

Social Protest against Repression and Violence in Present-day Argentina and Peru

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Exactly ten years after the disappearance of Miguel Angel Bru, his family members, friends, fellow-students and neighbours gather in front of the police station, as they do every year.² The meeting starts at 7 p.m. and lasts until 2 a.m., because it is believed that Miguel was tortured and murdered during this period of time. His parents express their gratitude by offering those present a barbecue, which gives the meeting an even more special character: all the people eating, drinking, chatting and sometimes singing in front of the police station, thereby keeping Miguel's memory alive but also showing their dissatisfaction with the eighteen policemen who, besides the two convicted policemen, are also held responsible for Miguel's death, (fieldwork observation Marieke Denissen, La Plata, Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, 17 August 2003).

The defence of our coca leaf is our primary goal. I'm not a dominant leader, like Evo Morales in Bolivia. In the Peruvian *cocaleros*' (coca farmers) movement, a dialogue with the members is very important. For example, some of the leaders in Peru are women. I think women are more honest. They think about their family and children. Some of the men involved in the cultivation of coca are corrupt. They are only interested in the money they can earn when engaged in the illegal drug trade and they are more easily persuaded. At this time it is important to strengthen the coca movement in Peru. They should not wait for my liberation. If the other leaders have a problem with my leadership, I will resign and become the regional leader of Ayacucho, (statement of Nelson Palomino³ on 13 August 2003, leader of the CONPACCP,⁴ in the Yanamilla prison in Ayacucho, Peru).

Everyday life in the Argentine metropolis of Buenos Aires and the remote area of the Peruvian Upper Huallaga Valley could hardly seem to be more different. Yet, these two settings have something in common that warrant a comparative exploration: the many experiences of violent repression that have brought forth new forms of largely peaceful protest by 'ordinary' civilians. In Argentina in 1983 and in Peru in 2000, repression by the State did not cease after the formal end of their internal conflicts. Systematic violence has continued under the formally democratic regimes of both countries. In Argentina, and especially in the province of Buenos Aires, such repression was in the hands of the police. In Peru, coca farmers have suffered under repressive and violent coca eradication efforts. In recent years the repressive role of the Argentine and Peruvian governments has become more indirect through their failure to adequately address the questionable activities of the security forces, and by the criminalization and stigmatization of vulnerable social groups that have been affected by violent repression. The emergence of a diverse array of social movements to address persistent violent practices is a relatively new phenomenon in (greater) Buenos Aires and the Peruvian coca producing regions. As the above fieldwork observations demonstrate, various unconventional forms of civil mobilization and protest characterize the wide range of resistance the movements have to offer.

In this article we aim to explore civil resistance to violent repression by state agencies after the fall of the military dictatorship in Argentina in 1983 and of the Alberto Fujimori government in 2000. In particular we will focus on the Argentine anti-repression movement in (greater) Buenos Aires and on the Peruvian coca

farmers' movement in the Upper Huallaga Valley. This comparison may contribute to the current academic debate on democratic transitions.

Over the past few years, attention has focused on the problematic aspects of democratic consolidation, or the so-called 'fault lines of democracy' (Linz and Stepan 1996; Agüero and Stark 1998; Diamond 1999). The persistence of social and political violence as an expression of the 'unrule of law' or even partial state failure has emerged as one of the crucial problems (Koonings and Kruijt 1999; Mendez et al. 1999). This kind of violence is used either by state agencies that seem to defy the formally established democratic order or by new types of armed actors that exploit the voids left by this very same order (Pereira and Davis 2000; Koonings 2001). As a result, the violence that is either sponsored by state-related actors or provoked by political omission is undermining the quality and legitimacy of democracy (Koonings and Kruijt, 2004).

Current scholarship has begun to acknowledge the importance of this failure to ensure citizens' rights and justice, not only in view of past violations by authoritarian regimes but also in relation to present-day society. The literature often points at the radical or 'uncivil' reactions in society, such as vigilantism and mob justice (Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley 2003). It is therefore particularly noteworthy that the 'new violence', as discussed here for Argentina and Peru, is often met by innovative forms of civil resistance. This may well inject new life into the by now somewhat stale debate on popular protest and social movements in post-authoritarian and post-conflictive Latin America (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998; Eckstein 2001; Foweraker 2001). The key issue is that the problem of violence and violation of the rights of certain citizens has been drawn into the domain of general civil society. The two movements examined here are attempting to give their protest against repression a more solid and legitimate organizational form and link it to the discourse and practice of defending the general public's concern of civil and social citizenship rights.

Past political violence and repression

Past experiences of political violence and state repression in Argentina and Peru show many similarities, among which were the prevailing rationalizations of counter-insurgency and the involvement of the police and 'specialized', sometimes hidden, sectors of the security forces. One key difference, however, was the nature of the political regime responsible for repressive violence. In Argentina, the military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983 was one of the most brutal and arbitrary regimes of the past century. In Peru it was a formal, albeit unstable democracy from 1990 until 1992 when Alberto Fujimori's infamous *autogolpe* in April marked the beginning of what has often been called a civilian authoritarian dictatorship (Kruijt and Tello 2002).⁵

During the dictatorship in Argentina, both the military and the police had taken upon themselves the task of cleaning up 'subversive elements'. The hunt for those subversive elements that, according to the military and the police, threatened traditional Argentine values resulted in many political murders and *desaparecidos* ('the missing'). The disappearances responded to at least five objectives, three of which were tactical: to instil fear in Argentine society, spread confusion in the guerrilla organizations, and avoid martyrdom. The two other objectives concerned the political future of the military forces (Robben 2000). The military leaders knew that

criminal prosecution would be impossible without any *corpora delicti*, and they believed that historical judgment could be decisively influenced in their favour if there were no bodies to mourn, deaths to commemorate or epitaphs to read (Robben 2000, 82-3). In this period Argentinians were not simply deprived of political citizenship (the military had banned all political activity). There was also an attempt made to subjugate Argentinians through social relationships and patterns of authority that marked day-to-day existence – in short, to turn them into ‘obedient infants’ (O’Donnell 1999, 53).

The involvement of the security forces in arbitrary practices was not a new phenomenon in Argentina. It had existed for decades under previous military and democratic governments. Authoritarian solutions to internal security problems were generally regarded as a legitimate way to keep or regain control over the population. The 1976-1983 dictatorship, however, caused a significant change in the perception of most Argentinians. The military had become totally discredited by military incompetence, economic mismanagement, and rage and disbelief following the Dirty War’s atrocities. The military became politically demobilized and retreated, for the most part, back into their barracks.

In some regions of Peru, its Dirty War began in the 1980s and continued until the late 1990s. In the Upper Huallaga Valley, the appearance of Shining Path (*Sendero Luminoso*) went together with the emergence of illegal cocaine cultivation and trade. Farmers in the region became completely dependent on this illegal industry (Poole and Renique 1992). The bonds that were forged during this period between the drug traffickers and the Shining Path guerrillas implied that the farmers had to obey the rules of the guerrillas in order to protect themselves against violent interaction with drug traffickers.

In reaction, the repression of the coca sector in the Upper Huallaga Valley by Peruvian government policies heightened the dispute between the local coca farmers and the national security forces. Violence became endemic in the valley due to the continuous presence of drug traffickers, subversive groups, police forces and armed self-defence groups. The local population especially resented the police forces that were engaged in the eradication of coca fields. The Dirty War and drug-related violence and repression had a direct impact on the local communities. In Santa Rosa, a small hamlet in the Upper Huallaga Valley, Nancy Obregón said the following about her experiences at that time:

During the war there was a military camp on one of the hills overlooking our village, and the other hill was in the hands of Shining Path guerrillas. We were living in the middle of the battlefield, (conversation with Mirella van Dun, 30 August 2003).

Continuing violence and repression

The democratic transitions in Argentina and Peru can be classified as ‘transitions by collapse’. Mounting dissatisfaction with the Argentine dictatorship and the Fujimori government was illustrated by massive public protests and contributed to their rapid downfall. Their legacy became thoroughly discredited and the successor regimes in both countries sought quick action such as legal persecution of key actors from the ousted regimes and the installation of national truth and reconciliation commissions. It may come as a surprise, therefore, that the prevailing rationaliza-

tions of violence and repression by state-related actors have undergone little change in both countries.

The Argentine police forces were left largely undisturbed after the transition to democracy. Yet the continuation of police violence under democratic rule cannot simply be explained as a hangover from the dictatorship. The lack of a thorough reform of the police and security sectors and the overall climate of impunity for crimes committed by the security forces have undermined government policies with respect to the police and their *de facto* right of self-discipline (Sain 2002). The prevalence of hard-line policies as solutions to crime and social and economic crises in recent years may be a plausible explanation for continuing repression as well.

Over the past two decades, the Argentine police in general, and the provincial police of Buenos Aires in particular (known as *El Bonaerense*), have been seen as responsible for many illicit, violent and repressive acts, such as 'pseudo-confrontations', disappearances, kidnappings, torture, extrajudicial killings, and involvement in prostitution, drug and arms trafficking, and they have been known to threaten those who have addressed these violations. The police have also been accused of operating with (criminal) youths from poor neighbourhoods in gangs or using them as informants or illegal sources of money.

The police have been reported as being involved in cleansing operations (similar to the infamous death squad operations with police involvement in Rio de Janeiro) and excessive repression of demonstrations, marches and protests (fieldwork observations of Marieke Denissen, August 2003; *Página/12*, 3 December 2003). In the case of 15-year old Natalia Melmann, for example, Gustavo Fernández, who had been put on probation, was being used as messenger-boy. He told the police on 4 February 2001 that Natalia was walking alone at night. She was picked up and raped by five men of whom at least three were members of the provincial police force of Buenos Aires. Then she was murdered at a place where police officers are known to regularly organize parties and have sexual contacts with prostitutes. Another case concerns the *piqueteros*.⁶ Dario Santillán and Maximiliano Kosteky, who were killed in the 'Massacre of Puente Pueyrredon' in June 2002 when the large crowd of protesters was dispersed by tear gas and rubber bullets fired from a line of 110 police officials. And in October 2003, a massive popular march to protest the death of a detainee in the province of Jujuy was suppressed by the police; one demonstrator was killed, many were severely injured and 30 others were detained. These examples demonstrate that citizens' rights to free expression and protest are far from being well protected.

In response to the alarming reports of police repression, President Kirchner announced dramatic changes just a few months after the start of his term in May 2003. According to the president, corrupt police chiefs and officers would be replaced or forced to resign. In November 2003 Kirchner declared that the police were involved in the majority of the kidnappings in the province of Buenos Aires, and that a large-scale reorganization of the police forces was necessary. Minister of Justice Gustavo Beliz added that the police are structurally corrupt because they receive support from unlawful politicians who finance their election campaigns with illegal money.

Although police involvement in criminal activities had been mentioned almost daily in the media, the kidnapping and murder of Axel Blumberg caused the situation to explode.⁷ As a result the provincial minister of security of Buenos Aires

resigned and Governor Solá declared a state of 'security emergency' in the province of Buenos Aires until the end of 2004. There was a huge mass mobilization to protest growing insecurity and police corruption. Both the government of the province of Buenos Aires, under the leadership of the new Minister of Security León Arslanián, and the national government have presented a plan to combat crime and reform the police. However, solutions for 'the most urgent political problem in Argentina' (*Página/12*, 28 November 2003) are hampered by the difficulty of how to carry out reforms in a police force that for decades has relied upon political support for (selective) repression and the political unwillingness to carry out reforms.

In Peru, the end of the state of emergency, which had placed the Upper Hualлага Valley under military control until March 2000, and the beginning of the new government of President Toledo in June 2001 have led to a national political realignment in the government's position regarding the drug sector and the problems of the local population. As Hugo Cabieses has said on the social situation in the Upper Huallaga Valley and another coca cultivating region of Peru:⁸

The cultivation of coca for the illegal market has contributed to the decline of social relationships in the valleys. In both valleys this has led to a rise of criminality and corruption. The connection between some *cocaleros* and drug smugglers has led to the decrease of social bonds and social organization in the Upper Huallaga Valley, (presentation in Ayacucho, 14 August 2003).

The previous interim government of Valentín Paniagua (November 2000-April 2001) had already instated the forced eradication program in remote regions and at the same time had installed a *Mesa de Diálogo y Concertación* (Negotiation Assembly) that was comprised of coca peasant leaders from different coca cultivating areas, representatives from local governments and officials occupied with alternative development projects. The most important change in perception during the Paniagua interim government was the state's recognition of coca farmers as negotiating partners who were willing, on the one hand, to cooperate in solving the problems related to the ongoing violence and drug trafficking, and on the other, to find substitutes for the failing alternative development programs (Rojas-Pérez 2003).

Paniagua also created a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission whose primary objectives were to investigate the root causes of the armed conflict between the Peruvian state and the guerrillas of Shining Path and Tupac Amaru, the (criminal) responsibilities of involved parties, and the manner in which this had affected the victims. The commission was also mandated to address issues such as inter-ethnic integration and community development. Special mention was made of the Upper Huallaga Valley, which noted the suffering of the local population during the alliance between Shining Path and the drug traffickers.

With the election of President Toledo, the efforts of the state to encourage coca peasants' political participation came to an end. The eradication program, part of the anti-drug policy, led to violent demonstrations in the Upper Huallaga Valley. As Elsa Malpartida (regional leader of the CONPACCP in Tingo María) has said about the eradication activities of the Toledo government:

We know that in Peru we have an overproduction of coca, and we want to solve this problem as well, but according to us total eradication of coca in Peru is not the solution. Many of the alternative development projects fail because they do

not keep the specific characteristics of the region in mind (conversation with Mirella van Dun, 29 August 2003).

The persistent and violent situation in the Upper Huallaga Valley can be closely linked to the ongoing dependence of the region on coca cultivation. The coca farmers are still caught uneasily between the criminal gangs of Peruvian drug lords and the often corrupt and violent Peruvian police forces. The regional leaders of the CONPACCP have been threatened by members of the national police forces. Hugo Cabieses said the following about the arrest of their national leader Nelson Palomino on 21 February 2003:

The actual arrest of Nelson Palomino took place in Ayacucho. Nelson had the strange feeling that the police were after him. He finally went to the regional office of the *Defensoria del Pueblo* to ask for protection, where the police, who wanted to arrest him that day, had followed him inside, but at that time they didn't have a warrant for his arrest. Nelson stayed in the office. After a couple of hours the police officers returned with a warrant and there was nothing the organization could do about it. Nelson Palomino was taken to prison where he remains until today (conversation with Mirella van Dun, 29 August 2003).

Social protest and mobilization

By the end of the 1980s, issues other than the Dirty War crimes were gaining importance for social movements and human rights groups in Argentina, due mainly to rising violence and crime which went hand in hand with a dramatic change in the social perception of insecurity and legitimacy of the State. Several cases of questionable police action had made people realize that Argentine society was still drenched in violence.⁹ During the 1990s family members, friends and neighbours of victims of police violence, human rights activists, journalists, academics, lawyers and *piqueteros* had stepped up their denunciations of violence. In its forms of mobilization and protest this new anti-repression movement has been strongly inspired by the more established (human rights) groups. In recent years, the recently formed anti-repression groups and the groups that address the violence of the last military dictatorship have often joined hands in their protest actions. For example, the 'marches of resistance' that have been taking place in recent years commemorated the victims of institutional violence that had taken place during both the last dictatorship and the following democratic governments. Taking part in the collective struggle, Rosa Bru, mother of Miguel Angel Bru and president of the Miguel Bru Association said:

... they continue killing our children with the same impunity as during the last dictatorship (*Página/12*, 5 December 2002).

Silent marches, the most frequently used form of protest by the anti-repression movement, have expressed four different demands: the demand for ending impunity, the demand for clarification, the demand for a more secure environment, and the demand for keeping the memory of the victims alive. There have also been more aggressive uprisings against police violence, as happened, for example, in August 2002 when angry crowds in the town of El Jagüel (province of Buenos Aires) set fire to the police station because of supposed police involvement in the

kidnapping and murder of 17-year-old Diego Peralta.

Escrachar is another way of showing dissatisfaction with arbitrary police conduct. The *escraches* movement began in the second half of the 1990s by the adult children of disappeared persons to unmask the identity of Dirty War perpetrators of repression and human rights' violations. The perpetrator's house would be plastered, noise would be made to attract attention and photographs of him would be distributed in his neighbourhood. The *escrache* movement emerged as a response to the unresolved impunity for the crimes committed during the last dictatorship. Other groups within the anti-repression movement have also started to use this new form of protest not only to put the perpetrators of repression and violations in the pillory, but also to expose politicians, policemen or the members of an entire police station.

Then there are also novel actions that are often very original. A group of members of various families camped several weeks – with tent and trailer – in front of the court in Quilmes (province of Buenos Aires) to protest against the juridical inefficiency in their cases. They demanded fair trials by '... annoying the court and the police with the tent, trailer and our presence' (conversation with Marieke Denissen, 26 August 2003).

Some groups, often consisting of the family members of victims of police violence, have set up commissions that over the years have gained respectable reputations by organizing meetings and counselling other family members of victims. The Commission of Family Members of Defenceless Victims (COFAVI), for example, has been involved in many cases of victims of police violence.¹⁰ Family members of victims of police violence have formed a commission within the Coordination against Police Repression (Coordinadora contra la Represión Policial e Institucional, CORREPI). Lawyer and activist of CORREPI, María del Carmen Verdú, said the following about the functioning of the commission of family members:

The formation and maintenance of the commission is not easy for various reasons. We are talking about 90 per cent of the victims that are from the lower and excluded classes of society. For them, material problems hinder a weekly reunion. Besides, the majority has no experience in activism. They are people who through mourning the death of a family member have ended up in this area of activism. This keeps many family members from thinking collectively, instead of individually, to understand that 'my son was killed in a police station' is the same as 'mine was killed during a protest' or 'was tortured in prison'. These three cases have things in common. The state is responsible for these deaths (conversation with Marieke Denissen, 6 March 2004)

The *piqueteros*' movement blocks roads and bridges as their way to show dissatisfaction. Unemployed people initially started this movement halfway through 1990s to force the government to create jobs. The movement broadened its objective because so many others had also suffered from extensive, nationwide police repression. Different *piqueteros*' groups block the bridge of Pueyrredon on the 26th day of every month, the day on which the two *piqueteros* Dario and Maximiliano were shot and killed by the police, to demand justice for these murders, and to denounce all police violence.

However, in the 1990s the escalation in demands and forms of protests was matched by State efforts to contain the protests by bringing criminal charges

against protesters. In criminalizing social protest, police repression increased, causing a great number of injuries and even deaths (CELS 2001). In spite of this, mass mobilizations in response to institutional violence has also had results. They caused the resignation of various provincial governments, as happened for example, in Santiago del Estero in March 2004.¹¹

In Peru, the common and prevalent perception about the Upper Huallaga Valley is that no one is involved in any form of social organization or cooperative. Yet there are different forms of organizations such as migrants' associations, producers' committees, and self-defence committees. On the national level, CONPACCP was established by coca farmers during a meeting in Lima on 20 January 2003 to address insecurity and violence in ways that are similar to the better known 'coca growers' movements in Colombia (Putumayo region) and Bolivia (Chapare region) (Cabieses 2003). The eradication efforts by the Toledo government have led to protests including roadblocks and (sometimes violent) demonstrations in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Nancy Obregón (vice-president of the movement) explained why she joined the CONPACCP movement:

In 2000, we the people of Puerto Pizana had to deal with eradication as well, which was by violent force. A good friend of mine became a victim of the violence accompanying the eradication, and this was when I decided to become involved (presentation in Ayacucho, 14 August 2003).

A large majority of the members are coca farmers from the Upper Huallaga Valley and the Apurímac-Ene River Valley, the main coca-cultivating regions in Peru. The main objective of the movement is to be able to have a direct dialogue with the Toledo government, demanding negotiating space and political participation for coca farmers. But one act gave this organization international publicity: the decision to organize a march on the Peruvian capital, Lima, and present their demands to the president. The majority of people participating in this march came from the Apurímac-Ene river Valley and the Upper Huallaga Valley. The coca farmers from the Upper Huallaga Valley started in Tingo María on 8 April and arrived in Lima on 21 April 2003. Some 4,000 coca farmers made the trip to participate in the peaceful demonstration. As a result 32 regional leaders of the coca farmers were eventually invited to speak with the president. Although CONPACCP is not legally registered as a formal organization, it is recognized by President Toledo. One key motive for this march on Lima had been the arrest of their national leader, Nelson Palomino la Serna, in Ayacucho. He had been incarcerated in the maximum-security prison of Yanamilla on charges of 'promoting terrorism' and being part of the still existing Shining Path guerrillas. Police officials said that they had identified protest leaders with links to drug smugglers and had taken the appropriate measures (*The Guardian*, 22 February 2003). According to the members of the CONPACCP these accusations were completely false. To protest his arrest, coca farmers in the Ayacucho department set up roadblocks and skirmished with the police, and at the same time demanded an end to the eradication efforts. To show support, coca farmers from the Upper Huallaga Valley held demonstrations in their own region.

Violence and repression are still part of the everyday lives of the local population in these valleys, and the situation of the cocaleros in Peru remains uncertain. Yet the cocaleros are willing to demonstrate again to demand participation in policymaking which affects their only livelihood resource, namely illegal coca, and to

question the prevailing misconceptions about their problems or their image as coca growers, because, according to Elsa Malpartida: 'We aren't drug smugglers or terrorists' (conversation with Mirella van Dun, 29 August, 2003). For the coca farmers it is important to change the perception of the national government so that the coca farmers are not seen as drug traffickers. There should be a difference between cultivating the coca leaf for the traditional market,¹² and making coca paste or cocaine.

Concluding remarks

Repression in the formally democratic regimes of Argentina and Peru has involved heavy-handed and arbitrary law enforcement. As seen in both cases, this has caused the victimization, stigmatization and exclusion from citizenship rights for distinctive groups in society. Nevertheless, Argentine anti-repression organizations have demanded an end to police arbitrariness and impunity for the crimes committed. In Peru the coca farmers have demanded direct political participation in the new democratic government to bring security into their lives. They want their rights as citizens, but within a context of democratic consolidation. These movements have been using diverse protest methods, such as demonstrations, road-blocks, and marches to gain political access and recognition.

The emergence of social movements in general can be seen as contributing to democratic transition and the development of democracy (Diamond 1999; Dagnino 1998; Linz and Stepan 1996). The movements discussed here no longer accept repression, but are struggling for 'the right to have rights', or what Dagnino (1998, 49) in reference to the Argentine anti-repression movement, has called a 'new citizenship'. They have forcefully demonstrated their discontent with the deficiencies of democracy. However, these very deficiencies are what have made them especially vulnerable to more state repression. The suppression by Argentine and Peruvian state institutions of social movements that protest state repression can be seen as a rejection of the legitimate claims made by their citizens, thereby denying these groups their citizens' rights. This is an alarming tendency that continues to frustrate further democratic consolidation.

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Notes

1. The authors would like to take the opportunity to express gratitude to the colleagues of the department of Cultural Anthropology for their comments. We are also grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable suggestions.
2. Miguel Angel Bru was a 23-year-old journalism student who, after being detained on 17 August 1993 in a police station in La Plata, was never seen again. His relatives, friends and fellow-students established the 'Asociación de Miguel Bru' to address the issue of police violence and impunity.
3. The statement of Nelson Palomino on 13 August 2003 was an oral statement made in the Ayacucho prison where he is being detained, during a visit from a delegation of which author Mirella van Dun was a member.
4. Confederación Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios de la Cuencas Cocaleros del Perú (National Confederation of Agricultural Producers of the Peruvian Coca-growing Valleys).
5. In Peru, the Fujimori government lasted from 1990-2000.
6. *Piqueteros* is a collective term for the members of jobless workers' movements.
7. Axel Blumberg was murdered on 23 March 2004. Although the criminal investigation is still going on, there is no doubt that police were involved. Federal Police Chief Juan José Schettino has been detained for covering up the kidnapping and murder, and some officials of *el Bonaerense* are being investigated for aiding in the cover-up.
8. Hugo Cabieses is a Peruvian economist; advisor to the national investigation commission of congress on corruption in 1990-2000, especially on drug trafficking and money laundering; director of the civil association 'Desarrollo Rural Integral Sustentable' (DRIS); and advisor of the Confederación Nacional de Productores Agropecuarios de la Cuencas Cocaleros del Perú.
9. One of the first well-documented cases of police violence in democratic Argentina was the 'Massacre of Ingeniero Budge' in 1987. The residents from a working-class neighbourhood gained national attention when they started a trial against three policemen accused of murdering three youths (Gingold 1991).
10. COFAVI was established in 1992 and was one of the first of its kind.
11. The national government subsequently intervened in Santiago del Estero because of the 'crime of la Darsena' in which powerholders, so-called 'hijos del poder' (children of power[holders]) and the police appeared responsible for the deaths of Leyla Nazar and Patricia Villalba.
12. Peru has an Andean tradition of chewing the coca leaf or using it to prepare tea.

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