The strongest cause of the feeling of nationality...is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and a consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incident in the past.

John Stuart Mill

Beginning in the 1980s, leading scholars in a variety of disciplines returned to the study of nationalism and identity in general (Calhoun 1993, Comaroff and Stern 1994). The new work marked a transition in how nationalism was perceived. While some holdouts still argue for the primacy of a common ethnicity or nation, the inventors and imaginers of nationhood have largely won the intellectual argument (Smith 1986, Gellner 1985, Hobsbawm 1991, Anderson 1991, Breuilly 1994). The focus is no longer on how peoples unite themselves, but how states invent nations.

This new literature, while a corrective on the old essentialism, may have gone too far in its social-constructivism. The new perspective tends to assume historical malleability and state agency; traditions can be invented and states that wish to can do so. Work on nationalism largely ignores a very prominent exception to the global pattern of nationalism. This paper analyses the relationship between history and nationalism in Latin America. It defines and explains the development of a national collective memory in eleven Latin American countries through the examination of public statuary, street names, postage stamps, and currencies.

The national iconographies in Latin America make clear how much state efforts to create nationalism rely on history, the mythic raw material with which to construct communities. Emphasizing history does not mean a return to determinism or the supremacy of national character. History is malleable and partly the creature of power. Traditions are invented. But never completely. Nationalism, much like culture, is situationally grounded (Fine 1979). States and their elites are embedded in the societies from which they rise and they can only use those iconographic resources available to them. Each state might try to create its own myths and each elite its own genealogies, but because there are different histories, there will be different nationalisms. States may make their own history, but not entirely as they please.

The Latin American cases contribute to our awareness of the critical importance of historical conjecture. They indicate that nationalism, as normally un-
understood, is not an inherent property of all nation-states and that its progress through the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries in Europe and North America may have had more to do with the history of those regions than with the process of statemaking itself. Following a general discussion of nationalism in Latin America, I proceed to discuss the role of monuments in the construction of national memory. I then describe the general iconographic pattern in Latin America, followed by a detailed discussion of particular cases. I conclude with an explanation for both the general Latin American exceptionalism and the differences within the continent.

**Nationalism and Patriotism in Latin America**

Let us form a patria at any cost and everything else will be tolerable.

Simón Bolívar

State nationalism is characterized by the domination by a single political institution over a territory containing a population who claims to share an essential identity. It assumes that the nation is a ‘materially and morally integrated society’ characterized by the ‘moral, mental, and cultural unity of its inhabitants’. I wish to argue that few mid-twentieth century Latin American countries would meet such criteria. With some significant exceptions, the continent’s different identities have remained divided by layers separating classes and ethnic groups and do not appear to have developed the more ‘modern’ layers dividing nations. The institutional bases of the nation-state never matched the cultural legitimating myths of the societies. Political rule was expressed territorially, but society and culture were both integrated and divided on different planes.

How do we account for this continental anomaly and how do we explain the exceptions? Three crucial characteristics helped define the general weakness of official state nationalism in Latin America. First, there are the ethnic and racial divisions which dominate most societies on the continent and which have limited the development of pan-historical legends and ethnic identifications. The second is the absence of clearly identified external ‘others’ that can be used to strengthen a sense of common identity; the past provided few opportunities with which to concoct a glorious heritage. Third, while much of recent literature on nationalism assumes that all states will seek to integrate their populations and link them to political institutions, this has rarely been the case in Latin America. The rule on the continent was that the masses were ‘organized, recruited, manipulated, but not politicized or included in the nation’ (Lynch 1984, p. 202). This is not to deny the existence of divisions within the elites (e.g. between Liberal and Conservative versions of la nación in the nineteenth century) or the presence of indigenista movements, but to note the general failure to include the masses in political institutions on a permanent basis.

The most important factor to keep in mind is the incongruity of territory and ethnicity within the continent. While Europe had geographically defined potential ethnicities over which a new pattern of borders had been overlaid, in Latin America such regional distinctions were largely destroyed by the Con-
What the Independence movement produced were not states overlapping distinctive groups, but states encompassing societies whose internal ethnic differences were greater than those between the various ‘nations’ they sought to represent. The gulf between white, black, and Indian within the countries was always greater than the differences between any of these groups across borders. If we think of Latin America as having four ‘nations’ at the time of independence: Spanish, Creole, Indian, and black, the first two were often united in their opposition to the last (Minguet 1973). The presence of these varied ethnic groups necessarily blurred the boundaries of any imagined community (Dodds 1993). While there may have been deep differences between an Italian meat-packer of Buenos Aires, an Aymara miner in Bolivia, and a black farmer in Brazil, their respective superiors shared a considerable heritage and ideology. Since these elites were in charge of the state, there was little chance for the real differences to find official confirmation and support. Without the competition between languages (and the states representing them), without the struggle between different elite cultures, there was no impetus for the subsequent conflict between political claims over territory.10 Perhaps most importantly, until well into the twentieth century for most cases, official, state nationalism ignored the non-European masses. It was purely an elite, white phenomenon (Thurner 1995). When subaltern populations sought to create their own version of the nation, they were often crushed by the state.11 The attachments made were either to the specific geographical region or to members of the same racial group, or even to all the countries sharing a history and a common threat. But these did not represent nationalism as understood in the European sense. Despite the differences between the various countries, one could argue that until relatively recently there was no such thing as a national culture in Latin America (Bermúdez).12

A second major factor helping to explain the Latin American pattern is the simple difference in historical narrative. If cultural identity is based on collective remembering (Gillis 1994, p. 2), there has to be narrative to recall. Latin American states did not possess the historical capital necessary to construct national identities as found in Europe. War would have provided an ideal iconographic solution (Smith 1981). Bolivar was well aware of war’s symbolic power. He considered allowing Peru to remain loyalist ‘so as to provide Colombia with “fearsome neighbors” to concentrate its mind’ (Collier 1983, p. 60). War would have served to forge a sense of commonality while at the same time helping to construct an ever threatening ‘other’ against which the nation needed to stand united.

Yet, with some limited exceptions (e.g. in the 1860s and 1870s) Latin American countries did not have the types of military experiences that formed so much of the basis of national allegiance in other countries, including the United States. Without threats and dangers emanating from neighboring institutions, the sense of distinctiveness which is at the heart of nationalism failed to develop. These moments of shared sacrifice might have provided a new basis for collective identification, a bridge with which to cross the racial gulfs. Latin America has no symbolic equivalents to the Hollywood war movie in which representatives of different ethnic groups meet and discover their common humanity and shared loyalties. The countries of the continent lacked the kind of heroic legends, the great exploits, and glittering conquests that are the raw
material of national mythology (Silver 1961). History created a particular form of national culture that in turn helped create a very different kind of narrative.

Thus, given the ethnic rifts and the absence of easily appropriated history, much more than in the European cases, identity and national consciousness had to be created after political boundaries had been drawn. States had to create the icons and liturgies that would support the ‘cultural revolution’ creating a nation (Corrigan and Seyer 1985). They largely failed. More significantly, they barely tried. Nationalism, whether democratic or totalitarian, implies state encouragement of the active participation of subjects. It may be nothing more than parade fodder, but the populace is integrated into liturgies requiring participation. Nationalism thus implies the mobilization of the masses. Yet, Latin American history is characterized by the political marginalization of significant parts of the population.

Given the prerogatives from the colonial era, the last thing on the minds of the dominant nineteenth-century elites was the inclusion and integration of the masses. The caudillos of independence were not interested in forming the kind of cultural or symbolic links associated with nationalism, but devoted their attention to expanding their patronage networks (Lynch 1984). The victory of Liberalism deprived nationalism of a political base as a secular state religion. Liberals disdained such particularisms while the defeated Conservatives refused to organize the masses.\(^1\) In the late nineteenth century efforts to create a nation were largely directed at new European immigrants. The same could be said of the U.S., but the demographic significance of the excluded was larger in Latin America, as was the weight of caste-like inequalities.

In the twentieth century, Latin America has not experienced the kind of political regime in which popular mobilization is paramount. The few democracies that have survived have often done so through the assurance of elite control. That is, the integration of a nation of citizens has rarely been a goal. On the other hand, we certainly have no examples of the mass organization and ideology associated with fascism (Payne 1995). Latin America did experience periods of authoritarianism as long as those of Germany, Spain, Italy and the Balkans, but we have no instances of a state and a society establishing a bond through the worship of a common ethnic identity opposed to neighbors or some universal ‘other’. Because of the relative stability of borders since independence, irredentism has never been a major political factor. The few mass movements that did arise (e.g. Peronismo), while borrowing elements from fascism, never achieved the totalitarian control associated with such regimes, nor did they engage in the kind of military adventurism which was another critical characteristic. Moreover, Latin American mass movements depended on definitions of the enemy that were often couched in class terms, not ethnic ones.

What explains this lack of state interest? While the popular engagement associated with nationalism is closely linked to the greater demands made by the state of its subject population (Tilly 1994), the Latin American states made surprisingly few demands of their people. Large segments were not needed as soldiers, as workers, as taxpayers, or even as consumers. Thus, there was relatively little incentive to homogenize and integrate them. To the perpetual question of *que hacer con el pueblo*, answers usually involved exclusion, not mobilization.
Before analyzing the specifics of the Latin American cases, this paper discusses the tools used to measure and compare the origin and extent of these sentiments.

**The Stuff Memories Are Made of**

National History is perpetuated in street names. It is commemorated in public statuary.

Raphael Samuel (1987, p. 10)

A major difficulty in the research on nationalism is conceiving a common measure that allows comparative analysis. Estimates as to which societies are more or less nationalistic and when they became so are often nothing more than subjective judgments. Similarly, nationalist beliefs are frequently both pervasive and amorphous making the definition of the various ideological and historical ingredients difficult if not impossible. This paper uses concrete manifestations of nationalist sentiments: monuments and street names. I have supplemented these data with the analysis of what we might call ‘paper monuments’: stamps and currencies. While these symbolic carriers lack the textual richness of other possible candidates such as political speeches and school textbooks, they have two important advantages. First, information about them is relatively easy to obtain for our cases and they can be easily categorized and counted. Second, they are on constant public display; they help define the public sphere. This is particularly important in societies characterized by low school attendance and high levels of illiteracy. We have no way of establishing how they are consumed, but we can certainly trace their production as a means with which to define state sponsored nationalism.

Monuments and street names express the attitudes and values of a nation through the choice of references and (more subtly) aesthetic style; they objectify the ideals for which the nation is supposed to stand. These memorials make the past not only bearable, but usable; they re-write history as a glorious beginning (Jgnatieff 1984). As understood here, monuments are largely a modern creation in that they mostly serve to bridge elite or institutional memory with popular remembrance. They do so by transforming historical figures into symbols and myths: they transform the political into the religious (Mosse, 1975, p. 50).

Currencies and postage stamps also serve as leading carriers of political symbolism, providing an opportunity for the state to portray the glories of national history. These paper monuments represent an unobtrusive pedagogical opening with which to emphasize which heroes merit praise, which symbols are worth worshipping, which events warrant memory, and which national goals deserve greatest attention and effort. Because of their very ordinariness, 'no other government artifact so symbolizes the nation's popular self-image' (Skagg 1978, p. 198).

What kind of values do these 'public classrooms' teach? They use history to diffuse politics by creating illusions of unity and solidarity. As has been said about patriotic literature, 'they develop a narrative formula for resolving continuing conflicts' (Sommer, 1991, p. 12). Icons do not arise from a social vac-
uum, but reflect their social contexts. Because these symbols are built or printed by those with authority, they often serve to legitimize power. Monuments are merely the most visible aspects of the entire system of symbols and emblems that try to gain recognition and acclamation of the political status quo (Agulhon 1985). They serve as an indication of what those who have enough power to construct such monuments want to remember or honor. They indicate the hierarchy of official memory. These symbols are not passive objects without their own role in the continual writing of history. They represent a ‘theory of the world’ which both reflects and shapes social power distribution (Azaryahu 1992, p. 351) They serve to remind and reaffirm and accordingly play a major role in the construction of that which is being remembered. Precisely because people are aware that monuments make history (they represent the most visible ‘text’ of that history), their construction is often full of rancor and debate. We may even read monuments as indications of the victory of one group or vision over others.17

The presence of a monument does not necessarily speak to the society as a historical constant, but only to the time in which it was built. Without rituals and reminders, the significance of what was once held sacred is lost and forgotten. Yesterday’s beloved general is today’s neglected pigeon roost, and may be tomorrow’s kitsch icon. Nor is the meaning of social symbols like war memorials rigid or stable (Barber 1949)18. Nevertheless, the remnants of past mythologies form the basis for current ideologies, even if only in opposition to them. The fashion and aesthetics of memory also change across time.19 The use of paper monuments comes much later since these required either a literate population (needing to buy postage stamps) or enough state control so as to assure a monopoly (in the case of currency). The types of references also change.20

Some patterns are relatively constant, however. In most societies, the most important references are to formative periods. Origin myths play a central role in practically all forms of nationalism (Matossian 1994, Calhoun 1993). These are often seen as incarnate golden ages (Eliade, cited in Schwartz, 192, p. 375).21 For the United States, for example, the Revolutionary War and subsequent decade appear as the central themes of national memory (Schwartz 1982). Zelinsky’s exhaustive studies demonstrate the central role played by Washington, Jackson and Lincoln in defining the American iconography (1988).22 Among nations who at least attempt to construct an unbroken link to some pre-national ethnic group, references to these forebears are also common. The Hermannsdenkmal in Germany was one prominent example as were Fascist Italy’s Roman pretensions. The continuing popularity of Joan of Arc as a symbol in France is another.

Military references are also popular. There is general agreement that war can and does often foster the kind of solidarity that is the basis of nationalism (Zelinsky 1988, Mann 1994). As many political leaders have found, war makes for votes. War is the fuel that allows the state to transform patriotism into nationalism. The early philosophers of the nation-state (Hegel, Fichte, Herder) appear to have been right: ‘war was the necessary dialectic in the evolution of nations’ (Howard 1991, p. 39-41). There are few experiences which promote a sense of collectivity as well as war: ‘war creates a pathos and sentiment of community’ (Weber 1946, p. 335). The gore and glory of war (Colley 1992) fed even British nationalism, often cited as the first example of state linked identi-
ty. Following more recent work on nationalism, it would be difficult to imagine a more efficient genesis for ressentiment than war (Greenfeld 1992). Nationalism can only be understood, in fact, within a geo-political context. An isolated nationalism is impossible since this sentiment is based on claims to distinctiveness vis-à-vis other nations (Calhoun 1993). We should not assume that war automatically is transformed into iconography, however. Nor is it always defining.

Stone and paper monuments thus provide a wonderful opportunity for the social scientist to study the very reflexivity that is part of identity construction. These phenomena provide insights into the way a society reads itself and its past. They allow us to read the writers of official history, to read the very process of mythmaking at its most basic level. In this particular instance, they allow us to measure the extent to which war and military heroism helped shape Latin American national identities.

**Latin American National Myths**

We come to give homage and to celebrate the great heroes of independence. Before their images, alive in the heart of the Mexican nation, we kneel as if in front of sacred icons.

Enrique Creel

At first glance, the distribution of themes in Latin American monuments and street names would appear to follow the general pattern found in other countries: a strong emphasis on military and political themes (Table 1). Obviously, as we will see, such aggregate portraits miss important differentiation. Yet, even at this level of generalization we can find important distinctions between the Latin Americana pattern and that found in Europe and North America.

First, Latin America tends to honor artists and scientists much more than European countries. In her analysis of various cultural indicators in the U.S. and Western Europe, Priscilla Clark (1987) finds much lower rates of artists on stamps, streets, and bank notes. In several of the Latin American cities we can detect vestiges of the positivist fascination with creating a nation through progress exemplified by science. Mexico City and Rio are the clear leaders in this pattern. There is also a continental cult of some figures such as Pasteur (who has a statue in practically every country).

Developmentalism is another major theme. In both currency and postal issues, Latin America shares a veneration of industry and progress far above anything seen in European or North American iconographies. Every currency has a least some example of a symbolic smokestack. Prior to industrialization, currency issues prominently featured symbols of agricultural plenty. These icons may also be found in street names (e.g. the ubiquitous Progreso) or even monuments, especially to the nationalization of industry.

Political figures are less honored in Latin America, at least as compared to the United States. Interestingly, Latin America does share with the U.S. something of a flag fetish alien to Europe, but it does not venerate founding documents, nor has it created a liturgy of celebrating political institutions.
Table I: Distribution of References

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Streets and Monuments</th>
<th>Mythic Theme Percentage of Biographical References</th>
<th>Mythic Period Percentage of Biographical References</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military &amp; Sciences</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asuncion Monuments</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asuncion Streets</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogota Monuments</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>33.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires Monuments</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buenos Aires Streets</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Paz Streets</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>31.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lima Monuments</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico Streets</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montevideo Monuments</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montevideo Streets</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quito Streets</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Monuments</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio Streets</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santiago Monuments</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that categories are not exclusive and will total >100%.
where do we see an equivalent to Mount Rushmore or the practice of honoring each president with a building or monument in Washington, D.C. With very few exceptions (e.g. Juárez and Cárdenas in Mexico, the oligarchic Republic in Chile) few politicians are honored after their term in office. For example, there is no monumental cult of José Batlle y Ordóñez in Uruguay while Vargas is barely seen in Brazil. In short, representatives of the authority of the state appear to play a relatively small role in Latin American national myths.

The most striking characteristic of Latin American monumental iconography is the huge historical silences that characterize it. The two most important missing elements are origin myths and references to war.

The national icons of Latin America do not appear to fulfil many of the functions assigned to such symbols. In particular, they fail to crystallize national identity and to draw the people into a moral communion (Cerulo 1995). In order to understand why, we need to analyze both their content and their context.
Origin Myths

The most dramatic example of historical amnesia is pre-independence. In their search for historical symbols to appropriate, Latin American countries had two difficult choices. The first was to honor the pre-Columbian civilizations. This was the base for the earliest forms of creole patriotism in Mexico (Brading 1985). However, such a strategy would present a significant problem: how to glorify a past whose destruction came at the hands of the forefathers of those who hold power? An Indian republic would have been able to do so and might have used an invented past to smash inter-ethnic differences. For whites to do so was difficult since even if they desired to be compatriots of the Indians, they were descendants of those who had destroyed them. The contradiction between historic and imagined community was too great.

Mexico is obviously the leader in using the Indian past to create a sense of nation. Of all the other countries, Peru makes the strongest effort to include the large Indian majority into its nationalist mythology. The pattern in the rest of the continent is, at best, one of benign neglect. Even through the 1960s, for example, Bolivia had made no attempt to bridge its huge racial gulfs through the creation of a symbolic raza. Similarly, in Ecuador, I found only two references to pre-Colombian figures. Colombia and Venezuela were also lacking pre-Colombian icons. This same attitude applies to other ‘marginalized’ races. I was only able to identify one Afro-Brazilian among the 205 statues in Rio.

Another option with which to deal with pre-independence was to glorify the Conquest or the Colonial era. The Conquest was certainly celebrated prior to Independence and one still sees vestiges of such a perspective in the older Latin American historiography. In the twentieth century, worship of the Conquest has been universally rejected. The Southern Cone may symbolize a third strategy for honoring national origins. Uruguay and Argentina’s national identity are closely linked to the legend of the gaucho and the pampas (Justo 1962), and the enduring myth of the immigrant.

How to explain these differences? Some may be explained by archeological or historical legacies. A better answer to the pattern partly lies in the historical timing of both of the iconographic turns to celebrating the indigenous heritage. In Peru it is particularly obvious: only after the revolution of 1968 (the first time the Peruvian state made an attempt to create a popular nationalism) did pre-Colombian figures assume a prominent role in official iconography. As the regime made social justice the focus of its policies, it sought to redefine the state’s relationship with the population and to reject the previous 70 years of elite iconography. Similarly in Mexico, Porfirio Díaz’s attempts to re-establish the centrality of Mexico City and his use of patriotic imagery in the rebellion of 1877 required an integration of at least parts of the population. The veneration of the Aztecs was meant to not only give the Porfiriato a historical link with which to legitimize itself, but also to symbolically reassert the domination of Mexico City. Similarly, the 1910 Revolution’s concern with creating an inclusive authoritarianism helped shape their choices of nationalist myths to give an unbroken line from the Aztec emperors to the PRI.

But why no similar ‘origin’ worship in other cases? In Ecuador, until recently, politics consisted of intra-elite struggles between those whose power lay in Quito and those who were based in Guayaquil. The indian masses were largely
irrelevant, as were symbols that referred to them. The failure of the 1952 Revolution in Bolivia to use ethnic symbols or to create a more inclusive national iconography is surprising. But it may help to remember the domination of the MNR by whites over those of mixed race, or Europeanized Indians. Moreover, the central focus of that revolt was class based and concentrated on disputes in the mines. In the case of Chile, again, when governments have attempted to create a more inclusive set of national symbols, the emphasis has been on class or economic divisions rather than on reclaiming a pre-Colombian past. Argentina's use of the gaucho was also a reflection of political change. Certainly the Liberalism exemplified by Sarmiento would not have chosen it, but the populism that has marked Argentinean politics since the 1930s found the barbarie represented by the gaucho a convenient symbol in its fight against the Buenos Aires elite (Shumway 1991).

The result of this general absence of attention to origin myths is that Latin Americans have continued to feel, in Bolívar's words, like orphans divorced from any cultural parentage (Minguet 1984). One may add that orphans may not know their own kin; few Latin Americans necessarily feel an ethnic link to their national compatriots. The same may be said of North Americans, but the United States has managed to construct a proto-ethnicity from a series of historical institutions such as the Constitution (Murrin 1987). The limits of any political imagined community in Latin America were reached much before the territorial boundaries of the respective countries. 33

Thus history helps determine national icons in two ways. First, the genesis of national symbols is partly a function of the available past (e.g. archeological remnants). More importantly, official iconography is also a product of the needs of particular states at critical moments of their development. Origin myths have been used when the need to create them appeared. The key is that the perception of that need has been much more chronologically and geographically sporadic in Latin America. Moreover, more than in most countries, addressing the issue of origins meant bringing up issues and debates that were more likely to divide than to unite. Given the dilemma of the Conquest, states had to make choices regarding whom to include among the forefathers. As a rule, that did not include the non-white masses.

War

Despite its reputation for militarism, Latin American nationalism appears much less based on bellicose claims and military heroics than European or North American examples. 34 The high percentage of military documents largely reflects the central importance of founding fathers from Independence (note the high representation of a small number of years in Table 1). 35 If we take into account other iconographic sources such as stamps, currencies, and public festivals, the importance of military symbols declines even further. Battle scenes or military heroes rarely appear in stamps or currencies (again with the exception of independence). In general, Latin America has not glorified a nation at arms fighting to preserve a political rule over a territory. After the wars of independence, military conflict largely disappears as a source of state legitimization. 36 The pattern among the countries reflects the same influence of his-
tory and state decisions discussed above. This section discusses the specific cases of remembrance of international, civil, and independence wars.

War dominates the Paraguayan nationalist imagination as in no other Latin American country. Over half of the major monuments in Asunción are dedicated to remembering a figure or some aspect of a war; over half the streets recall a person or event associated with war. Bolivia also owes its sense of national identity to wars (Ortega 1971). Peru is also concerned with making the remembrance of war a central part of its nationalist iconography. Especially after the War of the Pacific, Chilean nationalism had a clear martial air. But Chile’s military veneration does not approach the levels of Peru or Paraguay. Argentina honors those wars that are closest to independence: the conflict with Brazil in the 1820s and the English invasion of 1806-07. The War of the Triple Alliance is barely mentioned, either in street names or in monumental icons. While military and heroic statues dominate the major memorials of Montevideo, such figures only account for less than 15 percent of total monuments. Roughly one fourth of streets, however, did make references to military themes. In Mexico, the international war most officially remembered is that against the United States, particularly through the symbols of the Niños Héroes – the cadets who died defending Castle from the U.S. forces.

For several countries, post-independence war appeared to play an even smaller role in their national iconography. In Caracas, I was only able to find only one geographical reference to a post-independence external struggle. While in Colombia military figures are important in general (one third of all monuments); they are again almost exclusively concentrated in the Independence era. The political geography of Rio largely ignores the international and regional wars that consumed much of Brazil’s military attention during two thirds of the nineteenth century. The information from the very limited Ecuadorian sample would indicate that Quito has the least martial geographical iconography. Just over 10 percent of street names identified refer to a person or place with links to military.

While historical circumstance might help explain the relatively small role played by external wars in official iconography, there is even less mention of the many civil wars experienced by practically all the countries. This is particularly surprising since it was through these wars that most of the nations were forged. Certainly one would expect some icons in Argentina, for example. But while Buenos Aires does honor some of those who fought against Rosas, the losing side is largely ignored. There is nothing approaching the cult of the Civil War in the U.S. and no attempt has been made to unify the nation through the elevation of heroes from both sides. Similarly, Colombia largely ignores its own violent history. Venezuela honors Bolívar, but devotes much less attention to Páez. Bolivia barely mentions 1952, and Brazil ignores the rebellions of the nineteenth century. Mexico is the exception to this pattern. The monumental focus of Mexico City is obviously the Avenida de la Reforma extending from Chapultepec Park to the colonial center and it is meant to celebrate the ultimate Liberal victory in the decades-long struggle following independence. Obviously there is also a cult of the Revolution. This event is the only case (among the 11 analyzed) where a civil war is treated and venerated as a popular struggle.

The wars of Independence are the obvious exceptions to the generally pacif-
ic history of Latin America. These do represent a moment of martial glory with legends of heroism, sacrifice, and loyalty. They were the high points of Creole patriotism: the rise of a consciously American population challenging an easily identifiable enemy (Brading 1987). They remain the central icon in many national mythologies and are clearly the dominant expression of political consciousness on the continent.41

The center of Venezuelan iconography is Simón Bolívar (usually referred to with some honorific such as ‘Father of the Fatherland’ or ‘Illustrious Hero of Independence’).42 Perhaps even more than Venezuela, Colombia places Bolívar at the center of its nationalist mythology. In both cases, Bolívar dominates the ‘paper’ monuments. The Ecuadorian pattern is similar as Sucre and Bolívar dominate both paper and stone iconographies. The iconographic center of Argentine nationalism is also the War of Independence in general and José San Martín in particular. Buenos Aires alone possesses thirteen statues or monuments to the hero (who also has a major avenue named in his honor) while those provinces remotely touched by his life now honor their bit of history. The great procer is featured on an outstanding 44 percent of stamps depicting political figures. Much like other cases, a single individual dominates Uruguay’s mythology: Artigas. The Mexican variant is somewhat more ample in its scope. Below the famous Angel of Independence sit statues of the independence heroes: Hidalgo (the most prominent), Morelos, Francisco Javier Mina, and Nicolás Bravo.

In Peru and Bolivia, Independence does not exercise the iconographic domination seen in Argentina or in the northern Andes. While Independence and its heroes are honored, the next half-century plays a much more important role. The Chilean equivalent of San Martín is O’Higgins, but he does not dominate the iconography (stone or paper) nearly to the extent of his Argentinean counterpart. Independence plays a relatively insignificant role in Rio’s iconography and Brazil’s currency and postage. The revolution of 1889 that toppled the monarchy and created the Old Republic does receive some attention, but again lacks any coherent theme, hero, or a major monument dedicated solely to it.43

How can we account for the distribution of military images across Latin America?44 As I have argued, nationalist myths (or lack thereof) reflect historical experience. First, there has to be some historical narrative available, a symbolic skeleton around which to wrap nationalist legend. Second, there has to be a perceived need for the solidarity associated with nationalism. Many countries in Latin America lacked both the historical base and the kind of polity associated with nationalist integration.

Beginning with those who have not used military imagery, it would be practically impossible for Brazil to construct a national myth from independence. According to Doris Sommer (1991), the very ‘non-eventfulness’ of Brazil’s early history made it difficult to use this period as the basis for the romantic novels of the late nineteenth century. Yet, the failure of the Brazilian state to use the other possible subjects of epic treatment remains puzzling. In the cases of Peru and Ecuador, independence was partly forced on often-reluctant populations by external armies. While the birth of the nation is celebrated, there are limits to which one can mythologize an external liberation. Moreover, in the case of Peru (as in Chile), a subsequent struggle has partly supplanted the
independence as a central theme. For Colombia, Venezuela and Ecuador, there are no major external wars that could serve as the basis for a martial mythology. The internal wars that plagued all three did not produce clear enough winners to allow for either triumphalism or to permit a nostalgic veneration of the loser.

On the other extreme, Paraguayan history would make neglecting war almost impossible. Yet, the devastation of the Triple Alliance (and the success of the Paraguayans in holding off defeat for so long) could have produced either veneration or repulsion. Despite the massive loss of territory after the War of the Triple Alliance, Marshall López is not derided as a leader who sacrificed the nation (a la Mexico’s Santa Anna), but is venerated as a martyr. Argentina and Colombia and Venezuela can claim ‘ownership’ of the two great heroes of the Independence and it is not surprising that they have exalted these figures above all others. The cases of Peru, Bolivia and Chile would indicate that the reverence of a war has little to do with the outcome. It would be practically impossible to determine who won on the basis of the monumental evidence. The two major contestants have both created cults of single individuals (Chilean Prat and Peruvian Grau) that closely follow a classic tradition. This suggests it is the communal experience of shared danger and effort that makes the remembrance of war important. Defeats are recalled because they serve to link the community in a shared suffering. The survival of the nation despite the humiliation of defeat (and the ever important promise of revenge) works just as well as a celebration of victory.

Mexico’s use of military themes perhaps comes closest to a European pattern: non-elite heroes (the ninos of Chapultepec), the inclusion of civil and international wars, and a variety of icons and media. The key to the Mexican difference lies in precisely the kind of wars waged. More than in any other country (with the exception of Paraguay), Mexican wars were not matters of elites, but involved significant parts of the population. The Independence, American, Reforma, French, and Revolutionary Wars did not hinge on one or two battles or the fate of a single general. Thus, much like the American and European examples after 1860, these wars could serve as symbols of a nation, because they did involve the nation.45

As was the case with pre-Colombian images, independence cults arose in particular moments of political need. It is interesting to note that almost all of the independence myths and the subsequent monuments develop in the second half of the nineteenth century when states began to arise from the morass of post-independence civil wars. While there had been plans to honor Bolívar in a Caracas plaza as early as 1825, the statue was only finally obtained and unveiled in 1874. The veneration of San Martín began in the 1840s and achieved its climax through the works of Sarmiento and Mitre in the centennial celebration of his birth in 1878. During the first years of this century, at the time of the centennial celebrations of independence and when Buenos Aires was fully feeling the problems of assimilating large numbers of immigrants, the notion of using the independence as a means with which to inculcate patriotism on the new generations was widely discussed (Plotkin 1985). The dominance of Artigas similarly dates from the 1880s. The use of the anniversary of Mexican independence as a means to legitimize the regime really begins with the emphasis placed on it by Maximilian in the 1860s (Duncan 1996).
Once these regimes were able to establish at least nominal birthrights, however, they largely abandoned military celebrations. The most exceptional aspect of the iconographic role of the military is the drastic reduction in references to war beginning in the twentieth century (Table II). While such references account for nearly half of Argentine street names still surviving from the nineteenth century, for example, they are only 16 percent of those named after 1955. This trend, in part, reflects historical reality. Wars were concentrated in the nineteenth century. But there also seems to be a continent-wide decline in references to war in general. Even the cult of independence was affected. By the 1980s, the importance of Argentine independence festivals had been greatly reduced. In 1991, coverage of May 25 events merited a small part of the front page of newspapers where before they had monopolized entire front sections.

Whatever the reason, Latin American states have been deprived of the kind of nationalist symbolism created after the First World War. With few exceptions, Latin America lacks the monuments to collective sacrifice exemplified either by anonymous statues (as in U.S. Civil War privates or French WWI

| Table II: Changes in Themes (Percentage of Biographical References) |
|---------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| War                       | Pre-1920 | 1920-1930 | 1930-1960 | Post-1960  |
| Asuncion Streets          | 44.5     | 58.8       | 58.8       | 58.8       |
| BA Monuments              | 33.9     | 11.5       | 40.9       | 40.9       |
| BA Streets                | 46.9     | 50.0       | 35.0       | 35.0       |
| Bogota Monuments          | 35.6     | 50.0       | 23.8       | 23.8       |
| Lima Monuments            | 23.8     | 14.3       | 14.3       | 14.3       |
| Montevideo Monuments      | 16.7     | 33.3       | 33.3       | 33.3       |
| Rio Monuments             | 19.6     | 11.1       | 11.1       | 11.1       |
| Rio Streets               | 15.5     | 19.6       | 19.6       | 19.6       |
| Santiago Monuments        | 25.0     | 25.0       | 25.0       | 25.0       |

| Politics                  | Pre-1920 | 1920-1930 | 1930-1960 | Post-1960  |
| Asuncion Streets          | 22.9     | 11.4       | 11.4       | 11.4       |
| BA Monuments              | 54.0     | 59.3       | 59.3       | 59.3       |
| BA Streets                | 32.1     | 23.6       | 23.6       | 23.6       |
| Bogota Monuments          | 26.7     | 30.1       | 30.1       | 30.1       |
| Lima Monuments            | 16.7     | 42.5       | 42.5       | 42.5       |
| Montevideo Monuments      | 26.2     | 44.4       | 44.4       | 44.4       |
| Rio Monuments             | 35.0     | 42.5       | 42.5       | 42.5       |
| Rio Streets               | 20.4     | 35.0       | 35.0       | 35.0       |
| Santiago Monuments        | 36.9     | 36.9       | 36.9       | 36.9       |

| Arts & Sciences           | Pre-1920 | 1920-1930 | 1930-1960 | Post-1960  |
| Asuncion Streets          | 7.0      | 14.7       | 14.7       | 14.7       |
| BA Monuments              | 16.2     | 29.6       | 29.6       | 29.6       |
| BA Streets                | 30.3     | 41.8       | 41.8       | 41.8       |
| Bogota Monuments          | 35.6     | 46.8       | 46.8       | 46.8       |
| Lima Monuments            | 23.8     | 21.4       | 21.4       | 21.4       |
| Montevideo Monuments      | 66.7     | 14.7       | 14.7       | 14.7       |
| Rio Monuments             | 42.5     | 52.5       | 52.5       | 52.5       |
| Rio Streets               | 45.1     | 52.5       | 52.5       | 52.5       |
| Santiago Monuments        | 36.4     | 36.4       | 36.4       | 36.4       |

Sources: See Note on methods at end of paper.
poilu) or the purposefully faceless cenotaph. In all my searches I found not a single statue celebrating the Latin American equivalent of the Minuteman.46 Almost all the monuments associated with war honor famous individuals. War is an affair of elites and the masses appear to have little to do with it. The Brazilian monument to the Second World War is one of the few examples of anonymous monumental architecture reflecting more recent developments in the means to honor war-dead. Others include the massive monument in Lima honoring the 1941 war with Ecuador, a similar monument for the dead of the Pacific, and that to the Roto Chileno in Santiago.

This aesthetic pattern is extremely important for it indicates that the nationalist ‘return’ on even the relatively small number of war monuments is limited. These memorials do not serve to remind the nation of its hour of glory or of how el pueblo contributed to victory. Rather, they honor often generic men on horseback whose contemporary significance may be nil. The architecture combining nationalist aspirations and death is totally missing and so are the respective sentiments.47 This has consequences. If a single hero is considered the only basis of national pride, how is it possible to construct a nationalist ethos broad enough to include large parts of the population?

The Limits of History

One does not construct a homeland without patriotism as its cement, nor does one build on the soul and glory of a nation a city without citizens. Domingo Sarmiento48

In general, then, Latin American iconography is quite different from that of Europe and North America. It is much more focused on cultural and scientific figures, pays less attention to political symbols, and lacks the mythology of a people at arms uniting through sacrifice. As a whole, it lacks the sense of ‘great things done together’ which is at the heart of national consciousness.49

The icon of independence provides perhaps the best means with which to understand the constraints facing Latin American countries seeking to sponsor state-centered nationalism. First, there is the ambiguity of what exactly the criollos were fighting for. For each instance of San Martín abolishing legal racial distinctions in Peru or Bolívar’s use of black troops, there are backlashes against the fear of racial uprising. Although for the rebellious criollos the enemy was clearly the Spanish, this was not so obvious for the rest of the population (Silva Michelena 1971). Opposition to the independence cause was often found within the frontiers of the new ‘countries’. Peruvian reluctance is well documented: out of 9000 loyalists in the battle of Ayacucho, only 500 had been born in Spain (Mörner, p. 116).

Given these ambiguities, it was often difficult to choose what to celebrate. The Mexican experience, to use one obvious example, has been the subject of considerable debate. Is 1810 the appropriate date? But this struggle was crushed within two years not by Spaniards, but by white Mexicans fearful of more indian violence as in Guanajuato. Is Iturbide’s entrance in Mexico City 1821 better? But he served in those armies that helped to defeat Hidalgo and
Morelos. Thus, while the Independence Wars signaled the victory of the patria América, the identity of the triumphant nation was and remains unclear.

A second difficulty with the use of the Independence Wars is that they represented too unequivocal a victory to be used by the state seeking to create a common identity. Despite some adventures in the 1820s and 1860s, Spain did not represent a significant threat to Latin America after independence. In the twentieth century, Spain’s role was largely taken by the U.S. and it has served admirably as a basis for the legitimacy of Revolutionary Nicaragua and Cuba. One could argue that the conflict with the United States is at the very heart of the political project of the Cuban Revolution. It is not accidental that it is also the country that has succeeded in creating the most vibrant form of popular nationalism. But, given that the Latin American state was more often than not allied directly or indirectly with the U.S., fanning the flames of anti-yanquismo was a dangerous strategy. The PRI was one of the few that could master the art. (The anti-Americanism of contemporary military regimes such as in Guatemala deserves further study). Moreover, as powerful as David/Goliath myths may be, it is important for the shepherd to win once in a while. Prior to the Cuban Revolution, this was practically unimaginable. The popularization of dependency was a double-edged sword. Given the asymmetry in power, resentment of the U.S. often degenerated into hopelessness rather than national devotion.50

A third obstacle to using the Wars of Independence as the basis for a state-specific nationalism is that armies from a variety of countries fought them. Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia were given independence by armies consisting of soldiers from the River Plate, Chile, and Colombia. Sucre won in Ayacucho with soldiers and officers from practically every region of the continent. Men born in one state could become the presidents of another. It is only in those cases where regions sought to separate themselves from the traditional colonial boundaries that we find an early sense of difference. Paraguay is the obvious example here, but we might also include Uruguay.

Moreover, these wars left all the countries with a common set of images and references that would have made it difficult to completely demonize a neighboring enemy. The shared experience of the Independence Wars made all of the Latin American countries part of a single iconographic family. Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia fly practically the same flag, derived from Bolívar’s standard during the Wars of Independence. Argentina and Uruguay share images and colors. The continent shares the same two heroes: Bolívar and San Martín.

The independence of Latin America has often been used as an example of the new nationalism associated with the nineteenth century. Yet, Anderson (1991) is incorrect in claiming that the anti-colonial movements were national, if by that we are to understand that each new country was aware of its own particular identity prior to independence. The administrative boundaries of the Spanish empire and the daunting geographical challenges to communication and transport had begun to create some intra-continental differences. Simón Bolívar came to recognize the importance of these regional identities through the failure of his various federalist proposals (Collier 1983). But, aside from a vague regional sentiment among a minute part of the elite, I know of no evidence that any large part of even the white population thought of themselves as a nation separate from their creole neighbors (Massur 1966, Mörner

The nationalism of Latin American independence was a product of the Enlightenment and sought a liberty grounded in (granted, theoretical) universal rights. It sought recognition and defense of these rights, but never based them on claims to a special identity. The model was the French revolutionary fervor of 1789-92, not Napoleonic chauvinism. Bolivarian nationalism completely lacked references to ethnic or cultural dimensions; the ultimate criterion for nationality was political in nature (Collier 1983). Mexico and Brazil might represent exceptions, but at least in the former, nationalism remained ‘more creole than Mexican’ (Brading 1987).

Thus, for a political institution interested in creating a sense of identity bounded by territory, the wars of independence represent potentially debilitating challenges. Moreover, given the early acceptance of boundaries based on colonial practice and a policy of non-intervention, we see few examples of ‘crusades’ from one country attempting to liberate the other. Chile justifies its role in the war against the Peruvian-Bolivian confederation in these terms, but Brazil and Argentina are reluctant to do so even with the War of the Triple Alliance. The sense of a shared heritage appears to have overwhelmed any sentiment of particularity.

What does the Latin American experience tell us about the invention of state nationalism in general? First, communities cannot be imagined out of the ether; they require some basis in the past. In is no accident that the countries with the most developed martial iconographies, Paraguay and Mexico, were ones whose struggles most involved the relevant populations. In these cases, allusions to the Triple Alliance or the Revolution could resonate with a shared experience. These countries constructed myths, but they did so on an experience with real connotations for their people.

The historical context in which the Latin American countries achieved independent statehood appears quite similar to that experienced by the European counterparts: the nineteenth century was the ‘springtime of nations’ on both continents. The apparent similarity, however, hides two critical differences. First, the ethnic makeup of the population in Latin America was distributed in a way very different from the European case. Second, with few exceptions, Latin American countries did not undergo the type of military struggles that have been used to construct imagined communities among even those of diffuse origins. Both of these conditions placed limits on the development of nationalist symbols. The first because references to a collectivity were almost always exclusionary, the second because it limited the type of experiences which break down such segregation.

Lacking a common ancestor and shared trials, Latin American patriotism remained wedded to concrete places and people and did not develop into the institutionalized worship of an abstract identity that is at the heart of nationalism. Latin Americans such as the Chilean José María Núñez realized that teaching history was ‘the ideal means to bind an individual’s loyalties to his nation’ (quoted in Woll 1975, p. 24). But, in general, having lived a different history, they taught different lessons.

It might even be said that developmentalism has played the role usually
assigned to military competition. But, such an emphasis faces three key problems as the heart of a nationalist ethos. First, it very quickly brings into question precisely those issues of distribution and inequality that nationalism is often meant to quiet. Second, as the Cuban Revolution found out, the enthusiasm of even the 'new socialist man' for increasing productivity is rather limited. Production quotas do not appear to pack the same emotional punch of ethnic competition. Finally, the battle between 'civilization and barbarie', which is the antecedent to much of Latin American developmentalism, was inherently anti-populist. The advance of progress in Latin America, more often than not, has been seen as needing to defeat, control, and reshape el pueblo. As such, it makes for a fragile base on which to build the worship of the common identity.

History is not merely given, but is recreated through its portrayal. Not only did the Latin American countries have a different narrative, but also a different means to tell it. Nationalism made symbols the essence of politics and in turn the aesthetic quality of these could be said to shape some forms of politics, or at least reflect their basic qualities (Mosee 1975, Berezin 1994, Cerulo 1995). With a few exceptions, Latin American monuments fail to represent national identities. They do not embody an altar of the nation, but elite icons whose hold on the popular imagination may also not be very strong. To die for el pueblo is one thing, to do so for San Martin is another.52 As a whole, historical traditions did not work to create a sense of national community.

The underdevelopment of Latin American national iconographies also reflects the needs of the states and their commanding elites. In general, since there were few threats of war, there was little need to create a population willing to sacrifice itself.53 Since domestic markets were relatively unimportant, there was little need to integrate. Since there was no democracy, there was no need for citizens. Since there was relatively little war, there was no need for nationalism. Since the definition of the nation was so fraught with conflict, the state failed to exert the same effort seen in the European and North American efforts. This represents an important lesson for a field that often assumes that states will seek to construct integrating myths and develop nationalisms. As with all such assumptions and simplifications, geographical and historical contextualization remain critical, not simply to the explanation of any case's particularities, but to fine-tuning our more generalizable claims. The invention of nations and traditions is not something inherent to statemaking. Theories of political development must take into account the many cases where such integration did not occur, and thus produced very different state-social dynamics.

**A Note on Sources and Method**

In order to have a reasonable expectation that I would be covering a good part of the available iconography, I concentrated on the capital cities in the eleven cases.54 Unlike the case in many European cities, public monuments are not normally highlighted in guide books of Latin American cities. I initially attempted to use a variety of these guides such as Baedeker but found their coverage very scant past the most major monuments. In their place I have used a variety of guides to monuments produced by local scholars or city governments.55 I faced a similar problem with my analysis of streets. I have used the
nomenclature guides produced in several of the cities. These have the same problems listed above for guides to monuments, but again, given the nature of my analysis, these are not insurmountable.

I was able to obtain information for both monuments and streets for the following cities: Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Bogotá, Mexico City, Asunción, Montevideo, Santiago, and Caracas. For La Paz and Quito, I was only able to locate data on streets while for Lima I had to limit myself to monuments. For Buenos Aires streets I used Municipalidad de Buenos Aires 1983 and Cutolo 1988 (N=2427). For monuments I used Baliari 1972, Vigil 1948, and Piccirilli 1954 (N=285). For La Paz, I relied on Viscarra Monje 1965. This is not a complete listing of streets, but a sample selected by Viscarra Monje (N=167).

For Rio monuments, I used Amarente la Tarde 1947, Diario de Noticias 1946, and Fontainha 1963 (N=205). For streets, I relied on the ongoing work of Paulo Berger 1987 and 1994. I have been limited to three regions in the city (N=467). For Santiago the only source for monuments I could locate was Ossandon and Ossandon 1983 (N=54). Unsystematic information on street names was found in Thayer Ojeda 1904. For Bogotá streets I used de la Rosa [1938] 1968 and for monuments I relied on Cortazar 1938 (N=196). I have a very limited sample of Quito streets. I used the listings found in Gomez (nd) and checked with information available in Pérez Pimentel (1988). This produced a N=61. I supplemented this information with the more anecdotal data found in Jurado Noboa 1989. I have not been able to locate a complete listing of monuments in Mexico City. My analysis is based on the most prominent landmarks of the city based on Departamento de Turismo, 1964. For streets I used Morales Díaz 1961 (N=1171). For Asunción monuments I used Municipalidad de Asunción 1967 (N=50) and for streets Municipalidad de Asunción 1979 (N=1035). I was not able to find a nomenclature for Lima streets. Data on monuments come from Cubillas Soriano 1993 and de la Barra 1963 (N=258). Montevideo monuments are based on Casaretto 1948 (N=41). Streets represent a random sample (N=471) from Castellanos 1977. I have not been able to find a systemic list of streets or monuments for Caracas. I have used the following: Misle 1967, Gaspaini 1969, Valery 1978.

For currency issues I have used two standard sources for the entire continent (Pick 1986 and Raymond 1947, 1951) and have supplemented these with individual country materials where possible. For Argentina, I have also used Banco Roberts 1984, Nusdeo & Conno 1981 and for Brazil, Violo Idolo 1981, and Casa de Moeda 1984. For Ecuador I relied on Trujillo 1970 and for Mexico, Batiz Vazquez 1987. Paraguayan and Uruguayan information came from Seppa 1970. Zarauz Castelnau 1979 was useful for Peru. For Venezuela I used Rosenman 1980. For stamps, I have largely relied on Scott’s catalog (1995). I counted all stamps featuring individuals and also noted those celebrating battles and military events as well as those marking special anniversaries. For some countries and periods I have also relied on Bushnell 1982, Nuessel 1992, and Reid 1981. Since these sources are almost all catalogs for dealers, they may not represent a complete sample. Through cross checking for those countries where I found more than one source, I am fairly confident that they cover all major issues after 1900 and do a good job even before then. I have largely limited myself to a discussion of the persons featured on the bills and stamps and have mostly neglected the fascinating question of the nature of the allegor-
ical figures often used (usually prior to 1900) and the graphic symbolism employed. For other national symbols, I relied on Helman and Serchio 1989.

Given the quantities involved and uncertainties regarding the appropriate frame of reference (number of issues, etc.), it was impossible to reproduce the same method used for streets and statues. I did note all persons honored and categorized these according to the same categories discussed above. I also noted trends in allegorical references.

* * *

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Notes

1. From Representative Government, quoted in Masur 1966.
2. Even prominent treatments of this issue (e.g. Brading 1985 and Mallon 1994) are mostly read by Latin Americanists.
3. This paper is part of a larger project analyzing the role of war in Latin America. In order to avoid all the standard problems with sampling by dependent variable, I analyzed all the Iberian colonized countries in South America. I have excluded Central America as this zone has had a separate geopolitical system since the mid-nineteenth century and represented a difficult set of cases to integrate into any systematic comparison. My sample also omits the Caribbean countries which have yet another geopolitical legacy (even more dominated by the United States). The cases of Haiti and Cuba each represent significant exceptions to the patterns noted above and will be analyzed in a larger work. See last section for methodological note.
4. Here I borrow the paraphrasing of Marx from Eley and Suny 1996.
6. The definition is by Mauss as cited in Weber 1976, p. 484. Weber notes that France also did not meet this criteria in 1870. But it did by 1914 and certainly by 1918. I argue that this is partly explained by the experience of war and subsequent elaboration of nationalist myths associated with it.
7. For a general discussion of these differences (but with no references to Latin America) see Calhoun 1993.
8. The African experience may be similar, but with barely 40 years of widespread independence, comparisons are difficult. The South Asian and East Asian countries have followed a pattern closer to that of Europe (despite the colonial interregnum of the eighteenth to twentieth centuries).
9. Obviously, European identities were not given, but in most cases there was a basis for inventing common languages and origins.
11. Perhaps the best documented case of this is Peru in the nineteenth century where state building involved the destruction of a nationalism from below (Mallon 1994, Stern 1987).
12. Nor has Latin America produced the artistic and cultural environment which enshrined and supported nationalist dogma in Europe. Even in Rodó or Dario, what is praised and extolled in hispanidad (or in other cases indigenismo) is not the intrinsic sacredness of a particular nation as defined by territory (Palacios 1983). With rare exceptions (Herméndez in Argentina), no Latin American author has played the role of Walter Scott, Fenimore Cooper, the Brothers Grimm, or Victor Hugo. Perhaps most importantly, the nationalism of intellectuals has been
almost exclusively from the left. The gulf separating Neruda from D’Annunzio or Mariátegui from Heidegger is measured in light-years.

13. Even in the immediate aftermaths of wars, for example, Mexican elites were reluctant to use the discourse of nationalism (as traditionally understood in Europe). Mexican Liberals, rarely if ever appealed to the concept of the nation save in its constitutional sense...[they] invited their fellow citizens to lay down their lives in service of la patria which increasingly had less to do with a shared history and more with the ideology of liberal republicanism (Brading...p. 28).

14. Another potential resource are the guides including patriotic materials and speeches to be used in schools on national feast days. See for example, Basurto 1981.

15. For Latin America figures see Newland 1991.

16. I do not mean to enter into a debate as to the relative significance of nationalism from above or below (see Bonilla 1987 and Mallon 1987). This article is not meant as a refutation of the wonderful work being done in a very different tradition (e.g. Mallon 1994 and Joseph and Nugent 1994). Rather, I hope to complement the growing literature of nationalism from below with a more state-centered view.

17. See, for example, David Harvey’s (1979) account of the construction of Sacré Coeur in Paris.

18. Monuments such as the Volkerschlachtdenkmal in Leipzig could, at different times, symbolize democratic aspirations or collective authority. The monumental remnants of Communism have been transformed into memorials of the victims of authoritarianism, reminders of political dangers, or advertisements for fast food.

19. The column favored in antiquity has seen various cycles of popularity (as have the sub-set of obelisks popular in the early nineteenth century). The dynastic equestrian monument was born in the classic era, revived in the Renaissance and reached its apogee in the era of absolutism. Triumphal arches are largely a product of the nineteenth century, or associated with dictatorial regimes in the twentieth (Westfehling 1977). The nineteenth century and especially its latter half saw a veritable explosion of ‘statue mania’ in almost all Western cities. These monuments have been replaced by more ‘practical’ memorials (e.g. schools, hospitals). Among war monuments, the trend has been to reduce the triumphalist bombast of previous efforts and replace it with an emphasis on sacrifice and loss. Thus, for example, cemeteries (the practice of marking battle graves is relatively recent) have often replaced monuments as centers of veneration (Curl 1980) National anthems (a form of musical monument) also date from the rise of nationalism as a political force in the nineteenth century (Sadie 1980, Cerulo 1995).

20. This occurs most radically when the nature of the regime is somehow transformed. In Haifa, Saladdin gave way to Herzl, in East Berlin, Bismarck gave way to Rosa Luxemburg (Azaryahu 1992). The French Revolution marked an obvious turning point. Not only did the Place Louis XV become the Place de la Revolution, but the ‘pool’ of possible honorees also changed: names honoring commoners had no place in the world’s streetscape until after 1789 (Baldwin and Grimaud 1992, p. 157; Agulhon 1978, p. 147). This period also saw the rise of monuments honoring military heroes (Napoleon found these a convenient way of pleasing his generals and promoting popular patriotism). The Third Republic, on the other hand, was much more likely to honor artists (Hargrove 1986, Milo 1986). Germany also saw the addition of poets and scientists to the usual cast of kings and generals (Moss, 1975, p. 47). Since WWI, monuments to illustrious individuals have been generally replaced by ones honoring anonymous symbolic representations or even whole collectives (Borg 1991, Zelinsky 1988).

21. Among nations who at least attempt to construct an unbroken link to some pre-national ethnic group, references to these forebears are common. The Hermannsdenkmal in Germany was one prominent example as were Fascist Italy’s Roman pretensions. The continuing popularity of Joan of Arc as a symbol in France is another.


23. For some periods in some states, such references are central to the task of identity formation. In Israel, the post-statehood period saw considerable emphasis placed on military and heroic street names (Cohen and Kliot 1981). The heroism of Anzac forces in both World Wars (and especially the disaster of Gallipoli) remain sacred symbols for Australia (Inglis 1985). In the United States, memorials to various wars (and in the case of the Civil War, monuments to both sides of the same war) are a major part of geographical iconography (Savage 1993, Mayo 1988). The ex-Soviet Union’s fascination with war monuments and especially memorials to the ‘Great Patriotic War’ is justifiably famous (Ignatieff 1984). Germany also has a rich tradition (Lurz 1985, Weinland 1990). War memorials became so common in France after WWI than
they were mass manufactured (Sherman 1993). Stamps with some ‘victory’ theme were used by all the combatants in World War II. One Egyptian stamp from the 1960s made the Nasserite foreign policy crystal clear: it featured a dagger thrust into Israel.

24. Nor is military iconography always the same. European aesthetics may be unique in this respect (O’Connell 1995).

25. This pattern may be true for Willhemite Germany, but it certainly does not hold for pre-WWI Britain. For example, while Britain sought to honor those who defeated Napoleon, it largely did so through interior memorials not easily accessible to the masses, and as late as 1850 no public monument honored the Duke of Wellington (Colley 1986, Yarrington 1988). Even in modern Israel, Biblical and Talmudic references made up nearly half of street names as compared to less than 10 percent for military/heroic ones (Cohen and Kliot 1981, p. 245). Moreover, heroism can take several forms and does not necessarily imply military action (Levinger 1993).


27. Another characteristic that Latin America shares with North America and Europe is the almost complete absence of women from official iconography. Except for isolated cases of a few female heroines from the wars of independence, women are not to be seen, even in paper monuments. When this began to change in the 1960s, men still dominate the iconography. When women do appear, they do so in traditional roles. For example, I counted thirteen statues or monuments to a generic madre in Buenos Aires alone.


29. Religion retains some influence. Of the 299 Caracas esquinas, the largest number were religious in nature (45 for saints alone) or recalled some past event or figure from the local area. Among the countries of the Southern Cone, Paraguay is the only one with a significant religious presence in its iconography. Not surprisingly, given Ecuador’s reputation for the strength of its faith (Bolivar reportedly referred to it as a convent), the representation of religious figures is the largest of any other city.

30. For a wonderful discussion of how these served to cement U.S. ‘nationhood’ see Murrin 1987.

31. I borrow this distinction from Francisco Antonio Pinto as cited in Vial Correa, p. 130.

32. One iconographic genre where we do find more continent-wide attention paid to the question of race and the creation of a new pueblo is in literature. Works such as El criollo (1935), María (1867), El Zarco (1888), Doña Barbara (1929) and O Guarani (1857) challenged accepted notions of race division and often called for the creation of a new unified nation transcending ethnic divides.

33. Perhaps the best indication of the relative weakness of this sense of common identity is the cosmopolitanism of Latin American iconography. The extent to which citizens of other countries (Latin Americans included) play a major role in public iconography is perhaps unique in the world. Despite its popular reputation for xenophobia, Latin America as a whole is very generous with its honors. It is difficult to imagine the U.S. or European countries devoting 15-30 percent of their monuments and street names to non co-nationals. (Stamps are less exclusive; currencies more so). This reflects several historical legacies: the influence of Enlightenment on independence struggles, later positivism, and the continual pan-continentalism. The point here is not the source, but rather the implication: a state which often honors not itself nor its citizens, but neighbors. Even more remarkable are the cases of statues and street names honoring those against whom the nation fought at one time or another (e.g. Buenos Aires and Montevideo both have streets named after Mariscal López).

34. Considering how important wars have been as themes, or at least locales, for North American and European literature, they play a surprisingly small role in Latin America (Sommer 1991, Merton 1994).

35. Independence also dominates school curricula. In Colombia, for example, the independence conflicts are assigned an entire year of secondary school history while the period after 1830 also receives only a year (Cacua Prada, 1985).

36. The only exception to this pattern is in national anthems. These share a bloodthirsty martial air which is largely absent from other iconographic genres. Five of the eleven relevant anthems feature some variant on the ‘liberty or death’ theme, three others imply battle or conflict
against some oppressor and almost all involve a call for the people to sacrifice or march toward some vaguely military goal.

37. Yet, to a greater extent than most of the other countries, Chile has preserved a liturgy surrounding its dates of military glory. The battle of Yungay (against the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation) is celebrated in front of the monument to the Roto Chileno. On Navy Day (May 21) newspapers feature detailed biographies of Arturo Prat and descriptions of the Battle of Iquique from the War of the Pacific. Army Day (the day following the celebration of Independence) is the scene of military parades and exultation of martial glory. These festivities continued even through the Allende government and, of course, became more central during the Pinochet years. But even in Chile, such festivals have increasingly lost their luster. See El Mercurio, 9/18/92, p. 1.

38. Currency issues also give a much more prominent place to the war against the French. Cinco de mayo (the date of a victory over the French) was celebrated for many years as a mayor holiday in Mexico and was one of the few times that the military played a major role: the annual cohort of draftees would parade in the zócalo and pledge their allegiance. Since the 1970s, however, this ritual has been generally downgraded and now appears to play a minor role south of the border (it has been appropriated by the Mexican-American population).

39. Menem has begun something of a rehabilitation of Rosas (even featuring him on the new currency).

40. The largest monument in Mexico City is devoted to it and occupies the site (and some of the materials) of Porfirio Díaz' proposed legislative palace. Along with the central plaza (zócalo) this is the usual center of state ceremonies (Lorey 1995). The monument to the petroleum nationalization is an extension of this cult. The murals of Diego de Rivera and José Clemente Orozco are also part of this liturgy. They emphasize how the pre-Colombian past, the glory of independence, and the social injustice of the Porfiriato produced the Revolution and the social progress it brought. Schools teach a history which also culminates in the establishment of the post-Revolutionary regime (Vaughn 1986, O'Malley 1982).

41. For example, only independence heroes such as San Martín, Sucre and Bolívar (and their Mexican equivalents) have been honored with province names and they have also received the most numerous place names. The flags of almost all the countries date from this period and many make references to this conflict (e.g. the sol de mayo on the Argentine flag) while national anthems refer to it almost exclusively.

42. On the possible problems associated with this kind of cult (which apply to other countries in Latin America) see Carrera Damas 1983.

43. Brazil appears comfortable with the legacy of the Empire. Nearly a fourth of the monuments and streets honor a person or an event associated with the Empire. Both emperors, for example, have retained their monuments. While imperial references decline with time, the practice continues well into the twentieth century. The Empire also accounts for nearly two-thirds of the major monuments, but this is very likely a reflection of aesthetic styles dominating in the nineteenth and early twentieth Centuries.

44. This is particularly surprising given the political domination by the military in many of these countries. I suggest that the central domestic role of the military may be partly explained by the absence of an external role – as with other institutions the military needed to invent a function in the absence of obvious need. Since much of its actions were oriented towards an internal enemy, these could not be celebrated without political division.

45. See, for example, Mallon 1994 and Thompson 1990.

46. Paraguay is the only country which uses an image of the 'generic soldier' (on the currency).

47. For example, no Latin American university has the roll of the dead that is a feature of every U.S. and British school. Nor are Latin American university students (no matter the prominence of their political role) expected to courageously die for the fatherland on the orders of the state.


49. I borrow the phrase from Weber 1976, p. 110.

50. The use of the U.S. as a handy enemy was also mitigated by the fact that for most of the nineteenth century, it remained the model against which Latin American elites (and especially the victorious Liberals) judged their accomplishments (Aguilar Camin 1993).

51. The rules for indoctrinating schoolchildren in new patriotic values offered by Belgrano in 1813, for example, suggest an opposition between foreigners and Americans, not Argenti-
neans (quoted in Szuchman 1990, p. 114). Interestingly, in light of the themes of this article, we may detect the most coherent sense of a proto-identity within the various colonial militias.


53. While earlier observers blamed nationalism on war (Hayes, 1928), we may wish to reverse the causal order (Smith 1981). It may now be said that ever since the battle of Valmy, modern war and its dependence on conscription has made nationalism necessary (Hobsbawm 1991, p. 83-84). This applies not only to the participants, but to the entire society evolved in treasuring their survival, resenting their defeat, or remembering the dead.

54. These were chosen as part of the larger project on war and statemaking and contain four of the five geopolitical zones of Latin America (excluding Central America and the Caribbean).

55. This presents several problems. First, I am hostage to the sample taken by the different authors. Second, I have had to use sources with widely ranging periods of coverage (e.g. much of the Colombian data are from 1938, that on Lima are from 1993). Given that I am analyzing the distribution on a fairly broad level, I feel that neither problem represented a fatal flaw in my method.

56. I have used Rio as opposed to Brasilia since it gave me an opportunity to analyze historical change in iconography.

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