazilian communities, or their status as an ethnic minority (cf. Hunsche, 1938, pp. 89-90). During a visit to Germany in late 1940, much to the indignation of his German hosts, Barroso would not deviate from the nationalist positions of Integralismo concerning the German-Brazilians and the need to integrate them into the Brazilian nation (BA Koblenz, 1940).

Although it did not elaborate on these consequences, the Auswärtige Amt may have taken the decision in view of the increasingly important economic relations between Brazil and the Third Reich (cf. Hilton, 1975, p. 166). An official invitation might have undermined them.

Interestingly enough, in early January 1937 *A Offensiva* published a list of local branches that named only 1,363 centres. See Broxson, 1973, p. 196, n. 1.

The Partido Integralista Argentina, for instance, which nominated candidates in the city of Buenos Aires for the national elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 1936, only obtained 267 votes (or 0.01 per cent). cf. Canton, 1968, p. 115.

Industrialists and bankers from Minas Gerais officially bankrolled the publication and made the switch to a daily possible (PA AA, 1936a), although additional evidence suggests that two leading Integralistas, Belmiro de Lima Valverde, the national treasurer, and José Madeira de Freitas, the editor of the paper, also contributed to its financing by taking out personal loans (APERJ, 1935).
Because of the emphasis on quantity over quality, some members privately voiced their misgivings about this development. See FGV-CPDOC, 1936.

Yet, with the exception of one possible case, the anti-Semitism preached by the Brazilian fascists at least did not lead to physical violence against Jews or Jewish institutions. See Deutsch, 1999, p. 280.

Besides Barroso, the following men belonged to the institution, Everaldo Leite, Madeira de Freitas, Belmiro Valverde, Rodolfo Josetti, Miguel Reale, Jaime Ferreira da Silva, Jeová Mota, and Raimundo Padilha. cf. Ao, 21 June 1936, p. 9.

German diplomats also mentioned Góes Monteiro’s sympathies for fascism in general and the Third Reich and Fascist Italy in particular, and reported to Berlin rumours about his plans to establish a fascist regime. See PA AA, 1933; 1934a.

While there is no denying that Valverde had bought arms – he admitted that in a letter to Salgado (APERJ, 1937d) –, there are indeed no pieces of evidence that would prove an armed conspiracy on the part of the Integralistas against the state government of Bahia.


In 1945, by the way, Mota presented himself as a communist candidate for deputy and senator in Pará. See, APERJ, 1955.

But he, too, eventually returned to the fold, being promoted to Major General in March 1942. See APERJ, 1942.

After the war, during an interrogation conducted by the Office of Us Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, Karl Ritter provided another explanation for this suspicion. Ritter stated that on the night of the failed integralista coup a dinner took place in the home of three Germans that many of his compatriots attended. Just before midnight, a number of people from the Embassy as well as other people passed by the presidential palace. The traffic police made a note of the number plates, amongst them many ‘German numbers’. This coincidence, Ritter implied in his statement, caused the rumour. Although it completely omits the real reasons for the tensions between the two regimes, the statement is at least worth noting, if only as a footnote of history. See IRZ MUNICH, 1947.

Melo as well as Padilha subsequently broke with Salgado, however, Melo in 1948 and Padilha in 1955.

Cf. the homepage of the Centro de Estudos e Debates Integralistas, Estado do Paraná, at www.anauefoz.hpg.ig.com.br. This page is maintained by the Núcleo Integralista de Foz do Iguaçu.
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1930

1 March  Victory of Júlio Prestes over Getúlio Vargas in the Brazilian presidential elections.

16 April  Plínio Salgado leaves for Europe.

30 May  Vargas issues manifesto in which he denounces the ‘frauds and intimidations’ committed by electoral officials.

26 July  Assassination of Vargas’s vice presidential candidate, João Pessoa, in Paraíba.

3 October  Start of revolt against President Washington Luís in Rio Grande do Sul, Paraíba, Minas Gerais, and Pernambuco.

23 October  Revolutionary troops occupy the city of Rio de Janeiro.

24 October  Washington Luís resigns from Brazilian presidency.

27 October  Brazilian military junta warns of communist subversion.

3 November  Getúlio Vargas becomes head of provisional government.

11 November  Vargas signs decree that gives him full legislative authority, assuming the title of ‘Dictator of the Provisional Government of Brazil’.

8 December  Gustavo Barroso loses his position as director of the Museu Histórico Nacional in Rio de Janeiro in retribution for his support of Júlio Prestes.

25 December  Creation of ministry of work.

1931

19 January  Vargas orders arrest of Communists and seizure of their properties.

10 February  Government decree underlines that electoral laws have to be reviewed.

26 February  Legião de Outubro of Minas Gerais launches its manifesto.

4 March  Publication of manifesto of Legião Revolucionária of São Paulo.

4 May  On occasion of first meeting of electoral commission Vargas stresses that it is necessary to transform the state and expand its powers.

5 June  Salgado publishes first political note in São Paulo-based paper A Razão.

23 August  Severino Sombra sets up Legião Cearense do Trabalho.

25 September  First Congress of Legião Revolucionária of São Paulo.
1932


15 March  Vargas issues decree which sets 3 May 1933 as the date for elections to Constitutional Assembly.

25 April  Salgado takes part in the Salute to Rome, a ceremony organized by the Italian consulate in São Paulo.

6 May  Salgado proposes establishment of Acção Integralista Brasileira (AIB).

5-9 July  First National Convention of Club 3 de Outubro in Rio de Janeiro.

9 July  Start of Constitutionalist Revolution in São Paulo.

7 October  Salgado presents Manifesto de Outubro in São Paulo. AIB officially founded.

10 October  Constitutional Revolution defeated.

15 November  Constitutional Assembly starts deliberations in Rio de Janeiro.

18 November  Barroso again becomes director of Museu Histórico Nacional.

1933

1 January  Formation of Independent Electoral League by the Brazilian Federation for the Progress of Women to promote political education and present feminist candidates.

3 January  First public meeting of Integralistas.

10 January  Creation of the Delegacia Especial de Segurança Política e Social (DESPS).

23 April  First public march of Integralistas in São Paulo, led by Salgado.

28 April  Registration of AIB as ‘political party of national scope’ at Supreme Electoral Court.

3 May  Elections to Constitutional Assembly. On the platform of the Catholic Electoral League (LEC), Jeová Mota is the only Integralista elected to the assembly, and Carlotta Pereira de Queiroz of the ‘Single Slate for a United São Paulo’ is the only woman elected.

8 November  Constitutional Assembly begins its deliberations in Rio de Janeiro.

8 December  Salgado announces date for the first national congress of AIB.
1934

28 February
First National Congress of AIB in Vitória,

3 March
Espírito Santo.

1 March
Salgado proclaimed ‘eternal chief of integralista revolution’ by congress.

4 March
Publication of integralista statutes adopted in Vitória.

7 May
Final voting on new constitution begins in Constitutional Assembly.

17 May
First issue of A Offensiva, the national organ of the AIB, appears in Rio de Janeiro.

28 May
Vargas grants amnesty to those involved in Constitutionalist Revolution of 1932.

12 June
Establishment of integralista faction in Blumenau.

22 June
Ministry of war approves integralista uniform.

24 June
3,000 Integralistas take part in a march in São Paulo.

2 July
Parade of 400 Integralistas in Salvador, Bahia.

12 July
Armando Laydner, a classista deputy in Constitutional Assembly, submits proposal aiming at dissolution of militarized formations.

16 July
Promulgation of Constitution of 1934.

17 July
Vargas elected President.

4 August
Conference of Salgado and march-past of members of the integralista militia in Jaboticabal, state of São Paulo.

2 September
Parade of 1,000 Integralistas in Niterói, state of Rio de Janeiro.

4 September
Salgado and Miguel Reale start a propaganda tour through the states of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, and Paraná.

3 October
First integralista martyr in Bauru, state of São Paulo.

7 October
Leftist militants attack integralista march in São Paulo.

14 October
Jeová Mota is the only Integralista elected to the new Chamber of Deputies. João Carlos Fairbanks as well as Ubirajara Indio do Brasil and Carlos Benevides are elected to the state assemblies of São Paulo and Ceará, respectively.

17 November
Start of first three-day congress of provincial organization of the AIB of the state of Rio de Janeiro.
### 1935

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 January</td>
<td>First meeting of Supreme Council of AIB in Rio de Janeiro.</td>
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<td>10 January</td>
<td>Ministry of war bans members of the armed forces from joining AIB.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 January</td>
<td>Vargas submits project for Lei de Segurança Nacional to congress.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 February</td>
<td>Premiere of film <em>O Integralismo no Brasil</em>.</td>
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<td>7-10 March</td>
<td>Second National Congress of AIB in Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro.</td>
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<td>30 March</td>
<td>Foundation of Aliança Nacional Libertadora (ANL).</td>
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<td>4 April</td>
<td>Promulgation of national security law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 April</td>
<td>Official dissolution of integralista militia and establishment of National Secretariat of Moral and Physical Education, with Barroso remaining head of organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 March</td>
<td>Statement by Council of the Naval Staff describes the integralista movement as undemocratic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 June</td>
<td>Confrontation between militants of AIB and ANL.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June</td>
<td>Salgado exonerates members of armed forces from swearing the integralista oath.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-12 July</td>
<td>First integralista congress of the province of Guanabara (city of Rio de Janeiro).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 July</td>
<td>Publication of ANL programme. Luís Carlos Prestes, de facto leader of the National Liberation Alliance, underlines necessity to establish a ‘revolutionary national popular government’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July</td>
<td>Dissolution of ANL by government decree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July</td>
<td>Government of Santa Catarina dismisses all Integralistas from public service.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 October</td>
<td>Integralista congress in Blumenau.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 October</td>
<td>First Congress of AIB of Province of Rio Grande do Sul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-9 November</td>
<td>Integralista congress in Bahia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 November</td>
<td>Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approves constitutional reforms curtailing civil rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-4 November</td>
<td><em>Intentona comunista.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 November</td>
<td>Declaration of state of war in Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 December</td>
<td>Registration of ANL as political organization is cancelled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 January</td>
<td>Vicente Rao, minister of justice, announces establishment of commission against anticommunist activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 January</td>
<td>Publication of <em>Manifesto-Programma</em> of AIB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 February</td>
<td>Salgado attacks Hitler’s ‘pagan nationalism’ in <em>A Offensiva</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March</td>
<td>In local elections in Santa Catarina, AIB wins in eight of the 42 municipalities of the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 March</td>
<td>Arrest of Prestes and his pregnant wife, Olga Benario, in Rio de Janeiro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 March</td>
<td>Vargas declares state of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April</td>
<td>Salgado expresses his support of Vargas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April</td>
<td>Salgado removes Gustavo Barroso and Miguel Reale from their posts as national secretaries of Moral and Physical Education and Doctrine, respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April</td>
<td>Salgado announces restructuring of AIB. Filinto Müller, police chief of the federal district, underlines status of AIB as legally registered party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 September</td>
<td>Juraci Magalhães, governor of Bahia, orders the arrest of the provincial leadership of the integralista movement and its complete closure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September</td>
<td>Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approves establishment of Tribunal de Segurança Nacional (TSN).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 September</td>
<td>Foundation of TSN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 October</td>
<td>First issue of integralista daily <em>Ação</em> appears in São Paulo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-15 October</td>
<td>Meeting of Court of Sigma in Rio Grande do Sul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 October</td>
<td>Congresso Parlamentar das Províncias Meridionais of AIB.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 November</td>
<td>Salgado announces date for Convenção Syndical Integralista.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 December</td>
<td>First Syndicalist Congress of AIB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 January</td>
<td>Minister of the interior, Agamemnon Magalhães, describes AIB as a democratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 February</td>
<td>Salgado dismisses all members of Supremo Conselho Integralista.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April</td>
<td>Miguel Reale again named Secretario Nacional de Doutrina e Estudos.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 April</td>
<td>Barroso again named Secretario Nacional do Educação Moral, Cívica e Physica.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 May</td>
<td>Integralistas celebrate Labour Day at the national level for the first time.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1-3 May</td>
<td>First Workers' Congress of AIB in São Paulo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May</td>
<td>TSN gives Prestes a prison sentence of 16 years and six months for his role in the <em>intentona comunista</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>Salgado named presidential candidate of AIB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 June</td>
<td>Salgado names members of Câmara dos Quatrocentos, the future corporatist chamber of the integralista state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 June</td>
<td>Jeová Mota, the only federal deputy of the AIB, leaves party in protest.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 June</td>
<td>Salgado officially nominated as integralista candidate for the presidential elections, scheduled for 3 January 1938.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 June</td>
<td>Vargas receives integralista delegation led by Joaquim de Araújo Lima.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 July</td>
<td>Failed assassination attempt against Salgado in São Paulo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 August</td>
<td>Salgado makes radio-speech <em>O comunismo contra o Brasil</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August</td>
<td>Attack on integralista rally in Campos ends with at least eleven casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 August</td>
<td>Establishment of Directoria Nacional de Organização Rural of the AIB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September</td>
<td>Brazilian Bishops publish pastoral letter against Communism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 September</td>
<td>General Eurico Dutra, minister of war, denounces Communist plot revealed in forged <em>Plano Cohen</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 October</td>
<td>Brazilian congress approves suspension of constitutional rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 October</td>
<td>Vargas establishes committee to administer state of war.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 October</td>
<td>Flores da Cunha, governor of Rio Grande do Sul, resigns and leaves for Uruguay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 October</td>
<td>Federal intervention in Rio Grande do Sul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 November</td>
<td>Integralista parade in front of Vargas in Rio de Janeiro. Salgado expresses his support of Vargas and armed forces in radio speech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November</td>
<td>José Carlos de Macedo Soares, the minister of justice, resigns, and Francisco Campos assumes his post.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 November</td>
<td>Establishment of Estado Novo.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 December</td>
<td>General Newton Cavalcanti, commander of Vila Militar, resigns in protest to dissolution of AIB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 December</td>
<td>Decree-law 37 dissolves all political parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 December</td>
<td>Transformation of AIB into Associação Brasileira de Cultura.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 December</td>
<td>Speech of Vargas about New State.</td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>1938</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>17 January</td>
<td>Violent confrontation between Integralistas and police in Campo Grande, a suburb of Rio de Janeiro.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 January</td>
<td>Open letter of Salgado to Vargas in which he outlines the secret talks between him and representatives of the president in the run-up to the Estado Novo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February</td>
<td>Brazilian regime bans newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasts in foreign languages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 February</td>
<td>Police raids two integralista centres in Petrópolis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 March</td>
<td>Osvaldo Aranha becomes Brazilian minister of foreign affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 March</td>
<td>Failed integralista insurrection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 March</td>
<td>Salgado claims that he can no longer control Integralistas because of internal fission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 March</td>
<td>Last issue of <em>A Offensiva</em> appears.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 April</td>
<td>Nationalization of foreign schools in Rio Grande do Sul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April</td>
<td>Nationalization of oil and gas reserves in Brazil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May</td>
<td>Integralista-led coup (<em>intentona integralista</em>) fails.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 May</td>
<td>Imprisonment of Gustavo Barroso.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May</td>
<td>Barroso is suspended from his post as director of the National Historical Museum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May</td>
<td>Vargas regime, under pressure from Third Reich, states it has no proof of German involvement in failed coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August</td>
<td>TSN absolves Barroso.</td>
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